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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the development of the local self- 
government organizations of Shandong Province, with particular 
reference to Jinan Prefecture, in the second half of the sixteenth 
century. It is mainly based on contemporary documents and also on 
other information included in the earliest available gazetteers for 
each subprefecture and district of Jinan. The most important local 
self-government organization was the Z'i-j'La which during this period 
was no longer organized strictly according to the number of households. 
The duties performed in the Z'Z-j'Za were regarded as corvee and the 
Z'Z-j'Za was also closely connected with the conscription of other 
corvee and the levy of taxes.
The Z-Z-j’ia, together with the local self-government position of 
tax collector (da-hu), was around 1550 still a very active part of the 
fiscal administration of the province. Later reforms increased 
reliance upon the more capable persons in local self-government and 
also increased the involvement of officials in the levy of taxes and 
corvee. The Zi-leaders were conscripted from wealthy households, and 
as such households were also conscripted to the heaviest duties in 
other corvee this in effect amounted to a progressive taxation upon 
them and consequently to increased tax fraud by them. The result was 
that the households registered as the wealthiest and thus selected as 
leaders in the local self-government system were no longer in fact the 
wealthiest and most powerful households.
Reforms in the tax and corvee system were directed towards 
eliminating this progressive taxation and its bad effects by a uniform 
or greatly simplified system of levy called the Single Whip. This 
reform was probably introduced in most districts of Jinan by the turn 
of the century. At the same time the involvement of the local self- 
government system in fiscal administration was greatly reduced.
iv
The non-fiscal functions of the local self-government system had 
previously been performed by Z-i-elders. These still existed but 
their role had changed to become predominantly fiscal. The second 
half of the sixteenth century saw a growing interest in strengthening 
the non-fiscal side of local self-government. The li-jia was no 
longer suitable as a unit for this function so various other 
organizations such as the bao-j-ia and xiang-yue were created. They 
were established in many districts of Jinan, particularly after 1587, 
for all kinds of non-fiscal duties, not least for the organization of 
welfare granaries. There are signs that these new institutions were 
drawn into fiscal work. However they do not appear to have functioned 
for more than a few years.
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INTRODUCTION
The Ming dynasty has over the last twenty to thirty years aroused 
increased interest and research by historians. This contrasts with 
the situation during the Qing dynasty when — apart from official 
historiographical work such as the Ming shi — Chinese scholars found 
less controversial topics in their study of earlier periods, and 
contrasts also with the situation in early Western sinology which was 
chiefly concerned with the classical period (pre-Han and Han) and the 
culturally more illustrious Tang and Song dynasties. This work by 
both the Qing scholars and the Western sinologists was usually 
combined with intensive philological and literary studies. These 
provided invaluable tools for the understanding of Chinese history and 
culture also help us to understand the background for the later 
periods of Chinese history.
This increased interest in the Ming is quite understandable.
Many historians came to realize that this dynasty — with its firm 
amalgamation of traditional Chinese concepts with foreign influences 
from the Liao, Jin and Yuan dynasties — was the period when many 
institutions emerged which influenced Chinese history well into the 
twentieth century. Another reason for this interest is, of course, 
that historians naturally incline towards periods and topics which 
have been inadequately studied. This is my reason for working on the 
Ming period. Furthermore this dynasty is attractive to historians who 
do not want to indulge in lengthy philological analysis. This does 
not mean that we do not encounter textual problems similar to those of 
the previous periods, but that we often have documents relating to 
specific events or institutions and do not have to rely upon the 
philologically tedious work of identifying passages which have been 
included in longer narratives. This work has to be done in some cases 
and the lack of dates and the use of varying literary names in many 
Ming documents still leaves the historian with considerable tasks of 
identification.
2The beginning of Ming historical studies in the West can be 
closely connected with the names of Professors Wolfgang Franke and 
Charles 0. Hucker. The former published his preliminary notes on Ming 
sources in 19481 2 and twenty years later a revised and extended edition,
An Introduction to the Sources of Ming History (Kuala Lumpur-Singapore,
1968). This annotated list of sources is not intended to be 
comprehensive — indeed the SDJHL, the single most important source for 
this thesis, is not included — but it still provides both the beginner 
and the advanced student of the period with a firm starting-point and 
gives us advantages not available for other periods of Chinese history. 
Hucker's main contribution has been his article on government 
organization which provides a good survey of the bureaucracy. Perhaps 
equally important is that his translations of titles and names for 
institutions in this article, although sometimes irritating, have been 
accepted as standard for works in English. In his work on the 
censorial system and in his pamphlet on the traditional state in Ming 
times Hucker has also attempted to explain the important features of 
Ming government in such a way that scholars from other disciplines can 
benefit from his analysis.3 In this respect, he has certainly set a 
good example for younger scholars in the field.
The main work on Ming fiscal history has been done by Ray Huang 
in his book on taxation and financial administration in the sixteenth 
century.14 To write such a work at the present stage of research 
was very audacious and the student of selected topics in the 
period may find mistakes and inadequacies as I found in the 
case of Shandong. This however does not detract from its
1 Wolfgang Franke, Preliminary Notes on the Important Chinese 
Literary Sources for the History of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644),
Studia Serica Monographs Series A, No. 2 (Chengtu, 1948).
2 Charles 0. Hucker, "Governmental Organization of the Ming 
Dynasty", HJAS 21 (1958), 1-66; Charles 0. Hucker, "An Index to the 
Terms and Titles in 'Governmental Organization of the Ming Dynasty'",
HJAS 23 (1960-1961), 127-151; both reprinted in John L. Bishop,
Studies of Governmental Institutions in Chinese History, (Cambridge,
Mass., 1968), pp.57-151.
3 Charles 0. Hucker, The Traditional Chinese State in Ming Times 
(1368-1644), (Tucson, 1961); Charles 0. Hucker, The Censorial System 
of Ming China, (Stanford, 1966).
14 Ray Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance in Sixteenth- 
Century Ming China, (Cambridge, 1974).
3overall value as it provides us with a much needed framework for more 
detailed studies. This was presumably the intention of the author. 
Local studies have also been carried out. A very useful one is by 
Michel Cartier on Chun’an District, Zhejiang Province, Une Re forme 
Locale en Chine au XVIT* 6 Siede. Hai Rui ä Chun3an 1556-1562 (Paris,
La Haye, 1973), largely based upon the works of Hai Rui. The 
extensive description of local institutions by Hai Rui has enabled 
Cartier to give a lucid account of district administration and the 
reforms carried out by Hai Rui. Unfortunately such comprehensive 
descriptions only exist for very few districts and in most cases we 
have to draw upon information scattered throughout local gazetteers 
and other sources. This has been the case with this thesis.
So far, the major outcome of the growing interest in Ming studies 
is the publication of the monumental Dictionary of Ming Biography 
(New York, 1975), edited by L. Carrington Goodrich and Chaoying Fang 
with contributions from scholars all over the world (but with the bulk 
of the biographies written by the editors and a few other 
collaborators). The DMB took seventeen years to complete. It was 
impatiently awaited and is now the joy — and despair — of the 
profession. It is particularly strong in political and cultural 
history and must list just about every European who was in China 
during the Ming dynasty, together with many other foreigners. This 
will perhaps make the work more useful for non-specialists in Ming 
history and thus introduce the field to them. If this happens then 
the editors' selection will be justified even though it has resulted 
in an unfortunate weakness with regard to institutional and economic 
history of the period.
Chinese scholars have also paid increasing attention to the Ming 
period. Most impressive is perhaps the pioneering work beginning in 
the 1930s of Liang Fang-zhong on the fiscal history of the Ming 
period.5 Interest in the Ming was also very strong during the 1950s. 
This was stimulated by the discussion of periodization in Chinese 
history and many articles were written within the overall theme of the 
'budding of capitalism'.6 A leading Ming historian and Communist
J See Huang, pp.372-383.
6 Zhong-guo zi-ben zhu-yi meng-ya wen-ti tao-lun-ji, 3 vols, 
(Peking, 1957).
4Party member Wu Han was in 1966 one of the main targets for criticism 
in the Cultural Revolution because of his play about Hai Rui. We can 
only hope that the study of Ming history is continuing in China but so 
far very little has been published since the Cultural Revolution.
Japanese scholars have also paid great attention to the Ming 
period over the last twenty to thirty years. Numerous articles and 
several books have appeared, many of them concerning the fiscal and 
local self-government systems. Although I have not yet been able to 
read all the Japanese literature on Ming economic and institutional 
history, my indebtedness to these scholars is enormous as will be 
apparent from my footnotes and bibliography. An effort which deserves 
particular mention is the publication of bibliographical andybiographical aids under the direction of Yamane Yukio. In this field
oscholars in Taiwan have also made useful contributions.
AN OUTLINE OF MING ADMINISTRATION
1. Political trends and administrative changes
The Ming dynasty was founded in 1368 with the capital in Nanking 
by Zhu Yuan-zhang who took the reign title of Hong-wu. From 1381 he 
established himself as the most powerful ruler hitherto in Chinese history 
when he abolished the Secretariat headed by a Chief Counsellor. This 
office had in the past assisted the emperor in co-ordinating the work 
of the various ministries and agencies but had at the same time acted 
as the spearhead of the bureaucracy in cases where it disagreed with 
the emperor, that is as a check of his power. The abolition of the 
Secretariat removed this counterbalance and in the following years the 
strong personality of Zhu-Yuan-zhang exercised virtually unrestrained 
despotic power, while at the same time he showed considerable interest 
in promoting effective and largely benevolent measures for population 
control.7 89 The abolition of the Secretariat had however the result
7 Yamane Yukio, Mindaishi kenkyü hunken mokuroku, (Tokyo, 1960); 
Yamane Yukio, Nihon genson Mindai chihöshi denki sakuin ko, (Tokyo, 
1961).
8 Guo-li Zhong-yang Tu-shu-guan, Minq-ren chuan-di zi-tiao suo-yin, 
2 voIs, (Taipei, 1963-1966).
DMB, pp.381-392.9
5that the bureaucracy lost overall leadership if the emperor was not 
able, willing, or had no time to rule personally. The most notable 
example of this was the Wan-li emperor (1573-1619) who for years on 
end refused to handle government affairs.10 Some leadership was 
exercised by the grand secretaries who were appointed from 1382 
onwards to assist the emperor in handling paperwork and who gradually 
came to be regarded as the leaders of the government. But their 
position was more informal and precarious than that of the former 
Grand Counsellors and they often had to compete for power with the 
eunuchs.* 11
When Zhu Yuan-zhang died in 1398 he left the empire firmly under 
the control of his dynasty and well on the way to economic recovery. 
However there was one important weakness. He had enfeoffed his sons 
as princes in various parts of the empire, notably on the northern 
frontier, with direct command over the troops stationed in their area. 
His successor was the son of his eldest son, Zhu Yun-wen, who became 
emperor at the age of twenty. Zhu Yun-wen adopted the policy of 
stripping his princely uncles of their real power which led to the 
uprising of the fourth son of Zhu Yuan-zhang, the Prince of Yan Zhu Di. 
This was the so-called Jiag-nan Incident. After many setbacks the 
forces of Zhu Di finally conquered Nanking in 1402:6 and he became 
emperor with the reign title of Yong-le.12 Much attention was over 
the next fifty years devoted to foreign policy. Zhu Di led several 
expeditions across the northern frontiers to pacify the Mongols; he 
occupied Annam and launched several maritime expeditions to Southeast 
Asia and the Indian Ocean. The culmination of these foreign policy 
ventures was the defeat of the Chinese army in 1449 by the Oirats and 
the capture of the Zheng-tong emperor. The following years saw almost 
constant unrest on the northern border but major military campaigns 
were only undertaken in the middle of the sixteenth century when the 
Mongols made major incursions and even came in sight of Peking. At 
the same time the government had to fight major campaigns against 
pirates on the south coast. A major military campaign was also 
launched in the north in the 1590s against the Japanese who had
10 Ibid., pp.326-327.
11 Hucker (1958), pp.29-31.
12 DMB, pp.398-404.
6invaded Korea.
During the Hong-wu period there had been some distribution of 
land by settling households on uncultivated land and also by breaking 
up the estates of wealthy households. The fifteenth century saw a 
reversal of this with the concentration of land in private hands and 
the consequent impoverishment of the peasants leading to social unrest 
and several uprisings. The most important of such uprisings for 
Shandong were the bandit incursions in 1510-1511 led by the brothers 
Liu Liu and Liu Qi.14 They were eventually defeated but not before 
they had managed to ravage several districts and conquer district 
towns.15 This resulted in a sharp increase in the construction of 
walls and fortifications around district towns of the province.16
The weakness of the central government organization set up by the 
Hong-wu emperor was evident in the sixteenth century. For two-thirds 
of this century the throne was occupied by only two emperors, with the 
reign titles of Jia-jing and Wan-li. The Jia-jing emperor may 
personally have been a capable man and he took some interest in the 
government but his reign was marred first by the controversy over his 
succession and later by his indulgence in and dependence upon Taoist 
practices. This together with factional struggles in the bureaucracy 
weakened the power of the government over the local bureaucracies.
This situation was to a certain extent remedied under the Wan-li 
emperor; not by his personal intervention, as he showed little 
interest in government, but by a powerful and effective trimvirate of 
his mother Li-shi, the chief eunuch Feng Bao and the grand secretary 
Zhang Ju-zheng. The mere fact that stability and consolidation of 
government authority depended upon collaboration between persons not 
acting as recognized leaders of the bureaucracy did not augur well for 
the future and after the fall and degradation of Zhang Ju-zheng in 
1583 many of his policies introduced were either reversed or not 
enforced by his adversaries. With the inattentiveness of the emperor
13 Herbert Franke and Rolf Trautzettel, Das Chinesische Kaiserreich, 
Fischer Weltgeschichte vol. 19 (Frankfurt, 1968), pp.257-258; DMB, 
pp.832-834.
14 Li Guang-bi, Ming-chao shi-Züe, (Hubei, 1957), pp.88-90.
15 E.g. Chccngshan xian-zhi 1716/2/2.
16 Leling xian-zhi 1762/1/55; Taian zhou-zhi 1671/1/3.
7in the following years the administration became increasingly 
difficult as decisions were difficult to take, and perhaps even more 
importantly appointments to key positions were not made, so that the 
central bureaucracy found it hard to cope even with day-to-day 
administration. At the same time factional struggles in the 
bureaucracy reached their peak in the aftermath of the controversies 
over Zhang Ju-zheng and other important matters such as the site of
1 7the imperial tomb and the succession.
The sixteenth century also saw considerable changes in fiscal 
policy. From the beginning of the dynasty taxes had been paid in 
grain, and corvee had been performed as labour. When money was used 
by the government to pay for purchases of grain and also in the case 
of some tax payments it was in the form of paper currency which had 
been introduced by Zhu Yuan-zhang but which was not accepted for a 
long period because too many notes had been issued. Tax payments in 
silver had begun in 1436 and the commutation of both taxes and corvee 
into payments of silver became gradually accepted although this 
process was probably not completed before the end of the dynasty.
Taxes continued to be assessed in grain, and corvee in the number of 
persons required to perform it or the amount of material to be 
delivered to the government. Corvee had become increasingly heavy 
since the early years of the dynasty and as it was levied according to 
tax classes assessed on the wealth of the households and the number of 
their adult men {ding), this meant that progressive taxation on the 
wealthy households had become increasingly heavy. As could be 
expected, this led to increasing tax evasion, further facilitated by 
tampering with the privileged exemptions for some taxes and corvee 
granted to families of officials and examination graduates. Several 
reforms were introduced in the sixteenth century aiming at rectifying 
this situation, and from about 1530 many of them were known under the 
generic term 'Single Whip' or 'Uniform Assessment' (yi-tiao-bian-fa)• 
The general trend of these reforms was that the corvee as levied upon 
persons and households was to be abolished and incorporated into the 
land tax and that all taxes were to be levied in one consolidated 
payment in silver, perhaps paid in several instalments. The Single
1 7 DMB, pp.315-321, 324-338.
8Whip in Shandong was however in its first form used to abolish the 
granary rates levied on tax payments according to tax classes. Thus 
the aim of the Single Whip could perhaps more appropriately be 
described as a policy to end, or at least greatly simplify, 
progressive taxation — not to please the wealthy (as they had often 
managed to manipulate themselves into the lower tax classes) —  but 
rather to secure that all households paid at least in proportion to 
their economic strength. The Single Whip originated in the south and 
when it was introduced in the north it met with considerable 
resistance from local people who claimed that conditions there were 
unsuitable for the levy of corvee on land. The introduction of this 
system no doubt created problems but the general conclusion of this 
thesis is that the Single Whip with modifications introduced to suit 
local conditions was an improvement in Shandong over the tax system 
which it replaced and that the opponents of the Single Whip did not 
put up any better alternatives. Taxes were probably never fully 
collected in the districts; in the second half of the sixteenth
1 8century an 80% completed collection was regarded as an achievement.
With the increase in expenditure in the 1590s due to the military 
campaigns against the Japanese in the north and also to palace 
expenditures, the emperor demanded more and more in taxes and in 1599 
he sent eunuchs to each province as taxation supervisors. In the same 
year an uprising in Shandong resulted in the murder of thirty-seven 
henchmen of the local tax eunuch.15 So the period under study ended 
on a note of government oppression and discontent in Shandong.
2. The bureaucracy
The central bureaucracy was divided into the ministries and other 
agencies in the capital, with branch offices in some provinces. In 
the sixteenth century the Ministry of Revenue had a granary branch 
office (cang-fen-si) and a transport branch office (dui-fen-si) in 
Shandong.21
18 Huang, passim.
19 DMB, p.332.
20 This section is mostly based upon Hucker (1958), passim.
21 Jinan fu-zhi 1839/25/17-23.
9The military bureaucracy was divided into five commissions with 
administrative control over the forces in specific areas of the 
country. The only branch of the bureaucracy which appears to have 
been unitary was the censorate which every year sent a regional 
inspector to each province to supervise the local administration. In 
the sixteenth century Shandong also had a censor for salt 
administration (xun-jan-jian-oha-yu-shi),22 The provincial 
administration was also divided into three branches, one each for 
civilian and military administration and one for censorial or 
surveillance duties. The latter had in the sixteenth century lost 
most of its censorial character and had become merely a judicial 
bureaucracy but it also had administrative duties in the military 
defence circuits. There were originally no single co-ordinators of 
the provincial administration. Beginning in the fifteenth century 
grand co-ordinators or governors were appointed in some provinces or 
other areas where and when unified leadership was necessary. In some 
areas these appointments were only temporary but Shandong had a 
governor continuously from before 1500. The position of governor 
was never recognized during the Ming dynasty as a substantive 
appointment so governors were at the same time given nominal 
appointments in the ministries and the censorate.
The provinces were divided into several circuits for different 
purposes with deputy officials in the provincial administration and 
surveillance offices appointed as circuit intendants. The circuits 
had specific functions and the province was covered by one or more 
circuits for each function. Shandong had in the sixteenth century 
three general administration circuits, one for ’troop purification’, 
one for education, one for postal services and finally six military 
defence circuits. More permanent territorial divisions of the 
provinces were the prefectures, subprefectures and districts.
Shandong had six prefectures and Jinan Prefecture had four sub­
prefectures and twenty-six districts.25 The prefectures exercised a
22 Ibid. 25/12-17.
23 Ibid. 25/2-4.
24 SDJHL 7/10.
25 DMHD 15/24-28.
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supervisory role over the subprefectures and districts and the four 
subprefecturcs also supervised the districts under their jurisdiction. 
Only eleven of the districts in Jinan came under a subprefecture; the 
others were directly under the prefecture. The subprefecture differed 
functionally from the prefecture in that it was directly responsible 
for an area, acting as a district under direct prefectural control in 
addition to its supervisory role.
Government personnel consisted of regular officials and lesser 
functionaries assisted by a number of clerical staff. Admission to 
the career of regular official was usually on the basis of examination. 
In Jinan Prefecture most of the district magistrates had passed the 
metropolitan examination and obtained the gin-shi degree or at least 
passed the provincial examination and obtained the ju-ren degree.
Other avenues to official appointments were also open but in the 
sixteenth century they seldom led to higher office and even such 
appointments were usually the result of some education. The reliance 
upon education and examination for official appointments allowed some 
social mobility in the bureaucracy but one should be careful not to 
overestimate this because with few exceptions education was no doubt 
the privilege of the families who could afford to send their offspring 
to schools, or even better to hire private tutors. Emphasis on the 
education of officials also led to regional imbalance in recruitment, 
as more officials (particularly those in higher offices) came from the 
economically and culturally richer provinces around the lower Yangtze 
river and the south coast.26 This became one of the issues in 
Shandong during the discussion of the Single Whip, as it was claimed 
that the officials from the south introduced this southern method into 
the north. However there was also a tendency to appoint officials to 
provinces close to their own, so that the number of officials in 
Shandong recruited from northern provinces was probably greater than 
the overall proportion of northerners in the bureaucracy as a whole.
Whether the appointment of officials from nearby provinces who 
would have had better knowledge of local conditions was a 
consideration in government policy is difficult to determine. However
26 James B. Parsons, "The Ming Dynasty Bureaucracy" in Charles 0. 
Hucker, ed., Chinese Government in Ming Times, (New York and London, 
1969), pp.186-188.
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a list of the governors appointed from .1522 to 1619 docs give the 
impression that during periods when the government exercised
relatively effective control it was more inclined 
northerners to the governorship of Shandong:27
to appoint
Year Southerners/Westerners Northerners
1522-1539 4 6
1530-1569 20 1
1570-1583 1 5
1584-1619 11 4
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN MING
1. Scope and limits of the investigation
This thesis will investigate the local self-government system of 
the Ming dynasty. As this system was the point of contact between the 
bureaucracy and the people, such an investigation must use the sources 
which relate to the lowest level of the administration in the 
districts, where the bureaucracy was in direct contact with the people. 
To use the sources at this level for the whole country was obviously 
impossible, as there were in the sixteenth century c. 1,400 districts 
in the empire. The geographical scope of the investigation was 
therefore reduced to one province. The choice of Shandong (excluding 
the Liaodong Regional Military Commission) was rather arbitrary. The 
province was interesting because it does not belong to the 
economically and culturally richer provinces in the south which abound 
in available sources and which have so far been the focal point of 
most research on local history in the Ming. It was not on the border 
with the special problems existing there nor in the far south and west 
where special circumstances were created by the presence of large 
numbers of non-Chinese inhabitants under their 'native' 
administrations. Shandong was at the same time important for the 
government, as the main traffic between the south and the capital and 
the northern border defences went through the western part of the 
province. Finally the availability of the Shandong Jing-hui-tu as one 
of the main sources made the province very attractive.
2 7 Jinccn fu-zhi 1839/25/2-4.
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As this thesis was to a large extent to "be based upon local 
gazetteers I considered this a good opportunity to attempt to use 
gazetteers from all districts within an administrative division rather 
than to make selections from scattered districts without regard for 
developments in their neighbouring districts. The latter has been the 
approach of most of the Japanese literature and has proved valuable 
because districts with more informative sources can be selected. Many 
of the initial problems in Ming institutional history have been solved 
in this way, but to get a deeper understanding of local institutions 
an exhaustive study of a limited area could be useful.
Shandong Province with over 100 subprefectures and districts was 
too large an area if gazetteers from all districts were to be 
collected and processed, so Jinan Prefecture was chosen for special 
consideration. This choice was made first of all because late Ming 
gazetteers were available for thirteen of the thirty subprefectures 
and districts. The prefecture was also largely unaffected by the 
problems of the corvee on the Grand Canal while it was still an 
important centre of communication as it was transversed by the trunk 
road from Peking to the south (see p p . 133-13*0.
Jinan Prefecture bordered to the north on Beizhili and the sea 
(Bohai) and on its other sides to Qingzhou, Yanzhou and Dongchang 
Prefectures of Shandong Province. The northern part of the prefecture 
is an alluvial plain which has been created by the Huang River. In 
Ming times this plain was transversed by several rivers of which the 
most important was the Daqing River. The part of the prefecture south 
of the line east-north-east from Licheng through Zhangqiu, Zouping 
and Changshan is covered by mountains with steep escarpments on the 
northern side. The average height of the mountains is 300-500 m, the 
highest peak being the Tai Mountain standing at 152*+ m.28
The main crops in the prefecture were winter wheat harvested 
before the middle of the year, and kaoliang and millet with a variety 
of minor crops. The land was reasonably fertile but the mountains had 
large tracts of land wThich could not be cultivated and they were not 
always suited for forestry as they were rugged and infested with
28 The Times Atlas cf China (London, 197*+), pp . 32-35 ; Shandong 
tong-zhi 1533/1.
13
tigers.29 In the north-east the land had a high salinity which made it 
unsuitable for profitable cultivation. This may have been alleviated 
by the spread of cotton cultivation as a cash crop of which there is 
evidence in the province during the Wan-li period,30 but Zhanhua 
District reported in l6l9 that the production of cotton was still
O Tbarely sufficient to provide the households with their own needs.
These topographical and economic differences within the prefecture 
may have influenced the administrative development in the various 
parts of the prefecture but the sources do not give any conclusive 
evidence of this. Information on the size of the population is also 
too scanty to make any definite statement but I suggest that the 
figure may have been around three millions (see Appendix III). The 
prefecture was in this period constantly subjected to natural 
calamities -such as floods, drought and pests. Each district and 
subprefecture reported such calamities at regular Intervals of only 
a few years, and few if any of the districts avoided famines at 
least once during the period 1550-l600.
The time-limit for the investigation of conditions in Jinan 
Prefecture (and to some extent in the whole province) was chosen for 
several reasons. The period under investigation had to be in the late 
Ming in order to get reasonable coverage from the local gazetteers and 
this also had the advantage of making it possible to study to what 
extent the local self-government system of the early years of the 
dynasty was still in operation. The starting date of 1550 was chosen 
arbitrarily but has proved to be a fortunate choice because it largely 
coincided with the introduction of the first Single Whip in Shandong 
and because the period 1550-1570 is well covered by the SDJHL. The 
closing date of l600 was chosen so that the investigation would not 
have to consider the changes which took place during the final 
decline of the dynasty and the wars in the first part of the 
seventeenth century.
The chronological sequence of the developments in the province
29 Zichuan xian-zhi l602/10/l.
30 Nishijima Sadao , "Mindai ni okeru momen no fukyu ni tsuite" , 
Shigaku Zasshi 57 (19^8), 295.
31 Zhanhua xian-zhi 1619/3/65.
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and prefecture has been attempted in chapters III and IV, the former 
covering the period until c. 1570 and the latter the rest of the 
century. Documents and events have as far as possible been dated to 
fit them into this sequence but this has not always been possible. I 
doubt whether greater chronological accuracy is possible given the 
kind of sources used for this thesis. Such a chronological approach 
has been possible (and perhaps necessary) because of the geographical 
limitations put on the research and I think that the results obtained 
here warrant further regional investigations along the same lines, 
rather than the selective research without regard for a strict 
chronological sequence which is seen in much of the early work on 
Ming institutional history. This thesis at the same time indicates 
that such research is best carried out in areas for which important 
collections of documents and narratives are available in addition to 
the local gazetteers.
2. Sources
Local gazetteers
The main sources used in this thesis have been the local 
gazetteers for each district of Jinan Prefecture. The principle 
behind their selection has been to use the earliest available 
gazetteer for each subprefecture and district, and when this edition 
was compiled before 1600 to use the following edition as well. Such 
double coverage is also provided for some other districts notably 
those with an earliest available edition compiled during the first 
half of the seventeenth century. The earliest available gazetteer 
dates in a few districts from the nineteenth century but generally 
they were compiled before 1700. All these gazetteers were available 
in microfilm. Some of the earlier editions are marred by textual 
damage. This may be a matter of missing chapters or pages or a few 
undecipherable lines or characters — sometimes irritatingly in the 
middle of a text which promised interesting information but which was 
rendered useless in this way.32
3 2 The damage is not entirely confined to early editions. A micro­
film was obtained from the Library of Congress of the 1771 edition of
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The officials and local scholars collaborated in compiling the 
local gazetteers. Both had an interest in such compilations as a 
gazetteer gave prestige to the district. For the officials the 
gazetteer furthermore served as a quick and convenient introduction to 
the district when they first arrived. The content of the gazetteers 
is a reflection of the interests of their compilers and all follow 
more or less the same pattern. In addition to a historical and 
topographical description of the subprefecture or district a major 
part of the gazetteers consists of descriptions of local government 
and educated people. Public buildings and monuments are listed 
usually with a detailed history of their construction and repairs, and 
the administration of the district is described together with 
institutions such as schools and granaries. Names of the district 
officials are listed as far back as the records allowed, usually 
including a few illustrious officials from earlier dynasties and a 
comprehensive list at least from the sixteenth century. Examination 
graduates are listed usually for the whole dynasty, and biographies 
are included of meritorious officials and local examination graduates 
together with other persons who deserved special attention such as 
recluses and virtuous women. The latter seem to have been mostly from 
educated families. Some information relevant to this thesis have been 
gained from these sources but the single most important part of the 
gazetteers has been the chapters on taxes and corvee, since they often 
give some information on the fiscal role of the local self-government 
system. Some information can also be gained from the sections on 
local customs and products. Finally most gazetteers have a large 
section entitled 'Literature* in which important writings of officials 
or local people are quoted in extenso. Tablets composed for the 
inauguration of newly constructed and repaired buildings and monuments, 
or descriptions of other major construction work such as water-control, 
are predominant in this section. Some tablets give details as to how 
the finance and manpower for the work was raised, mostly by 
impositions on the people in the district, and they give the 
impression that such work must have represented a considerable burden
the Licheng District gazetteer but not one single page is wholly 
decipherable so this copy is completely useless. This is however an 
exception as later editions are generally in better condition. In the 
case of the 1796 edition of the Deping gazetteer the binding is how­
ever such that one line per page often fails to appear on the micro­
film.
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in addition to normal taxes and corvee. This 'Literature' section 
also contains a few descriptions of taxes and corvee and occasionally 
of the local self-government system. Unfortunately most of these 
descriptions are for the Qing period. This section also includes some 
administrative documents, sometimes concerning the district itself but 
every so often documents composed by local men on higher government 
service outside the province. This raises the question whether 
documents relating to Jinan can be found in gazetteers of other parts 
of the empire. This is possible but for this thesis neither time nor 
resources were available for a systematic perusal of home-district 
gazetteers of Shandong officials. Such work will have to be postponed 
until more gazetteers are available in reprint and until indexes are — 
hopefully — published.
Shandong Jing-hui-lu
The single most important source has been the Shandong Jzng-hui-- 
lu which was compiled in the provincial administration of Shandong in 
1571:10. This work has been used by Liang Fang-zhong and a copy was 
found in 1958 by Iwami Hiroshi in a private library in Japan. It has 
twelve chapters with a total of 928 pages. It is divided into six 
parts: taxes (Ch. 1-4), equal corvee (Ch. 5-9), 1■'i-j'ia (Ch. 10),
postal services (Ch. 11), horse administration and salt administration 
(Ch. 12). Each part is further divided into four sections: tables 
(heng-tu) giving the levied figures for each item in each district in 
1571, summaries (zong-e) of these figures, changes (yin-ge) — 
particularly since 1540 — and finally documents and deliberations (fu- 
lu) relating to major changes. The preface is fragmentary (together 
with the last few pages of Ch. 12, the only damaged part) so its 
authorship cannot be established but there is sufficient information 
to show that it was compiled in the provincial administration perhaps 
with the administration commissioner as editor-in-chief.34 The work
33 Liang Fang-zhong, "Ming-dai yi-tiao-bian-fa nian-biao", Lingnan 
xue-hao 12.1 (1952), 19.
3 4 The Left administration commissioner in Shandong was until 1571: 
10:5 Wang Zong-mu, who was the author of a work titled Dong-sheng 
jing-zhi-lu. Ray Huang who wrote the biography of Wang in DMB but has
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was probably a forerunner of the later Comprehensive Registers on 
Taxes and Corvee (fu-yi-quan-shu) and it is known that similar works
3 5existed in other provinces during the Jia-jing period.
The most important sections for this thesis have been the fu-lu 
sections, particularly the deliberations and documents about the 
Single Whip. Deliberations are intermingled with decisions by the 
governors so it is sometimes difficult to decide whether the policies 
described were actually carried out. A final conclusion on this 
problem can only be reached if further details of the administrative 
procedures in the provincial government can be obtained, and this is 
very unlikely. My own conclusion at the moment is that most of the 
proposals and decisions recorded in these sections were in some way 
reflections of policies carried out in the whole province or at least 
in parts of it, as regional variations were obviously allowed by the 
provincial administration either by choice or by necessity.
Other important sources
These are the writings of Li Kai-xian, Ge Shou-li (GDSGWJ), Yu 
Shen-xing (GCSGWJ) and Lii Kun (SZL). Li Kai-xian was born in Zhangqiu 
District, Jinan Prefecture, in 1502 and obtained his gin-shi degree in 
1529. After a career in the capital he retired in 1541 and spent the 
rest of his life at home in Zhangqiu writing plays and collecting 
folklore. This latter interest may have given him opportunity to 
learn more about the conditions in the district than other persons of 
similar background. Around 1560 he wrote some essays about conditions 
in Zhangqiu but these writings are difficult to use partly because he 
describes situations for which we do not know the background and 
partly because of their very strong bias. These essays which are in 
the form of questions and answers can almost be regarded as early 
examples of propagandistic journalism. I have used them when they 
related to local self-government but have avoided doing so to make
seen neither the SDJHL or the Dong-sheng jing-zhi-lu strongly suspects 
that they are essentially identical. DMB, pp.1439-1440; personal 
communication from Ray Huang dated 4 November 1976.
35 Iwami Hiroshi, Santo keikairoku' ni tsuite”, in Shimizu hakase 
tsuit'd kinen Mindaishi rous'dy pp. 197-220.
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statements about social and economic conditions. I do not regard Li’s 
complaints as unfounded, and there is other evidence to support his 
claim that the situation in the province needed reform. But the care­
ful assessment of his claims which are needed before conclusions can
3 6be drawn has been beyond the scope of this thesis.
Ge Shou-li was from Deping District, Jinan Prefecture, and a jin-
shi graduate from 1529. He was probably the most ardent and outspoken
opponent of the introduction of the Single Whip policy in Shandong.
His opposition was directed mainly against the levy of corvee on land
in place of ding and households, as he had seen by administrative
experience in Henan how this had created hardship for the primary
producers. He spent the years 1556-1567 in retirement and had thus a
good opportunity to study at first hand the introduction of the early
Single Whip. His interest in this problem can be seen in several
letters to provincial officials both in Shandong and Henan but his
main argument is presented in a memorial which obtained imperial
approval in 1567 while he was Minister for Revenue. These writings
contain important information but they have been used with some
3 7caution because of his strong bias against the Single Whip.
Yu Shen-xing was from Donga District, Yanzhou Prefecture. He was 
born in 1545 and became a jin-shi graduate in 1568. After a career in 
the capitals he retired in 1591 and probably spent most of his time at 
home, among other things, editing the prefectural gazetteer. His 
writings used here are those about the Single Whip in the Wan-li 
period mostly describing this policy in Donga and neighbouring Pingyin 
on the western border of Changqing District. He does however also 
discuss the suitability of the Single Whip for other parts of the 
province so I have made use of his arguments as he seems to have been 
well informed and, although in favour of the policy, at least to have 
lacked the fiery bias of Ge Shou-li.38
36 DMB, pp.835-836; Wolfgang Franke, "Material aus Gesammelten 
Schriften (pieh-chi) als Quelle für Lokalgeschichte. Bemerkungen zu 
einer Untersuchung von Michel Cartier", OE 21 (1974), 192-193.
37 See Ch. II below and Leif Littrup, "The Early Single Whip Policy 
in Shandong 1550-1570", Papers on Far Eastery History 15 (1977),
75-86.
38 See Ch. IV below.
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In late Ming Lil Kun was one of the best known officials connected
with initiatives with regard to local self-government. He was born in
1536 in Ningling District, Henan Province, and became a jin-shi in
1574. When he was governor of Shanxi from 1592 to 1594 he issued
detailed instructions for local government including regulations for
the non-fiscal duties of local self-government. He had served in
Shandong Province from 1587 to 1589 as administration circuit
intendant of Jinan and he reveals in parts of his instructions that he
had already adopted similar policies while serving in Shandong. As
initiatives in Jinan with regard to the non-fiscal self-government
organizations can clearly be connected with his stay in the province,
I have used his regulations for Shanxi to describe the principles of
3 9such institutions as they probably operated in Jinan.
3. Conclusions
In the investigation of the official local self-government system 
of the Ming dynasty I have concentrated on the developments which took 
place in Shandong Province, with particular reference to Jinan 
Prefecture in the second half of the sixteenth century. The official 
local self-government involved participation by the people in the 
process of government at the lowest level, supplying a contact between 
the official bureaucracy and each household and also regulating minor 
disputes which might arise between the households. The system was 
established by the government —  central or local —  and was employed by 
the officials as a part of the administrative processes for the levy 
of taxes and corvee and for population control. This thesis clearly 
shows that such an official local self-government system still existed 
in Shandong in the sixteenth century and that the officials still 
regarded it as an integral and active element in the administration of 
the province. It is not concerned with any unofficial local self- 
government which may have existed —  with or without tacit approval 
from the officials. This does not mean that such unofficial systems 
or organizations did not exist. On the contrary all evidence on the 
history of Chinese society almost up to the present day shows that
3 9 See Ch. V below.
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such organizations did exist at least in connection with the religious 
ceremonies in the temples, and the Jinan gazetteers in their sections 
on local customs amply verify that such ceremonies took place in the 
prefecture in the second half of the sixteenth century. However 
little evidence has been found that they actually performed duties of 
local self-government such as mutual assistance and settlement of 
disputes. This probably happened but the sources —  written and 
compiled by and for officials and other educated people — are not very 
informative. The indications are that such activities were not 
approved by the officials, as they might infringe upon the prerogative 
of the government in population control.
The official local self-government system of the Ming dynasty was 
from the establishment of the t'i-j'ia system in 1381 heavily oriented 
towards fiscal functions. The unit of local self-government, the 
li-Qia, was established strictly according to the number of households 
without any provisions for modification according to settlement 
patterns. The administration with such units of equal size and of 
comparable economic strength could place the burden of taxes and 
particularly corvee on the Z'i-j'ia rather than on the individual house­
holds, thus reducing the administrative burdens of the bureaucracy.
The li-jia was also used as the unit for population registration by 
means of the Yellow Registers and the accuracy of the population 
figures obtained in the last two decades of the fourteenth century was 
probably unsurpassed for 400 years. Some scholars have suggested that 
this accuracy in population figures was already lost under the Hong-wu 
emperor by giving increasing priority to the fiscal aspect of such 
registration, and also that the Z■'i-jia tended to become more a 
territorial unit than one based upon the number of households as a 
result of policies introduced by this emperor. This thesis contends 
that these suggestions are certainly applicable to later developments 
but they cannot be ascribed to policies deliberately introduced by the 
Hong-wu emperor. The Yellow Registers were from the outset fiscal in 
nature and the procedural changes in the registration must be seen 
as corrections to weaknesses or misunderstandings in the original 
procedures. The policy that the Z'i-j'ia should be kept within the 
boundaries of the subdistricts can be seen as a concession to 
traditional administrative and settlement patterns but it did not in
21
itself indicate a basic change in the policy of organizing the t'i-jia 
according to number of households. In my view all this was part of a 
prospective continuous process of amending the local self-government 
regulations whenever inadequacies were revealed in the existing laws. 
The reason this process did not continue was in the first instance the 
result of the Jing-nan Incident which disrupted the administration for 
several years and later the result of a lack of interest on the part 
of the emperor and his advisers in the local self-government system. 
Perhaps the fact that corrections in the Z■'L-jia and the Yellow 
Registers were only to be made every ten years contributed to the 
discontinuance of this process, as it only gave the Hong-wu emperor one 
occasion on which to issue supplementary regulations for the 
organization of the I'L-j'ia and the compilation of the Yellow Registers.
Fiscal duties
The li-jia was organized with ten li-leaders each serving one 
year in a decennial rotation and 100 j-Za-heads divided into ten j’-Za. 
This thesis will show that each Z-i-leader was permanently attached to 
one jia. During the year of incumbency he was assisted by the jt-a in 
carrying out his duties as Z-Z-leader, and during the years of non­
incumbency he acted as leader of the ji-a for the purpose of collecting 
taxes and equal corvee and for registration work. The jia-heads —  
despite the deceptive terminology —  did not exercise any supervisory 
power over other jia-heads. Their position towards households in the 
I'i-j'ia which were not members of the official Z-'Z-j'Za structure, a 
situation which must have existed in many of the larger Z-'Z-j'Za in the 
sixteenth century, has not been clarified. The Z/Z-j'Za was still 
during this period regarded as the unit for the levy of certain items 
of corvee at least in the sense that some of these were levied upon 
the districts according to the number of Z.-Z-j'Za. All the evidence 
shows however that the officials were fully aware of the discrepancies 
in the economic power of the li-jia and that most if not all levies 
within the districts were probably made according to the respective 
strength of the Z.-Z-j'-Za.
Officers of the local self-government system, i.e. incumbent and
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non-incumbent Z-Z-leaders, Z^-registrars and da~hu, were still employed 
in the collection and forwarding of taxes and corvee, and corvee heads 
who were responsible for each item of corvee still performed in the 
form of labour continued to be conscripted at the beginning of the 
period under investigation. All these persons had the responsibility 
of making up deficits in payments and could then attempt to recoup at 
least some of the deficits from assisting households or the other 
members of the li-jia. Most of the reforms carried out during this 
period aimed at eliminating these services and this appears to have 
been effected in most districts for most services by the end of the 
period. This followed official deliberations — which must have been 
fairly common during the period — as to the continuous involvement of 
the li-jia and other local self-government officers in these 
processes. Perhaps there were also considerations of the capacity of 
the bureaucracy to take over these duties. This transfer of duties 
from local self-government to the bureaucracy was in order to avoid 
households from being ruined and also to prevent them from using their 
posts for their own personal benefit. Such a transfer of duties to 
the bureaucracy was greatly facilitated by the increasing commutation 
of taxes, and in this period particularly corvee to silver payments. 
The officers of the li-jia are the only recorded middlemen between the 
taxpayers and tax receiving agencies. Unofficial middlemen may have 
existed but they have not been recorded in these official writings and 
their absence indicates that the li-jia system at least brought such 
middlemen under official scrutiny even if control was not always 
effective.
The li-jia was still levied corvee items for which no other 
budgetary allowances existed. This was to a certain degree eliminated 
with the consolidation of the li-jia corvee in the late 1560s but my 
impression is that the officials even thereafter regarded the li-jia 
as a legitimate and convenient source for emergency and irregular 
levies and that they were reluctant to see this function of the li-jia 
disappear. But the case of the reception heads in Zhangqiu in the 
1590s show that the officials were under strong pressure from the 
people, at least those who were heeded by the local officials, to 
completely abolish the offices of the li-jia in order to avoid the 
ruin of households which could follow from these duties. There are
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also signs that the reason the officials wanted to retain the 
services was in order to continue rotatory services which would reduce 
the risk of any person using his post for continuous fraud.
Non-fiscal duties
The non-fiscal duties of the local self-government system were 
from 1381 connected with the ia but from the 1390s were under 
direction of the li-e.lder which was a more or less permanent position 
in contrast to the rotational duties of the Z-i-leaders. The prestige 
and function of the Z't-elders seems to have declined rapidly. They 
still existed in Shandong in the second half of the sixteenth century 
but they seem to have been used mainly for fiscal duties, even to the 
extent of performing corvee as door-men.
During this period, their non-fiscal functions were to some 
extent performed by gong-zheng. The gong-zheng were apparently 
responsible for welfare granaries but they also performed fiscal 
duties such as receiving returns from land registrations. Educational, 
judicial and security functions were from the 1580s performed through 
the bao-jia and xbang-yue with mutual responsibility for the behaviour 
of the members. These organizations which seem to have been wide­
spread in the prefecture also assisted in the collection and 
distribution of grain from the various welfare granaries and in the 
establishment of local schools. I have not been able to ascertain the 
success of these organizations. My impression is that they may have 
operated successfully for a period of a few years but they were 
certainly not enduring.
Decline of local self-government
Local self-government depended upon the willingness of the 
members and particularly the leaders to perform their duties. To 
operate effectively the leaders moreover needed to be persons with a 
certain standing in the community, that is the more wealthy and honest 
persons. This seems to have been the basic weakness of the 1■'i—g'ia
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system particularly when the gentry were generally exempted from 
performing Lhese duties and all the wealthy households used any 
available means to avoid such classification. This was closely 
connected with the division of the households into nine tax classes 
which if the classification could be maintained laid the heaviest 
corvee burdens upon the wealthy households. This could however not be 
done, as the burden on the households in the upper tax classes became 
increasingly heavy as the dynasty progressed. They not only had to 
serve as Z-'Z-leaders but also as da-hu and corvee heads for the equal 
corvee and horse administration. All these burdens amounted to heavy 
progressive taxation on the households and as could be expected tax 
evasion became the norm. The result was that the households in the 
upper tax classes, i.e. those who according to the registers were 
conscripted as Z-i-leaders, were no longer the wealthiest (but probably 
not the poorest either) and the efficiency of the l-i-jia as a fiscal 
unit declined as a result. Worse however was that when the officers 
of the li-jia could no longer perform their duties then the elders 
were drafted to carry them out, thus damaging the non-fiscal functions 
of the local self-government. My conclusion must be that fiscal and 
non-fiscal duties could not be combined into one local self-government 
organization, at least not when the operation of the organization was 
affected by heavy progressive taxation.
Progressive taxation was obviously an important concern of the 
officials during this period, indeed the purpose of the Single Whip 
was to eliminate such progression, first by abolishing the granary 
rates and later by abolishing or at least diminishing reliance upon 
the households and tax classes for the levy of corvee. The burden of 
corvee may also have been alleviated when corvee items were shuffled 
between the different forms of levy, such as equal corvee and li-jia 
corvee. Transfer to equal corvee certainly meant that the levy was 
assessed more often, which would be not only an advantage but a 
necessity if the fortunes of households changed before the next 
decennial assessments originally used in the Yellow Registers. There 
was a constant tendency during this period to shorten the assessment 
periods for the different items and this must indicate greater 
fluctuations in the wealth of the people and perhaps also greater 
migrations than was foreseen by the Hong-wu emperor. The Single Whip
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largely eliminated the need to assess households at regular 
intervals so it was probably an approbiate response to the conditions 
in the province at the end of the sixteenth century. However by 
abolishing local self-government participation in the collection 
of taxes and corvee, the Single Whip also eliminated some of the 
flexibility in the previous fiscal system and this weakness became 
apparent when emergency levies had to be made during the later years 
of the dynasty. This lead to the re-introduction of some elements 
of local self-government in Licheng District in the form of the 
da-hu.
Finally a word on the term "local self-government", which is 
a translation of the Chinese di-fang zi-zhi. This term has in 
modern Chinese and Japanese scholarship been used to describe the 
sub-bureaucratic institutions which in Imperial China were the 
official institutions between the bureaucracy and the people. During 
the Republican period the term had "a heterogenous body of ideas 
attached to it, particularly that of political d e m o c r a c t " T h e  
term has been used in this thesis only to indicate that the sub- 
bureaucratic institutions were under the direction of local people 
(as opposed to "local government" at the district level) and that 
some degree of autonomy in administration was given to these 
institutions. However to caution against the value-laden terminology 
I suggest that the term "sub-bureaucratic government" can be used. 
The reader should keep this in mind throughout the work, and this 
has also been chosen for the title.
** c For a discussion of the development of the term di-fang zi-zhi 
see Philip A. Kuhn, "Local Self-Government under the Republic", in 
Frederic Wakeman, Jr. and Carolyn Grant, ed., Conflict and Control 
in Late Imperial China, (Berkeley, 1975), p p . 257 ff.
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CHAPTER I
ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 
IN THE MING DYNASTY
INTRODUCTION
1. Local self-government and Chinese society
Local self-government (di-fccng zi-zhi) , or sub-bureaucratic 
government as it could also be called, is a common feature of Chinese 
society from Han or pre-Han times to the twentieth century.1 Its 
purpose was to provide the last link between the official bureaucracy 
—  which normally did not have representatives below the level of sub­
prefectures (zhou) or districts (xian) — and the population for which 
the usual administrative unit was the household (hu). The need for 
such a link is easily explained when we consider that in the Ming 
dynasty some of the more populous districts had over half a million 
inhabitants.2 Even in the relatively small districts in Jinan 
Prefecture (fu) in Shandong the population was several tens of 
thousands, and in some of the districts over 100,000 in the sixteenth 
century.3 In the subprefectures and districts there were usually less
1 For the early introduction of local self-government see note 12 
below. Its existence in the nineteenth century is amply documented in 
Kung-chuan Hsiao, Rural China. Imperial Control in the Nineteenth 
Century (Seattle, 1960), passim. For the twentieth century, see for 
example Martin C. Yang, A Chinese Village. Taitou3 Shantung Rrovince 
(New York and London, 1945), p.244, and Ramon H. Myers, The Chinese 
Feasant Economy. Agricultural Development in Hopei and Shantung3 
1890-1949 (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), pp.97-99.
2 For 1391 Shanghai District reported 114,326 households and 
532,803 ’mouths’ . Ping-ti Ho, Studies on the Population of China3 
1368-1953 (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), p.12.
3 In 1596 Qidong District reported 141,220 inhabitants and Wuding 
subprefecture in 1588 62,770 males and 69,880 females. These figures 
cannot be accepted as absolutely correct, but they are probably a good 
indication of the population. Qidong xian-zhi 1617/15/4; Wuding 
zhou-zhi 1588/5/1.
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than a handful of officials: the three regular officials (zheng-guan),
the magistrate (zhi~xian), the vice magistrate (xian-cheng) and the 
assistant magistrate (zhu-bu); and one chief officer (shou-ling-guan) 
who was the docket officer (dian-shi) . 4 For example in Binzhou Sub­
prefecture in 1583 the officials were as follows: regular official,
the magistrate (zhi-zhou); one vice magistrate (tong-zhi) and two 
assistant magistrates (pan-guan) as deputies (zuo-er); and the docket 
officer (li-mu) as the chief officer. Even if we consider the lesser 
functionaries (li) of which there were twenty-four in Binzhou and the 
other underlings in the yamen of which there were ninety,5 the task of 
administering and supervising the population in a district or sub­
prefecture would have been difficult if there had not been supporting 
systems based upon the participation of the people themselves.
The need for such self-government systems is further increased by 
the absence in Chinese society of a supplementary statewide clerical 
bureaucracy as it is provided in other countries by a church/ 
educational establishment. When such establishments co-operated with 
or were under the control of the political establishment they could 
perform some of the functions such as population registration, 
education, justice and agricultural supervision found in the Chinese 
local self-government institutions.
To what extent the religious movements in Chinese society played 
an active role in community functions of the local self-government 
type throughout its history remains to be studied. However given the 
nature of the sources such studies will be extremely difficult to 
undertake. Max Weber whose studies were mostly based upon reports 
from nineteenth and early twentieth century China describes how the 
village 'temple' had jurisdiction over petty litigation and enjoyed 
the confidence of the people. The 'temple' took care of public works 
and security, and provided schools and medical assistance. As will be 
seen later these were all regarded as local self-government functions. 
Weber further describes with historical examples how the political
4 DMHD 4/6.
5 Binzhou zhi 1583/2/56. A useful description of the administrative 
personnel in the districts and their functions is given in Michel 
Cartier, Une Re forme Locale en Chine au XVIe Siede3 Hai Rui ä Chun* an 
1558-1562 (Paris-La Haye, 1973), pp.35-55.
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establishment in China had not always taken such a laissez-faire 
attitude towards this unofficial local self-government. The 
distinction he makes between official and unofficial self-government is 
whether or not the government had or did not have control over local 
religious communities. If there had been a religious hierarchy 
supervising the local communities, government control could have been 
exercised through this hierarchy. Even though the state supervised
nthe religious movements such as Buddhism and Taoism there was in 
China no religious hierarchy controlling local religious communities, 
whose religion was a mixture of these two movements with folk religion 
and ancestor worship.
For the area under study here there is not much evidence that 
religious movements were connected with local self-government 
functions. The only example is in Wuding Subprefecture in 1588.
Under the heading she , the gazetteer describes communities of a 
Buddhist nature where the people mostly ate vegetables and in cases of 
illness they did not use medicine but attempted a cure with witchcraft 
and other invocations of supernatural powers. Most of the people, but 
not the educated ones (shi~da~fu), belonged to these she and each she 
had a leader. On the first and fifteenth day of the month the members 
deposited money with the leader and this money would be lent out at 
interest. At the end of the year the money was returned and used for 
beneficial work such as assistance with tax and corvee payments, dowry 
and funeral expenses. The ceremonies for marriage and funerals, etc., 
were conducted by the she. Some time before the compilation of the 
gazetteer an assistant surveillance commissioner, probably the 
military defence circuit intendant from 1543 to 1548 Wang Ye (or Wang 
Qiao), attempted to bring these customs under official control and 
appointed scholars to conduct the four ceremonies (si~li), but with no 
apparent success.8
6 Max Weber, The Religion of China. Confucianism and Taoism. 
Translated and Edited by Hans H. Gerth (Glencoe, 111., 1951), pp.92-93.
7 Hucker (1958), pp.35, 47. Monks and nuns in the religious orders 
were registered and certificates were issued to them from 1372:12.
They were to be examined in the Holy Books before the certificates 
were issued. MHY 39/694; DMHD 226/1-3.
8 Wuding zhou-zhi 1588/7/2-3. The assistant surveillance 
commissioner is only mentioned by his personal name Ye. Under the 
military defence circuit intendants in the gazetteer 1588/10/14 is
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The impression we get from the account of the she in Wuding is 
that they were not highly regarded by the officials and the educated 
people. Such unofficial organizations, religious or secular (if such 
existed), do not appear to have impressed the officials as potential 
supplementary administrative organizations. They were rather regarded 
as a nuisance, possibly because they might have interfered with the 
authority of the officials.
The use of the natural village as the unit for local self-
government was not attractive to governments and officials for most
of Chinese history. The natural village is best defined as a number
of households living in relative proximity, having a certain degree of
inter-relationship between the households and a feeling of community
distinct from feelings towards households from other natural villages.
The natural village had either developed out of historical or
geographical circumstances or was based upon clans. In contrast to
the natural village was the administrative village which was the
official unit of local self-government. The administrative village
was sometimes based directly on the natural village as had been the
case in the Liang and Hou-Tang dynasties. A slightly more artificial
form of the administrative village was to appoint several leaders in
the natural village without actually interrupting its^  community life,
or alternatively to have one leader for several villages. This system
was practiced in the Yuan dynasty. Finally the administrative village
could be organized without foundations in the natural village but
purely on the basis of a certain number of households. This system
was with few modifications the most common and it was probably most
0stringently applied during the Ming dynasty.
The community life of the natural village could be a useful help 
in some self-government functions such as security, education and 
agricultural supervision. Disregard for the natural village in 
creating administrative villages could therefore create problems 
unless the official policy was modified. Such modifications were
mentioned Wang Ye from Jintan District. In the prefectural and 
provincial gazetteer he is called Wang Qiao from Jintan district. 
Jinan fu-zhi 1839/26/21; Shandong tcng-zhi 1911/48/1726.
s Shimizu Morimitsu, "Chügoku no göson töchi to sonraku" in Shakai 
köseishi taikeiy v.2, pt.2 (Tokyo, 1949), pp.9-20. See further p p . 
5^-55.
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often provided for in official policy but to get a full picture it is 
necessary to study actual conditions at the local level. Such studies 
are extremely difficult with the available sources but several 
Japanese scholars have attempted it. Their tentative conclusions are 
that the administrative village was probably in most cases adapted to 
the natural village.10
2. Historical and historiographical approaches 
to the origin of local self-government
In the Ming dynasty there was a strong feeling that the 
institutions of local self-government had their roots far back in 
Chinese history. A writer in the middle of the dynasty gave the 
following description of the history of local self-government, 
comparing the Ming institutions with their historic antecedents:* 11
In the Zhou-li12 the xiang-shi, sui-shi, zhou-zhang, dang-zheng, 
zu-shi, li-zai, bz-shi, lü-shi, lü-xu and bi-zhang were in charge 
of collecting taxes from the six xiang. In Qin and Han ten li 
formed one ting and the ting had a leader. Ten ting formed one 
xiccng and the xiang had a san-tao, a se-fu, and a you-jiao. The 
san-tao was in charge of education, the se-fu handled litigations 
and collected taxes, and the you-jiao apprehended thieves.
In the Tang dynasty 500 families formed one xiang and there 
was appointed a xiang-zheng. One hundred families formed one ti, 
arid a ti-zhang was appointed. They administered the population, 
gave advice about planting and cultivation and about mournings, 
and they investigated bad conduct. Those who lived in the towns 
were called fang-zheng. They were in charge of the gate of the 
fang, kept the keys and controlled villainous behaviour. In the 
countryside they were called eun-zheng and they were similar to 
the fang-zheng.
10 Shimizu, pp.22-121; Kuribayashi Nobuo, Rikosei no kenkyu (Tokyo, 
1971), pp.26-49.
11 The following translation is part of the essay "Jiangxi chai-yi 
shi-yi" which was included in the Tu~shu-bian by Zhang Huang in 1613. 
The text used here was included in the Ba-bian jing-shi tei-zuan (1626, 
photographic reprint Taipei, 1966), 35/16. The author and the date of 
the essay is not given but from internal evidence it was probably 
written at the beginning of the sixteenth century.
12 There is some doubt whether the Zhou~li was actually compiled 
before the Han dynasty. However in the opinion of Karlgren it was 
compiled during the Zhou dynasty so the institutions described here 
probably refer to that period. Shimizu Morimutsu, p.14; Sven Broman, 
Studies on the Chou Li (Stockholm, 1961), pp.l and 15.
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The Song used Zi-zheng, hu-zhang, and xiang-shu-shou to levy 
and collect taxes and qi-zhang and zhuang-ding to pursue and 
apprehend thieves. Later there were three groups of corvee.13 
ya-qian, aheng-fu, ren-Zi, shou-Zi> san-cong, and zhi-hou.lk The 
ya-qian corvee which was levied upon the rural households was the 
heaviest. People performing this corvee were either in charge of 
granaries or treasuries or transported goods to the granaries, 
often to the extent that they ruined themselves. So in the 
Huang-you period (1049-1053) it was prohibited to use households 
serving in the xiccng for the ya-qian corvee, and orders given to 
hire people to do this work. In the Kang-ning period (1068-1077) 
there was also the bao-jia method, and in the Bao-qing period 
(1225-1228?) there was the yi-yi method.
The Yuan dynasty established fang-zheng in the fang, Zi- 
zheng in the Zi > and zhu~shou in the du. Without assistance they 
pressed for payment of the taxes and they summoned and escorted 
the people to public works.
In this dynasty the Yellow Registers for taxes and corvee 
were first compiled in 1381. One hundred and ten households 
formed one tu [li~jia\. The ten households with most taxable 
property were chosen to be Zi-leaders (Zi-zhang) and the other 
one hundred households became jia-heads (jia~shou). They served 
in rotation over ten years. They pressed for the payment of 
taxes and other public expenses and administered public affairs. 
They were like the li-gui and ting-zhang of Qin and Han and the 
fang—zheng and Zi—zheng of Tang, Song, and Yuan. Virtuous old 
men in the fang and Zi were selected as elders (Zao-ren). They 
were issued with the Precepts of Popular Instruction (Jiao—min 
pang-wen) and supervised public morals and litigations. They 
were like the so-called san-Zao.
Tax-captains (iiang-zhang) were appointed to exact the two 
kinds of taxes; they were like the so-called se-fu. The zong- 
jia and xiao-jia investigated irregular events; they were like 
the so-called you-jiao. These were the regular ten-year-corvee 
services.
At present all public expenses for sacrifices and worship 
are paid in addition to the land tax. All these items are called 
Zi-jia because they are provided by the Zi-jia of the entire 
district. There are also miscellaneous corvees in the ten years.
1 3 In the early dynasties service in local self-government was 
regarded as carrying a certain prestige. From Sui and Tang this 
status was debased and came to be regarded as a corvee. Heinz Friese, 
Das DienstZeistungs-System der Ming Zeit (1368-1644) (Hamburg, 1959), 
p.22; Li Jian-nong, Song-Yuan-Ming jing-ji-shi-gao (Peking, 1957), 
pp.227-229.
14 The corvee services of the early Song can be divided into four 
groups: 1. the ya-qian in charge of public goods, 2. the Zi-zheng,
hu-zhang, and xiang-shu-shou in charge of taxation, 3. the qi-zhang, 
gong-shouy and zhuang-ding for apprehending thieves, and 4. oheng-fUy 
ren-Zi, shou-Zi, san-eo?ig, etc., who provided services for the 
officials. Li Jian-nong, p.226.
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They are called 'labour corvee' (ii-ohai) and 'silver corvee' 
(yin-ohai). They are all levied from the li—giay from the adult 
males (ding) and from the fields. There are also militia (min- 
bing)and postal horses (fu-rna). The fu-ma are substitutes for 
postal services in kind. For highly frequented water and land 
transport there are mutual assistance parties (xie-ji-zhi-pai).15 
The levy of these services is equally distributed among the ii~ 
leaders, the ding and taxable property but there are not 
sufficient of these to satisfy the needs of the whole country.
The levies are increased year after year. How can there be a 
limit on ding and fields?
Similar descriptions are found in the Qing dynasty16 and even 
modern Chinese scholarship has a penchant for tracing the origin of 
these institutions to the classical period of Chinese history.17 For 
a non-Chinese historian it is not always easy to see the justification 
for this, as it would often be more rewarding to attempt to analyse 
the institutions on their own merits and their contemporary function 
and background. However tracing the historical roots of institutions 
is practised not only by modern Chinese historians but also by 
contemporary officials so the modern non-Chinese historian cannot 
completely disregard this concern for origin in the study of these 
institutions.
3. Local self-government in the Yuan dynasty
As the translation in the previous section shows, the local self- 
government institutions from the earliest times to the Ming dynasty 
underwent several complicated changes. A complete account of these 
changes is beyond the scope of this thesis. However a brief 
description of the institutions in the Yuan is useful for our purpose, 
since the changes under that dynasty were to some extent designed to 
meet the special conditions in north China and left most traces there.
After the Jin dynasty had been founded in north China in 1126 it
15 Xie-ji was used when one district or province assisted the postal 
system in another district or province. SDJHL 9/41.
16 E.G. in the essay 'Li-jia-lun' by Liu Qi included in Tang-yi 
xian-zhi 1710/2/9-10.
17 See e.g. Wei Qing-yuan, Ming-dai huang-ce zhi-du (Peking, 1961), 
pp.7-13.
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largely adopted the Song policy for local self-government. The 
population was organized into units of five and twenty-five households, 
the latter called bao. These bao were for the mutual surveillance of 
the households. For supervision and pressing of taxes the districts 
were divided into xiang under the leadership of a li-zheng. The 
number of households could be from under fifty to over three hundred.
To assist the li-zheng in his duties a number of zhu-shou were 
appointed according to the number of households in the xiccng. 18
During the years of the Jin and the Mongol Conquest the 
population of the north remained stable or declined either through 
emigration to the south or by losses due to warfare. The disruption 
of the social life was further aggravated in the years after the 
Mongol Conquest of the north when they had not fully accepted the 
Chinese administrative pattern but adopted a feudalistic system which 
upset the traditional territorial units.19
Local self-government institutions were introduced together with 
the strengthening of the central power of the Mongol dynasty from 
about 1250. Regulations were issued in 1269, 1270 and 1286 for the 
creation of communal villages (s/ze).20 The main purpose of the new 
system was to assist in the revival of the agricultural economy of the 
north, by means of irrigation, reforestation, improvements in rural 
education and the organization of granaries to prevent shortages in 
bad years. The implementation of such a program indicates that 
agricultural production and productivity in the north were in a
o Iserious state. In these circumstances an administrative village 
which did not interrupt the community life of the natural villages was 
found to be the solution. There is evidence that the she as a mutual 
assistance organization had existed during the Jin dynasty but its 
adoption during the Yuan marks the heyday of this type of local self- 
government as an official policy on a large scale.
18 Li Jian-nong, p.260.
19 Paul 0. Elmquist, Rural Control in Early Modem China (Ph.D
thesis, Harvard University, 1963), pp.109-111, 124.
20 Elmquist, p.146.
21 Herbert Franz Schumann, Economic Structure of the Yuan Dynasty 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p.7.
22 Elmquist, p.150.
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The she were organized on the basis of fifty households.
Villages with more than fifty households were, however, not divided 
into two or several she y but remained under one she. If there were 
more than 100 households an additional she-leader (she-zhang) was 
appointed. If the natural villages were smaller than fifty households, 
two or more villages formed one she if the distance between them was 
not too great. One she-zhang would be appointed preferably from a 
village centrally located in the she.23
The she was ordered to select a person in the she to be she-zhang. 
He should be advanced in years, have an understanding of agriculture 
and have at least one adult male (ding) in the family. The officials 
were not allowed to ask the she-zhang to perform duties outside that 
she. His main duties were to encourage agriculture, advise the 
farmers on the crops he judged most suitable for cultivation in the 
area, and supervise irrigation. In his efforts to persuade the 
farmers to cultivate their land in the most appropriate way he could 
admonish them. If they did not improve he was to report it to the 
officials and the misbehaviour was publicly exposed.
If a household in the she was unable to work the fields then the 
other households were ordered to do so at the appropriate time so that 
they did not fall into disuse. If a household lost its plough oxen 
then the other households were to assist it to get a new animal. The 
she-zhang was furthermore in charge of the granary (yi-oang) where the 
villagers were to deposit grain in years of good harvests, while grain 
would be distributed to the inhabitants in lean years. The she-zhang 
was also in charge of the village school (she-xue) where a person well 
versed in the Classics was to instruct youngsters in the Xiao-ging and 
other elementary books on good behaviour. Finally, the she-zhang was 
empowered to settle disputes in the she involving marriages, family 
possessions, land, dwellings, and debts. He was to do this by 
reasoning with the people concerned.24
For the purpose of tax collection the Yuan continued the system 
which had been applied in the Jin. The officers of this system were
23 Elmquist, p.170.
24 Ibid. , pp.170-185.
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Z'i-zheng and zhu-shou, which were considered a corvee obligation.25 
However when this system was introduced to the south it created 
problems as the number of households in the area under the control of 
the Z'i-zheng was considerably larger there than in the north because 
of the higher concentration of population. When the Z'i-zheng was 
responsible for the collection of taxes year after year his duties 
could become too heavy for one household. The solution was to have
the duties as Zi-zheng rotated between several households on a one-
year basis.26
There were also developments towards involving the she-zhang in 
the collection of taxes. Such a development towards the use of the 
non-fiscal self-government system in tax collection had also been seen 
in the Song dynasty. In the Yuan it was first avoided by upgrading
the status of the Z'i-zheng but in the long run the prestige of the
she-zhang, being selected by the villagers themselves, was apparently 
stronger than that of the Z'i-zheng. The result was a marked tendency 
for the she to become a unit for tax collection.28
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN MING CHINA
1. Population registration in early Ming
In contrast to Yuan, the Ming dynasty had its origin in the 
economically important area with high population density around the 
lower Yangtze river, and the administrative changes in population 
control introduced in the beginning of the dynasty should first of all 
be regarded as an attempt to bring the population in this area under 
control. As in the Yuan this control was exercised along two 
different lines, the first being population registration for the 
purpose of conscription of taxes and corvee, and the second being 
organization of groups of the population for maintaining and expanding 
ideological control over the people. The latter control is here
25 Schurmann, p.96.
26 Elmquist, pp.165-166.
27 Li Jian-nong, p.236.
28 Elmquist, pp.167-169.
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defined in a broad sense to include the maintenance of public security 
and encouragement to agriculture. These two lines were merged to a 
large extent early in the dynasty with the introduction of the Zi-jia 
system in 1381. This development in population control coincided with 
the consolidation of the imperial power over the bureaucracy through 
the purges of 1380-1381. It has been suggested that the introduction 
of the li-jia system was an expression of this assertion of imperial 
control over the country, and also that social conditions were ripe at 
that time for this change.29
Land registration had already begun in 1368. At that time, 164 
officials were sent out to survey the land in Zhejiang and Jiangxi.30 
In the same year the equal-work-men (jun-gong-fu) were organized in 
Nanzhili and three prefectures in Jiangxi for corvee services mostly 
on construction work in or around the capital Nanking. The jun-gong- 
fu were conscripted on the basis of land. One q-ing of land was to 
provide one man. There were provisions for pooling together if one 
whole qing was not held by the same owner, and also for the hiring of 
substitutes if a household did not have enough persons to supply the 
labour according to its landholdings.31 In 1369 or 1370 the 
compilation of the jun-gong-fu registers were ordered,32 but as 
population registers they were superseded in 1370:11 by the system of 
household certificates (hu-tie). The household certificates were 
based upon a system which had already been adopted in Ningguo 
Prefecture. It was not an uncommon feature of Ming administration 
that procedures in existence in some areas were extended to the whole 
country. It should however be noted that the adoption of procedures 
from one area did not mean that similar or different procedures for 
the same purpose could not have been in operation in other parts of 
the country.
The household certificates were issued to every household and
29 Kuribayashi (1971), p.ll.
30 Ibid., pp.3-4; Friese, p.42.
31 Yamane Yukio, Mindai yoeki seido no tenkai (Tokyo, 1966), pp.8-10; 
Friese, p.42.
32 DMHD 206/1 dates the introduction to 1369. In the SL a similar 
instruction is dated 1370:7:xin~mao. Friese, p.45; Yamane, p.9.
33 Kuribayashi (1971), p.4.
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duplicates were kept in government offices as population registers.
This registration was probably extended to all areas under effective 
government control. The certificates contained for each household 
information on their place of registration (ji-guan), the number of 
adult males and persons (Ten-ding), the surnames and personal names of 
members of the household, and in addition there was probably a 
description of the household property. The order to issue the 
certificates does not mention property, but the surviving copies of 
certificates include this item.34 With the property included, the 
certificates did not only serve as population registers but could also 
be used for tax assessment.
These household certificates were superseded in 1381 by the 
Yellow Registers for Taxes and Corvee (fu-yi-huang-ee). These Yellow 
Registers were a development of the household certificates in several 
points. They were to be revised every ten years. The registers 
recorded details of the previous registration for persons and property, 
changes over the intervening ten years for every person and item of 
property followed by the figures of the registration currently in 
progress. Finally the Yellow Registers were based upon the ti-jia; 
registers were compiled for each I'i-j'ia and the compilation was the 
responsibility of the persons on service in the i'i-j'ia. 35
All the inhabitants of a ti-jia were enrolled in the Yellow 
Registers irrespective of their professional registration or economic 
status. The Ming dynasty continued the division of the population 
into hereditary professional classes which had been a prominent 
feature of Yuan population policy. This was however greatly 
simplified under the Ming, with only three major groups: civilians
(min), soldiers (jun), and artisans (jiang). There were several sub­
groups but apart from the salt-producing households (zao) who are 
sometimes regarded as a separate group, their numbers were 
insignificant. These hereditary groups were perpetuated in order to
34 Ho, pp.4-7; Yamane (1966), p.19.
35 Wei, p.24; DMHD 20/1-2. Translated in Leif Littrup, "The Yellow 
Registers of the Ming Dynasty — Translation from the Wan-li Da-Ming 
Ilui-dian", Papers on Far Eastern History 16 (1977), pp. 83-84.
36 Wei, p. 12.
3 7 The division of the population into professional groups is rarely
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secure a supply of certain types of corvee labourers for the 
government.
It has previously been assumed that the soldiers and artisans 
were not enrolled in the Yellow Registers but only in the special 
professional Yellow Registers kept by the ministries or other 
government agencies under which they served.30 However it has now 
been established that with the exception of soldiers on service in 
guards or batallions, they were all registered in the Yellow Registers 
and performed the regular H-jia corvee besides their professional 
corvee.3 9
The Yellow Register for a li-jia was divided into two parts. One 
part listed the 110 households participating in the regular corvee 
service. The other part was a supplementary register for registered 
households or persons who did not have to perform corvee such as 
widows, widowers, orphans and childless. Later, children under the 
age of ten and absentee landlords (ji-zhuang), who had to perform 
their regular li-jia corvee where they lived, were added to this list. 
They were called 'odds and ends' (ji-ling).40 With the introduction 
in 1391 of the principle that the Zi-jia could not lie across the 
boundaries of the subdistricts a further category 'supernumeraries'
(dai-guan) was created. These did not take part in the regular corvee 
and were probably included in the supplementary register. Even if 
some of the households in the supplementary register were then liable 
to taxes and corvee,41 the division of the Yellow Register into these 
two parts underscores their fiscal emphasis.
recorded in the gazetteers. The only records available are from 
Deping District in 1512 and Zichuan District in 1543, 1553, and 1602. 
The official registration of numbers of households was in 1602 in 
Zichuan: min 6,868, jun 2,588, zao 39, jiang 280. Five minor groups
in the same registration totalled only 31. Deping xian-zhi 1796/3/2; 
Zichuan xian-zhi 1602/12/1.
38 Wada Sei, Shina chihö jichi hattatsushi (Tokyo, 1939), p.96.
39 Wei, p.54; Kuribayashi (1971), p.14.
40 DMHD 20/1-3.
41 Tsurumi Naohiro, "Mindai no kireiko ni tsuite", Togo gakuho 
47.3 (1964), 43 ff.
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2. Local self-government organizations before 1381
The li-jia from 1381 were not the first attempts to organize the 
population into self-government groups. Li-leaders are already 
mentioned in the areas under the administration of Zhu Yuan-zhang 
before the establishment of the Ming.42 A Zi-gia organization is 
mentioned in 1369 in Shanxi and similar institutions probably existed 
in other parts as well.43 In 1370 Small Yellow Registers (xiao-huang- 
ce—tu) are reported in Huzhou Prefecture, Zhejiang, based upon an 
organization (tu) of 100 households and with both 7f-leaders and jta- 
heads (jda-shou) . The purpose of the tu was to press and collect 
taxes, and to meet military needs. It is not easy to determine the 
exact nature of this organization. Descriptions of the tu are very 
similar to the Zi-gda, and this may well be because the people writing 
these descriptions were influenced by the 1381 text. However the 
organizational difference makes it clear that the Small Yellow 
Registers and the tu did exist before 1381. Yamane thinks that they 
were more widespread than Huzhou Prefecture and that they could in 
some way have been connected with the household certificates.44
In early Ming, together with these units for household 
registration, there were also established units empire-wide more 
directed towards the community aspects of local self-government. In 
the beginning of the Hong-wu period an order was issued for the 
establishment of Zi-she and xiccng-It altars all over the country. The 
Zi-she altars were for the worship of the 'five soil and five grain 
spirits' and the xiccng-Zi altars for the worship of unconsoled 
spirits.45 These were the spirits of persons with no descendants to 
perform their sacrifices, often persons who had died in accidents.46 
The altars were erected in each Zi of 100 households and they were 
simple earthen structures. They were established in most places 
c. 1375 and this can be regarded as the time when Zi were established 
all over the country on the initiative of the central government. The
42 Kuribayashi (1971), p.4.
43 Ibid. and Yamane (1966), pp. 14-15.
44 Kuribayashi (1971), p.5; Yamane (1966), pp.16-18.
45 Huang-Ming Zhi-shu 7/33, 36.
46 LeZing xian-zhi 1762/3/47.
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number of Zi-she and xiang-Zi altars in a district often corresponded 
to the number of Zi-jia created in 1381, so it seems to be a reason­
able assumption that the Zi created for worship were the forerunners 
of the Zi-jia in the 1381 system.47
In the pre-1381 Zi the responsibility for the worship was rotated 
mostly among old and respected persons. There were five ceremonies 
per year, and at the end of each ceremony there was communal wine 
drinking and reading of pledges of good conduct. The leaders of the 
1i were also responsible for the maintenance of good order. To that 
end Shen-ming and Jing-shan pavilions were erected. Records of bad 
conduct were posted at the Shen-ming pavilions and records of good 
conduct at the Jing-shan pavilion.48
To what extent these early units for population control were 
related to the natural village is hard to say. The principle was to 
have 100 households in each Zi. This figure corresponds with the 
figures from the earlier dynasties when the local self-government 
units were based upon multiples of five or ten, often with 100 as a 
central unit. As the policy in the earlier dynasties, and 
particularly in the Yuan, had been a certain flexibility in the 
organization of the non-fiscal units, it seems reasonable to assume 
that the same flexibility could have been practised during the early 
Ming when the power of the dynasty was still in its infancy.
3. Internal organization of the Zi-gia
The Zi-gia introduced in 1381 was primarily intended for the 
collection of taxes and corvee. The households in the Zi-gia were 
organized at two levels, which is probably the reason why there were 
110 households and not one hundred. The ten economically most power­
ful households in the Zi-gia were selected to be Z-f-leaders. These 
were the households paying most taxes and having most adult men {ding). 
The other 100 households were divided into ten jia and were called
47 Kuribayashi (1971), pp.5-7.
48 Ibid. ,pp.7-10.
4 9 Shimizu, p.22.
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jZa-heads. The service in the ZZ-jZa which is often called the 
regular corvee (zheng-yx) was performed on a rotational basis over ten 
years. In each year there would be one incumbent ZZ-leader and ten 
incumbent j'Za-heads, the so-called xian-niccn. 5 0
The incumbent ZZ-leaders were responsible for administering the 
affairs of the ZZ-jZa. Their duties included certain functions in the 
assessment and collection of taxes and conscription of corvee, certain 
ceremonial, judicial, educational, and agricultural duties, 
compilation of the Yellow Registers, payment of expenses within the 
ZZ-jZa and contributions to the government. These duties varied 
according to time and place; the most consistent duties were the 
fiscal.51
The incumbent ZZ-leaders were assisted in these duties by ten 
incumbent j’Za-heads. It is not clear in the sources how these j'Za- 
heads were selected. There are two possibilities. Either that in 
each year one household was selected from each jZa to assist the ZZ- 
leader, or that one whole jZa could in each year perform the duties.
In the latter case the ZZ-leader and the jZa could be more or less 
permanently paired. Heinz Friese seems to assume that the duty of 
j’Za-head was rotated among the ten households within the j'ia and that 
the ten incumbent jZa-heads from the ten jZa assisted the incumbent 
ZZ-leader.52 Ray Huang accepts the second possibility53 and it will 
be shown later on the basis of Shandong in the sixteenth century that 
this is probably correct.
Here we will only add an indication that the relationship between 
a ZZ-leader and a jZa appears to have been established on a reasonably 
stable basis from the early years of the ZZ-jZa system. In the 1391 
regulations for the Yellow Registers it was ordered that during the 
compilation of the registers each household should fill in their 
registration form and hand it over to the administrating j'Za-head. He 
in turn would hand over the registration form for his own household
50 Littrup, "Yellow Registers", p.82; DMHD 20/1.
51 Yamane (1966), pp.41-42; Kuribayashi (1971), pp.54-56.
52 Friese, pp.27, 76.
53 Huang, p.34.
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together with those from the ten other households in the jia to the 
/•"/-leader. J 4 This can only be interpreted to mean that each /-/-leader 
was permanently regarded as a member of the jia, and he was probably 
the administrating jia-head for the purpose of registration.55
4. The li-jia as a fiscal unit
In the laws for the introduction of the li-jia system in 1381 and 
the further regulation of 1391 for the organization of the li-jia 
there are no provisions for modifying the size of the li-jia in order 
to accommodate the natural villages. The reason for this strict 
adherence to numbers can be found in the fact that the li-jia was 
primarily a fiscal unit.
Taxes were levied on land. The official rate at the beginning of 
the dynasty was 0.0535 dan per mou from domain land (guan-tian) and 
0.0335 dan from private land (jnz.n-ti.an) . 56 These figures are probably 
administrative guidelines for the levy of taxes rather than uniformly 
applied rates. The land was registered in the Fish-scale Registers 
(yu-lin-tu-ce) and also in the Yellow Registers.57 If these two 
registrations were reliable and the tax payments were forthcoming, it 
would not matter whether there were considerable variations in the 
size of the li-jia for the collection of taxes. Under such 
circumstances the li-jia would only have provided clerical assistance 
for the bureaucracy. However it appears that the compilation of the
54 DMHD 20/1-2.
5 5 -7 •The above discussion of the relationship of the Z^-leaders to the
jia seems necessary to help clarifying the organization of the li-jia. 
That it has not yet been generally accepted seems to be clear from the 
description given by Mi-chu Wiens: "In each li, the household with
the largest number of male adults and the largest amount of property 
was chosen as the li-chang (village head). The remaining 100 house­
holds in each li were divided into ten chia, and chia-shou (section 
headmen) were selected to lead each chia. The li-chia service 
required the eleven financially better-off households within each li 
to serve as village head and section headmen each year." See Mi-chu 
Wiens, "Changes in the Fiscal and Rural Control Systems in the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries", Ming Studies 3 (1976), 58.
56 DMHD 17/3.
57 Wei, pp.74-79, ill. 5.
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Fish-scale Registers was only carried out with care in Zhejiang and
5 8 *7 •southern Jiangsu. More important perhaps was the fact that the Z%-
jia was involved in the collection of the tax from the households in
the Zi-jia and that it was the responsibility of the incumbent Zi-
leader that all the tax of the Z\i—jia was paid. If one household
could not pay its tax, the Zi-leader would have to pay it from his own
resources and at the same time, or later, attempt to get contributions
from the other members of the Zi-jia to reduce his losses.59 Under
these circumstances it was important that the Zi-jia were of roughly
the same size so that there would not be too great differences in
these possible deficits. If only the payment of land taxes had to be
considered it would probably have been a more satisfactory solution to
have based the local self-government units upon divisions of land.
For the Z'i-j'ia system such a development started in the sixteenth
century and continued into the Qing dynasty.60
In early Ming the conscription of labour for corvee was an 
important feature of population control. This must been seen in 
relation to the economy of the day which after the disturbances in 
late Yuan virtually returned to a natural economy with only scanty 
circulation of reliable money currency.61 This was one of the reasons 
for the jun-gong-fu system which had been extended to the whole of 
Jiangsu in 1375 and continued around Nanking after 1381. At the 
national level it became an important function of the Z'i-j'ia to raise 
the manpower needed for corvee. The corvee was divided into the 
regular corvee — the Zi-leaders and jZa-heads and other services 
connected with the Zi-jia and tax collection, i.e. the H-elders {Zi- 
Zao-ren) and tax captains (fZiang-zhang). Besides these services there 
were numerous services for the government at all levels. These were 
called miscellaneous corvee (za~yi) , 63
58 Ho, p.108.
59 Kuribayashi Nobuo, "Mindai köki no nöson to rikösei", Togo 
shigaku ronshü 4 (1955), 375.
60 Obata Tatsuo, "Könan ni okeru rikö no hensei ni tsuite", Shirin 
39.2 (1956), 92-101.
61 Kuribayashi (.1971), p.12; Wolfgang Franke, "Zur Grundsteuer in 
China während der Ming Dynastie", Zeitschrift für vergZeichende 
Rechtswissenschaft 56 (1953), 93.
62 Yamane (1966), pp.10-13.
63 Ibid. ,p.37.
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The procedures for the conscription of the labour force for the 
miscellaneous corvee have not been described in any source I have 
encountered. It appears that there were no fixed regulations before 
the introduction of the equal corvee (gun-yao) in the second half of 
the fifteenth century.64 The general idea in early Ming seems to have 
been that the officials in charge of the corvee would weigh each item 
of corvee against another and then distribute them evenly on each Zi~ 
jia in the district. In the Zi-gia the miscellaneous corvee was 
conscripted from the male adults (ding) but in such a way that the 
heaviest corvee fell upon the ding from the households in the highest 
tax classes. These tax classes were introduced in 1384 and were 
assessed according to the number of ding and the general wealth of the 
household.6 5
Under such a system it was important that the strength of each 
Zi-gia was more or less the same and the strict adherence in the 
official policy to the organization of the Zi-gia according to numbers 
should be seen in this light. If the Zi-gia were of comparable 
strength for the collection of taxes and conscription of corvee, the 
officials dealing with the fiscal matters could to a certain extent 
limit the scope of their work to deal with the Zi-gia instead of with 
each household. Such considerations must have carried a certain 
weight in the early years of the dynasty when the administration was 
not yet fully developed. At the same time the Zi-gia provided — under 
the restraints of a not fully developed bureaucracy — the means to 
distribute the burden upon the population with a certain degree of 
equality.
The equal distribution of burdens on the population seems to have 
been an important consideration at the time. The founding emperor of 
the Ming dynasty Zhu Yuan-zhang is on record to have several times 
expressed concern that the people should not be exhausted by excessive 
demands for public duties.66 This could be achieved by demanding 
relatively little from the population in the form of taxes and corvee. 
This policy was apparently adopted to such a degree that Ray Huang in
64 Friese, p.90.
65 Wada (1939), p.101; Yamane (1966), p.189.
66 Friese, pp.44-45.
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his studies of the Ming fiscal system has concluded that there was 
undertaxation in the beginning of the dynasty in relation to the 
ability of the population to pay. The policy of Zhu Yuan-zhang 
could also be achieved by ensuring that nobody was subjected to 
unequal demands.
It is not important for our purpose to discuss whether this 
concern expressed by Zhu Yuan-zhang for the livelihood of the people 
was genuine. This will be of interest for biographers who want to 
describe the personality of the emperor. The fact is — and we have 
little reason to doubt the value of the sources — that such concern 
was expressed and to us as well as to contemporaries it makes perfect 
political sense, considering how extreme impoverishment of parts of 
the community had threatened the life of the previous dynasty. It is 
in the light of this wish to distribute the burden equally and the 
realization of the limited administrative capabilities — either as a 
temporary state of affairs or as a desirable state of affairs — that 
we must view the apparent insistence that each li-gza should be of the 
same size without regard for the natural village.
5. The li-jia and the subdistricts
The only deviation from the principle of the Z-d-jia organized 
strictly according to numbers is found in the 1391 regulations. They 
state that the H -leaders were not allowed — during the compilation of 
the Yellow Registers — to go outside the traditional territorial sub­
district (du).68 The du, which was a remnant of the bao-ji-a system in 
the Song was not used for subdistricts in the north in Ming times.
It is however reasonable to assume that this provision also covered 
the other traditional subdistricts such as the xicmg which had 
persisted in the north since the Tang dynasty. This assumption is 
confirmed for Jinan Prefecture in the local gazetteers for which 
information is available for the Ming dynasty. In most cases we see
67 Huang, p.183.
68 DMHD 20/2.
89 Shimizu, p.43.
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Che li-ji'O. divided between the xiang10 and in the one case where this 
is not recorded we are left with the impression that this was the 
situation.71
In Jinan districts had from four to nine subdistricts. The xiccng 
which had existed before the Ming dynasty appear to have had deep 
roots, but in the reshuffling of the districts in early Ming some had 
to be divided between two districts. One example is the division of 
the xiccng between Qidong, Qing-cheng, Zouping Districts and Wuding 
Subprefecture. The main problem there was the creation of Qidong 
District, which demanded the transfer of several subdistricts from the 
surrounding districts. This resulted in two subdistricts divided 
between Qidong and Qingcheng and one divided between Qidong and 
Zouping. Between Qingcheng and Wuding there were one or perhaps two 
divided subdistricts. Each part of a divided subdistrict kept its 
original name and formed a subdistrict in its respective district. In 
the case of the Zhengde Subdistrict which was divided between Qidong 
and Qingcheng it is interesting to note that the tradition of the old 
xiang survived, as the numbered series of the ti-jia was on the basis 
of the old xiang. Nos. 1 and 2 li-jia were in Qingcheng and nos. 3 
to 7 were in Qidong. The ti-gia were kept within the boundaries of 
the subdistricts with one possible exception. In Qidong it was 
reported that some members of no. 2 li-gia of Jiahui Subdistrict were 
living in Liangzou Subdistrict. It is not possible to establish 
whether this had been the case at the beginning of the dynasty or 
whether it was only the state of affairs at the time of writing in 
1617. In Qidong the subdistricts were again reorganized in 1461 into 
four subdistricts, to the north, east, south, and west. The former 
subdistricts were absorbed wholly into the new but they apparently
7 2kept their identity as there were again nine subdistricts in 1685.
70 Binzhou zhi 1583/1/35; Leling xian-zhi 1762/1/65; Linyi xian- 
zhi 1673/4/1; Putai xian-zhi 1592/5/4; Q.idong xian-zhi 1617/6/2; 
Qingcheng xian-zhi 1612/1/11; Wuding zhou-zhi 1588/2/1; Xincheng 
xian-zhi 1693/1/3; Zhanhua xian-zhi 1619/1/9; Zhangqiu xian-zhi 
1596/1/4.
71 Zichuan xian-zhi 1602/1/2, 3/1.
72 Qidong xian-zhi 1617/2/3, 6/2, 1685/1/13; Qingcheng xian-zhi 
1612/1/6, 11; Wuding zhou-zhi 1588/2/1; Zouping xian-zhi 1660/1/5. 
Some of the transfers of subdistricts are in the Qidong gazetteer 
dated to the Hong-zhi period. From the other gazetteers it is clear 
that the date should be the Hong-wu period.
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The number of Z'L—j'La in each subdistrict in Jinan varied from two 
to twenty-five. When the Z■'L-jia were not allowed to lie across the 
borders of the subdistrict then there would often be a surplus of 
potential L'L-j'La member households because the number of households in 
a subdistrict rarely was a multiple of 110. These surplus households 
were the ’supernumeraries' who in contrast to the 'odds and ends’ had 
to perform corvee under the direction of the Z^-leader. The super­
numeraries did not have to serve in the rotation of the regular corvee 
so they were probably the first to be called upon when conscription 
was made to the miscellaneous corvee.73 One consequence of this 
policy was therefore that the H -leaders might have had an interest in 
having as many supernumeraries as possible and were thus reluctant to 
increase the number of the Zi-j'L a following population increase within 
the subdistrict. As a certain amount of the miscellaneous corvee was 
performed for the benefit of the local yamen — either official duties 
or duties for the personal benefit of the officials — it seems likely 
that the officials shared this attitude. With the extra super­
numeraries they could raise their demands without unduly exhausting 
the households performing the regular corvee. The officials probably 
also had an interest in keeping the number of Z■'L—j'La as low as 
possible as their number influenced the allocation of corvee for the 
provincial or central government between the districts, and no 
official — even the most honest and conscientious — would want his 
district to be allocated a too large share of this corvee.
6. Revisions of the l i - j i a
With the emphasis on the equal size of each Z■'L-j'La for the 
purpose of equalizing the tax and corvee burden, it is to be expected 
that the number of L'L-j'La within the subdistricts would be revised 
during the decennial compilation of the Yellow Registers according to 
fluctuations in the number of households.74 However in the sources 
describing the procedures for the I'L-j'ia and the Yellow Registers 
there is no specific order that such a redistribution should be made
7 3
74
Kuribayashi (1971), p.19. 
Wada (1939), p.98.
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when the population figures warranted it. There are only directions 
for supplementing the I'l-j'ia when there were vacancies both at the 
level of li-leaders and the level of J^a-heads. A vacancy among the 
Z-i-leaders was to be filled by the jia-head household within the 1%~ 
jia who was considered the strongest in terms of adult males and tax 
payment. The jia-heads were supplemented from the ranks of the 'odds 
and ends' presumably by a household whose circumstances had changed in 
the intervening ten years so that it was now liable to perform corvee. 
If there were no such households in the li-jia it was then permitted 
to transfer households from another ti-jia within the same 
subdistrict.7 5
From reading the instructions concerning the compilation of the 
Yellow Registers and the organization of the li-jia it is easy to get 
the impression of an implicit understanding that the number of l-i-jia 
should follow fluctuations in the number of households. The reason 
this is not clearly stated can be that adjustments were not intended, 
but this seems unlikely as corrections were carried out from time to 
time. A more likely explanation may be that the authors of the 
regulations in 1381 and 1391 did not feel any need for specific 
instructions regarding the increase or decrease in population as the 
fluctuations had not yet been so manifest as to warrant a 
redistribution. The 1391 regulations give the impression that they 
were issued as additional regulations to the 1381 law to cater for 
abuses and problems which had become evident in the period between the 
first and second registration, and this may be the reason why this 
particular problem was not dealt with.
If the need for adjustments in the number of li-jia was brought 
to the attention of the central government as a consequence of changes 
in the population, it would probably only have been after the 
completion of the second registration in 1391. Additional 
instructions would then have been issued in the years before the third 
scheduled registration when the instructions for this were being 
drafted in the Ministry of Revenue. This period coincided with the 
death of Zhu Yuan-zhang and the upheavals of the Jing-nan Incident. 
These events already caused the third registration to be postponed by
7 5 DMHD 20/2.
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7 6two years so it is likely that sufficient attention was not given to
work out the instructions for this registration, if any were issued at 
7 7all. It is furthermore conceivable that the local officials were 
not too anxious to draw attention to the problems arising from 
population fluctuations. Redistribution of the Zi-jia would mean 
additional work in re-allocating the corvee, and as long as the 
fluctuations were not too marked the absence of adjustments to the Zi- 
jia would not have had serious consequences.
There is thus an alternative explanation for the lack of direct 
orders to redistribute the Zi-jia to the one preferred by others. 
Following a seventeenth century author, Kawakatsu thinks that the 
number of Zi-jia became static in 1391 because the emphasis in the 
organization of the Zi-jia was moved from households to land following 
the new regulations with regard to subdistricts. This had become
7 8possible with the land survey of the Fish-scale Registers in 1387. 
Ping-ti Ho also claims that Zhu Yuan-zhang after the introduction of 
the Yellow Registers and the Fish-scale Registers became more 
interested in perpetuating the fiscal structure than in adjusting it 
to changes in population and wealth.79 There may be some validity in 
such arguments that the policy of Zhu Yuan-zhang resulted in making 
the system inflexible. The inertia of the system and the limited 
administrative capability of the bureaucracy are other factors to be 
considered but it appears that political events at the turn of the 
century over which Zhu Yuan-zhang had no influence must be taken into 
consideration as well. Whatever the cause was we must regard the 
failure to enforce flexibility from the early years of the Zi-jia 
system to have been a considerable weakness in the system and this
/b Wei, p.107.
77 No pre-registration instructions for 1403 are included in the 
Hou-hu-zhi as there are for 1381 and 1391. Pre-registration 
instructions only begin again in 1452 which seems to indicate a 
general lack of interest in the first part of the fifteenth century to 
making adjustments to the registration and the Zi-jia system. Hou-hu- 
zhi 4/1-6.
78 Kawakatsu Mamoru, "Mindai no kishöko ni tsuite", Toy’d zhi Kenkyu 
33.3 (1974), 53-54.
79 Ho, pp.9-10. He overlooks the fact that a Zi-jia had to be 
supplemented from the surrounding Zi-jia if there were no substitutes 
available.
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must have had considerable influence on its decline starting in the 
late Hong-wu period.
In Jinan Prefecture changes are found in the number of li-jia in 
eleven districts, while no changes are found in eleven other districts. 
Details are not available for the remaining eight districts and sub-
ft f)prefectures. In the districts where changes happened there were 
usually only one or two during the whole dynasty. Dates for the 
redistribution are only given in a few districts and it is not 
possible to draw any conclusions from these as to the general 
circumstances behind the changes.81 Presumably they took place when 
an official felt the need to make corrections and he had the will and 
power to carry them through with the support of the provincial and 
central government. Certainly redistribution did not take place when 
the numbers warranted it. In the Licheng gazetteer from 1640 it is 
mentioned that some li-jia could have over 1,000 households while 
others had only a handful of clans.82 This was at a time when the li- 
jia had lost much of its significance but we do get the impression 
that the author did not think that this difference was completely 
without relevance. This may be a special case but discrepancies in 
the size of the li-jia seem to have been a constant concern of the 
officials, so we are forced to think that any changes in the li-jia 
system met with considerable opposition from the population. The 
households in the larger li-jia would have had a vested interest in 
preserving the status quo as this would give then an a priori 
advantage in the allocation of corvee even if the officials took 
corrective measures against the unequal strength of the li-jia.
The only major redistribution for which details are available 
took place in 1512 in Zhanhua District. This coincided with a general 
policy of the central government to revise the li-jia system,83 but 
the direct cause given in Zhanhua was the bandit incursions into
80 See appendix I.
81 Dates are given for Zichuan where two li-jia were ceded to a 
district in Qingzhou Prefecture (1602/1/2). Lijin increased the 
number from 34 to 40 in 1462 (1673/4/1) and in 1512 there were 
reductions in Wuding (1588/2/1) and Zhanhua (1619/1/4).
82 Licheng xian-zhi 1640/3/16.
83 Hou-ku-zhi 8/2.
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Shandong in 1511-1512 which were claimed to have led to a population 
decrease. The result was that the number of li-jia was cut by one- 
half from forty-eight to twenty-four, still in four subdistricts each 
with six li-jia. The redistribution was done on the order of the 
provincial government and involved an assistant administration
8 4commissioner and the assistant prefect of Jinan Prefecture.
7. Li-jia and population figures
Underlying the discussion in the preceding section is the 
assumption that during the Ming dynasty there were population 
fluctuations in the districts of Jinan Prefecture which warranted 
redistribution. It is generally acknowledged that the figures for the 
Ming period tend to show a static picture of the population and that 
this cannot be correct. It has been estimated that the population 
more than doubled from 1368 to 1600. Although there is reason to 
assume that the increase was more rapid in the south than in the 
north85 this would still indicate that there were considerable 
fluctuations in Shandong province. The reason for the failure of the 
sources to reveal the true figures is that the population records were 
often those used for fiscal purposes and it is well known that such 
figures tend to become erroneous.
The picture of population development we get from the district 
gazetteers in Jinan Prefecture is extremely diversified. In some 
districts a constant rise in the number of households is recorded, in 
some a stagnation and in others the number of households decreased. 
When it comes to the number of persons living in the prefecture the 
situation is even more complicated. This is due to the counting of 
heads in some districts and the counting of male adults in others. As 
the male adults (ding) in the Ming dynasty tend to represent a fiscal 
unit rather than all the male adults living in the districts,86 such 
figures are virtually worthless for estimating the population.
84 Zhanhua xian-zhi 1619/1/4.
85 Ho, p.264.
86 Ibid. , p.26.
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In Jinan there are figures available for two districts which have 
a ring of authenticity as they show a fairly steady increase in the 
population and also a certain degree of consistency in the person/ 
household ratio. This ratio was in the vicinity of ten to one which 
seems to be a characteristic demographic feature of north China 
including Shandong.87
Figures for Qidong District88
Year Households Persons P/H Ratio
1391 4,360 47,813 11.0
1452 5,280 51,330 9.7
1462 6,718 62,310 9.3
1472 6,930 69,074 10.0
1492 7,515 71,140 9.5
1512 7,689 74,919 9.7
1551 11,340 101,290 8.9
Figures for Shanghe District (only available from 1492)
Year Households Persons P/H Ratio
1492 8,111 79,890 9.8
1502 9,896 99,896 10.1
1512 9,634 110,090 11.4
1522 9,936 115,835 11.7
1587 11,314 123,986 11.0
8 9
There are figures for Qidong District after 1551 but their
q  nreliability is doubtful. The 1586 Shanghe gazetteer admits that 
there was a degree of under-registration at least on the last year due 
to increases in taxes and corvee. This had caused Idle and lazy' 
people to enter the Buddhist and Taoist orders or to'sneak away1 to
87 Michel Cartier et Pierre-Etienne Will, "Demographie et
Institutions en Chine: 'Contribution a 1*Analyse des Recensements de
l’Epoque Imperiale (2 ap. J.-C. - 1750)'", Annates de Demographie 
Eistorique (1971), 230.
88 Qidong xian-zhi 1617/15/4.
89 Shanghe xian-zhi 1586/3/3.
90 For 1569, the 1617 gazetteer gives 16,729 households and 141,220 
persons (ratio 8.5). The 1685 edition gives the same households but 
only 102,020 persons (ratio 6.1). For 1617, the edition of that year 
gives 24,900 households, the number of persons being undecipherable. 
The 1687 edition has 24,000 households and 100,608 persons (ratio 4.2). 
The P/H ratio continued to be between 4.2 and 5.2 up to 1687. Qidong 
xian-zhi 1617/15/4, 1687/3/2.
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live elsewhere. Even among those who remained in the district some 
were in hiding and not registered.
These developments in Qidong and Shanghe Districts can be 
contrasted with the development in, for example, Putai District:91
Year Households Ding D/H Ratio
Hong-wu 17,354 36,817 2.1
Yong-le 17,921 37,153 2.1
Cheng-hua 12,914 35,368 2.7
Zheng-de 10,878 27,642 2.5
Jia-jing 9,196 11,073 1.2
1567 8,335 10,850 1.3
c. 1586 14,654 14,675 1.0
The sudden rise in the household figures during the Wan-li period 
is a common feature in districts which had shown a decline or
q pstagnation in these figures over the preceding two hundred years.
It is so drastic that it cannot represent a real increase in 
population but must be a result of changed registration procedures.
It is unlikely that the district officials had been unaware of the 
increase in the population. This statistical diversity is probably 
best explained by assuming that the figures recorded in the gazetteers 
were drawn from different kinds of registers in the districts.
Besides the Yellow Registers other registers were kept in the yamen. 
One of them would have been the equal corvee registers introduced 
together with the equal corvee (jun-yao). This began in Shandong 
between 1483 and I486.93 There is no record of the use of the 
unofficial population registers — White Registers {hai-ce') —  in Jinan 
Prefecture. These are reported in other parts of the country from 
c. 150094 and it is of course possible that they existed in Jinan 
Prefecture as well. Furthermore in the reforms carried out in the 
second half of the sixteenth century other registers than the Yellow
91 Putai xian-zhi 1592/4/1.
92 E.g. Deping xian-zhi 1576/3/1, 1796/3/2; Leling xian-zhi 
llbl/l/hl) Lijin xian-zhi 1673/4/1. There were examples where this 
did not happen. Zichuan xian-zhi 1602/12/1; Laiwu xian-zhi 1673/4/1.
93 Taniguchi Kikuo, "Mindai Kahoku ni okeru ginsa seiritsu no ichi 
kenkyü — Santo no mongin seiritsu o chüshin ni shite", Töyöshi Kenkyü 
20.3 (1961), 4.
94 Wei, p.226.
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9 5Registers arc mentioned. The conclusion must be that there were in 
the yamen archives a selection of different population data available 
for the compilers of the gazetteers. Each set of data served a 
specific purpose and could be different from others serving different 
purposes. The data available to us depends upon the availability of 
the registers to the compilers of the gazetteers and the selection 
made by them.
Irrespective of actual population developments it is sufficient 
to note for the purpose of analysing the li-jia system that changes in 
the number of Z-i-jia were not enforced when the recorded population 
figures warranted it. Even if we only take into account households 
registered for taxation, it does not appear that the adjustments were 
carried out. Putai District may be a case where the population 
figures are fiscal figures, but the number of Zi-jia was only reduced 
from sixty-three in the Hong-wu period to fifty-nine in the Jia-jing 
period.
8. Li-jia and the she
As seen above, Japanese scholars have made a considerable effort 
to determine the relationship between administrative villages and 
natural villages. The major work has been done by Shimizu Morimitsu. 
He makes it quite clear that this kind of study is extremely difficult 
as the sources relating to this level of the administration rarely 
give an explicit description of how the laws were carried out in 
practice. It is Shimizu’s general conclusion that administrative 
villages were always organized with regard to natural villages. This 
includes the li-jia of the Ming dynasty.96 Kuribayashi has found an 
example from Shandong where it is explicitly stated that there were a 
number of villages in the li-jia. Unfortunately his source is a late 
Ming gazetteer and he does not indicate whether he believes that the 
information is valid for early Ming. Some caution should be
95 SDJHL 4/3.
96 Shimizu, pp.49-58.
97 Kuribayashi (1971), p.301
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exercised in applying the evidence from the later period to early Ming 
as some developments could have taken place in the meantime. 
Manipulations of the Z■'i-j'ia system could have obliterated possible 
inconvenient divisions of the natural village and there could have 
been a tendency to establish new villages within the boundaries of the 
i'i-j'ia. These remarks do not mean that we have to reject the general 
conclusions of Shimizu and Kuribayashi. It is after all natural to 
think that the people always tended to prefer to identify the 
administrative villages with the natural villages. These remarks are 
only aimed at emphasizing the extreme caution needed before 
conclusions can be made on the evidence.
In the sources which have been examined in Jinan Prefecture no 
information on the relation between the i'i-j'ia and the natural village 
has been found. However in north China it may not be so important to 
examine this relationship because the she inherited from the Yuan 
seems to have played an important part in the establishment of the i'i- 
j'ia in early Ming. Gui E,98 who as a local official in Beizhili had 
been actively engaged in the problems of the I'i-j'ia, wrote around 1530 
that the subprefectures and districts in Jiangxi, Huguang, etc., 
divided the i'i-j'ia according to villages, whereas in Beizhili, Henan, 
etc., the i'i-j'ia were divided according to s/ze.99 Kuribayashi has 
found a few examples in Shandong outside Jinan Prefecture where the 
i'i-j'ia are called s/ze.100 In 1570 it is also seen in an administrative 
document from the provincial governor101 so there seems to have been a 
certain tradition for the use of the term she instead of i'i-j'ia.
In Jinan Prefecture there is no direct evidence that the she 
continued in the i'i-j'ia. In Pingyuan District there may however be 
indirect evidence that this had happened. The she in northern China 
were supplemented in the early years of the dynasty with other local 
self-government units called tun. The she were for the people already 
living in the area. The tun were established for migrants being moved 
by the government from other provinces, primarily Shanxi and Shenxi,
98 DMB, pp.756-758.
99 Ba-bian jing-shi tei-zuan 35/13.
100 Kuribayashi (1971), pp.29-30.
101 SDHJL 4/26.
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to bo settled on land which could easily be brought under cultivation. 
The land of the local people was measured according to a large mou, 
and that of the migrants according to a small mou. The use of the
large mou was probably introduced as a tax concession to the thinly 
populated northern provinces in comparison to those of the south. The 
use of the small mou for the migrants indicates that with the influx 
of new population such tax concessions were no longer regarded as 
necessary.10 3
In the 1590 Pingyuan gazetteer it is stated that the district was 
divided into forty-six li-jia. Of these twenty-two li-gia were large 
Z-i-gia (da-li) for the local population (tu-min) , while twenty-four 
were small li-gia (xiao-li) for the small people (xiao-min).104 This 
indicates that there had originally been twenty-two she and twenty- 
four tun and that the she had been used as a basis for the li-jia in 
early Ming. It is not clear whether the difference between the she 
and the tun had disappeared altogether in the sixteenth century. Gui 
E writes that he initiated reforms in Chengan District, Beizhili, to 
remove the difference between large and small mou. He further claims 
that the reform spread to the whole of Guangping Prefecture and that 
all the districts in Beizhili, Honan and Shandong wished to introduce 
similar reforms. He laments however that the reform met with strong 
opposition from the powerful official families.105 If the problem had 
existed in other districts than Pingyuan in Jinan Prefecture then the 
absence of references in the gazetteers would indicate that it had 
been solved at some time, perhaps following Gui E’s reform. The 
problem may not have existed in many of the other districts as it 
should be noted that Pingyuan District is on the border to Dongchang 
Prefecture which seems to be the prefecture in Shandong which had the 
greatest influx of migrants.106
102 Ba-bian jing-shi lei-zuan 35/13.
103 Wada Sei, Minshi Shokkashi yakuchü (Tokyo, 1957), pp. 56-58.
104 Pingyuan xian-zhi 1590/1/20.
105 Ba-bian jing-shi lei-zuan 35/13-14.
106 Kataoka Shibako, "Kahoku no tochi shoyü to ichijö benbo”, in 
Shimizu hakase tsuit'd kinen Mindaishi ronsd (Tokyo, 1962), p.141.
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TUE FUNCTION OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN MING 
AFTER TUE ESTABLISHMENT OF TUE L1-J1A
1. Population registration and other fiscal duties
The Zi-leaders were responsible for the compilation of the Yellow 
Registers in their Zz-jza. Each household filled in their registration 
form and handed it over to the administrating jza-head who in turn 
handed it over to the Zi-leader. The heaviest work load was on the 
Zd-leader on service in the tenth year of the decennial rotation.107 
There was a certain amount of paperwork involved in the distribution 
of the registration forms, their collection and supervision, and the 
forwarding to the yamen. They were usually assisted in this work by 
people in the Zz-jza who could write and calculate. These were the 
ZY-registrar (shu~shou) and the Zi-tax assessor (succn-shou) who in the 
beginning of the dynasty only served in the years of registration.
Their service was not regarded as a part of the regular corvee and if 
no qualified persons were found within the Zz-jza then persons from 
outside could be hired to perform the duties. As the clerical work in 
the Zz-jza increased with higher levies of taxes and particularly 
other duties, the ZY-registrars and ZY-tax assessors showed a tendency 
to become permanent and, with the increased responsibilities, more 
powerful positions.108
The Zi-leaders were also responsible for the population in the 
Zz-jza. It was their duty to make sure that nobody escaped from the 
Zz-jza in order to avoid corvee, and if they escaped the ZY-leaders 
had to report it to the authorities so that the fugitives could be 
apprehended. The ZY-leaders also ensured that no member household in 
the Zz-jza concealed fugitives from other Zz-jza. All these were 
criminal offences and the Ming Code prescribes punishments of the Zz- 
leaders and the household heads if they falsified or obstructed 
registration.109 A special kind of supervision exercised by the Zz- 
leader over the population was the control or 'purification' (qzng-Zz) 
of the military households and their registers in the Zz-jza. 110
107 Yamane (1966), p.42.
108 Kuribayashi (1971), p.52.
109 Mzng-Zil jz~jze fu-Zz (1610) (Taipei, reprint of 1908 edn.), 4/1-5, 
31-33; Friese, pp.24-26.
110 Yamane (1966), p.42.
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For tax collection in the. Zi-J'fa, the Ü - lead er would assist the 
tax captains in areas where these were appointed. In areas with no 
tax captains the Z-i-leaders would be in charge of pressing and 
collecting the taxes under direct instruction from the yamen 
personnel.111 So far no evidence that tax captains were appointed in 
Shandong in the first half of the dynasty has been found. We must
therefore assume that the Z-i-leaders in Jinan Prefecture in this 
period worked directly under the yamen. This seems plausible as the 
number of H-jia in the districts of Jinan averaged c. 50 and only in 
two districts exceeded 100.
The Z^-leaders were responsible for the supervision of the house­
holds in their Z-i-jia. If any of them cheated with their returns on 
ding and property, the Z-i-leader was to suffer the same punishment as 
the culprit if he did not report it. He was also to report on natural 
disasters in his li-jia such as drought, flood and pests. If he 
reported that his li-jia could not pay its taxes as a result of a bad 
year then the payments were deferred to the following year. However 
if the deficiency in tax payments was due to cheating or absconding of 
households, i.e. to the neglect of the Z^-leader, then the remaining 
members of the Zi-jia would have to make up the deficiency.113
The sources are not very informative with regard to the function 
of the Z--f-leaders in raising the manpower for corvee. In assessing 
the households and distributing the corvee between them, the Zi- 
leaders were assisted by the Z^-registrars and Z-i-tax assessors and 
perhaps the elders. After 1384 the assessment included a division of 
the households into the tax classes. This division provided a 
convenient guideline for the ^-leaders and Z-i-registrars in their 
allocation of the corvee duties and more important perhaps it made it 
possible for others — both officials and the households concerned — to 
check that the distribution of corvee was fair. In at least one 
prefecture it was apparently part of the regular corvee of the Zi-
111 Ibid. , p.40; Liang Fang-zhong, Ming-dai Ziang-zhang zhi-du
(Shanghai, 1957), pp.65-66, 85-90.
112 Taniguchi Kikuo, "Mindai Kahoku no daiko ni tsuite", Toyoshi 
Kenkyü 27 (1969), 483; Liang (1957), p.58.
113 Wada (1939), p.100.
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leaders to dispatch the soldiers and artisans to their corvee 
duties.114
2. The non-fiscal duties of the Zz-gza
These have been described by Yamane Yukio and Sakai Tadao from
various sources as follows: maintaining public order, instruction of
the people, settlement of disputes, encouragement to agriculture,
mutual assistance and other incidental work in the Zz-jza. This
included apprehension of fugitives for which the non-incumbent Zz-
leaders could be used.115 The period when the /-/-leaders were in
charge of the non-fiscal duties were relatively short as they were
more or less transferred to the Zz-e.lders (Zz-Zao-ren) beginning in
1394. From various sources it appears however that the duties which
had previously been performed under the Zz of the Zz-she and xzang-Zz
in connection with the Shen-mzng and Jing-shan pavilions were
transferred to the auspices of the Zz-gza. 116 In an order of 1383 it
appears that the /-/-leader was now to chair the wine-drinking
ceremonies which were conducted at the conclusion of the ceremonies at
the Zz-she altar in the spring and autumn. During these ceremonies
the participants were admonished to respect the old and virtuous,
observe the rituals and act in accordance with the criminal code. It
is not clear whether these ceremonies were actually performed in the
Zz-gza as the instructions mention 100 households and not 110 but it
is clear that the /-/-leaders presided over them.117 This is also
clear in an order of 1384 which stated that it was the duty of the Zz-
leaders to induce the inhabitants of the Zz-gza to follow the
appropriate social order, to encourage them to attend to their
agricultural duties and to warn them against bad conduct. At the end
of the year the /-/-leaders would further investigate the conduct of
118the people, criticize the bad and commend the good.
Kuribayashi (1971), p.51.
115 Ibzd. p.54; Yamane (1966), pp.41-42.
116 Kuribayashi (1971), p.55.
117 DMHD 79/4.
118 SL 1384:b:ren-wu.
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The informal: Lou is insufficient to claim that the Z-'Z-leaders took
over all the non-fiscal duties in the li-gia of the whole country.
Some sources mention that the tax captains shared the responsibilities
of the /.^-leaders. 119 It also appears that families with examination
12 0graduates had a special function in the instruction of the people.
The role of the I'L-j'ia in non-fiscal duties was probably only finally 
settled with the introduction of the Z-t-elders when they took over 
most of the educational and judicial duties of the Z-t-leaders. This 
may have been in recognition of the fact that the rotational service 
of the Z^-leaders, together with their other duties, made them unfit 
to fulfil these functions.
3. The li-jia contributions
During their year of incumbency the li-leaders and jia-heads had 
to pay minor expenses within the Z'Z-j'Za for educational and ceremonial 
activities, relief for the poor and support for prospective 
scholars.121 Probably from the very early years of the Z'i-j'La system, 
the incumbent Z-i-leaders and gi-cc-heads also had to pay for some 
expenses on behalf of the bureaucracy. These would include, on a 
modest scale, catering for official visitors to the district, often in 
such a way that the Z-i-leaders in the city would arrange banquets, 
etc. , while the Z--/-leaders in the countryside had to meet the expenses 
of gifts and the sending off of visitors on their further journey.
The Z-'Z-leaders would further be asked to provide paper, ink, etc., for 
the use in the offices of the yamen. Such contributions were not a
part of the original duties of the Z■i-j'La but it was a convenient way 
for the officials to meet such expenses for which there were no other 
budgetary allowances.123 Later in the dynasty they came to be known 
as ' Z■'i-j'La contributions' or simply 'Z■'i-j'ia' .
119 Liang (1957), pp.43-49.
120 DMHD 20/22.
121 Yamane (1966), p.41.
122 Yamane Yukio, "Mindai richö no shokuseki ni kansuru ichi 
kötsatsu", Tohögaku 3 (1952), 84.
123 Kuribayashi (1971), p.98.
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In the Hong-wu period there were already demands from the central 
government for Zz—gza contributions, the so-called shang-gong. At 
first these contributions consisted of local produce considered a 
necessity either for the imperial household, for the central 
government or for the military forces. Some of these contributions 
were offset in the tax payments but this was not universal and the 
reimbursements do not seem to have covered expenses.124 Contributions 
to the local government agencies, normally known as gong-fei-, were not 
reimbursed and they became increasingly heavy. Besides the provision 
of stationery and entertainment these contributions could be such 
items as travel expenses for examination candidates, welfare expenses, 
ceremonial expenses, repair of buildings and provision of household 
utensils.125 Other contributions could be the personal service of the 
Z-i-leader in attendance at the yamen,126 and a particularly heavy 
labour service was the postal service. Such service was provided in 
areas where there was no established regular postal service. Whenever 
there was a need for public transport the Zz-jza were required to 
provide the necessary manpower, horses or boats. As travel ways could 
change quicker than the regular postal services were re-routed, this
12 7imposition could be very heavy in some districts.
It was the nature of the Zz-jza contributions that they responded
to ad hoc demands from the bureaucracy. If such demands were illegal
and for the private benefit of the government personnel they were
12 8difficult to control and the system led to considerable abuse.
Even when the Zz-jza contributions tended to become institutionalized 
as fixed amounts, the arbitrariness of the levy continued as it 
provided flexibility in the fiscal system. However it also appears 
that the Zz-jza contributions were one of the main obstacles to a fair 
economic administration in the later part of the dynasty.
The Zz-gza contributions were paid both by the incumbent Zz- 
leaders and jza-heads. There is no indication of a country-wide
124 Huang, pp.34-35.
125 Yamane (1952), p.84.
126 Kuribayashi (1971), pp.92-93.
127 Yamane (1952), p.86; Kuribayashi (1971), p.90.
128 Kuribayashi (1971), pp.99, 103.
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policy for dividing the burden between the Z'Z-leader and the jta-head. 
The only example known so far is from a district in Sichuan where the 
Z-t-leader paid 30% of the contribution, while the rest was divided 
among the jia-heads. As long as the demands for li-jia contributions 
were not too heavy it was not a major problem for the households to 
provide them once every ten years. However when the levies increased, 
some of the incumbent households could no longer meet the expenses 
from their income during the year of service. They either had to make 
savings during the nine years of rest or they had to borrow money.
Both solutions were a major problem for many poorer households and 
probably contributed to an intensification of the gap between poor and 
rich.129
4. Li-lao-ren
In the non-fiscal duties which had apparently been laid upon the 
Z■i.-jia, the Z-^-leaders were assisted or superseded by the 4Y-elders 
(li-lao-ren). An examination of the system of elders in the Ming 
dynasty is greatly hampered by the term itself. There seems to be a 
general agreement that the elders had special privileges and duties as 
leaders of the people and scrutinizers of the bureaucracy even if 
there was no official definition of their status.
Institutionalized elders are first mentioned in the Ming dynasty 
when the qi-su were abolished in 1388:8. These qi-su had judicial 
power in petty cases and had probably been established shortly after 
the li-jia system in 1381. The subsequent formal establishment of 
elders was in 1394. However there are records from between 1388 and 
1394 showing that prefectures, subprefectures and districts selected 
elders to be sent to the capital for consultation with the central 
government. During this period the elders apparently also retained 
the privilege and duty imposed upon them in the Great Proclamation 
(Da-Gao) to report on the abuses of local officials.130
In 1394 the li-lao-ren were entrusted with judicial power in
129 Yamane (1966), pp.47, 52.
130 Kuribayashi (1971), p.56.
63
petty cases. In 1397 they were also given power over education,
encouragement of agriculture and mutual assistance in the Zi-gza.
Their duties were finally laid down in great detail in the Precepts
for Popular Instruction (Jiao-min pang-wen) in 1398. There were two
reasons for the appointment of the ZZ-elders. First, they could
relieve the ZZ-leaders of some of their duties in the ZZ-jZa so that
they could concentrate on the fiscal side of their responsibilities.
Since there was no time limit on the service as ZZ-elders they could
probably perform many of the community functions better than the ZZ-
leaders. The only limitation on the service of the ZZ-elders may have
been that their performance was reviewed every three years. Second,
they could relieve the judicial bureaucracy of petty cases. This not
only benefitted the local officials but also the central government as
too many local officials were unable to pass judgement in minor cases
and referred them to the higher authorities for a decision. The
introduction of the ZZ-elders was thus the result of the inadequate
13 1performance of the bureaucracy at the local level.
The first part of the Precepts for Popular Instruction is 
concerned with the judicial aspects of the ZZ-elder institution, in 
many ways similar to the duties of the s/ze-leaders of the Yuan dynasty. 
The ZZ-elders were primarily to concern themselves with civil matters 
but in some cases they could also pass judgement in criminal cases if 
the accused was a first-offender. However in serious criminal cases 
such as burglary, fraud, and loss of life the ZZ-elders could only 
hear the case with the consent of all parties. The ZZ-elders were to 
hear the cases in the Shen-ming pavilion and they were allowed to 
punish by beating with the light and heavy bamboo, but not to arrest 
people and hold them in custody. The cases were normally decided by 
several elders. It is not clear whether this meant ZZ-elders from 
several ZZ-jZa or other elders appointed from within the ZZ-jZa. In 
all cases of a nature to be handled by the ZZ-elders, the plaintiffs 
were strictly forbidden to bypass the ZZ-elders and bring them 
directly to the officials. If this regulation was disregarded then 
the plaintiff would be punished and if a ZZ-leader refused to hear a 
case he would also be punished.
131 Wada (1939), pp.111-113; Kuribayashi (1971), p.56; Yamane 
(1966), p.55.
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In the field of instruction of the people, the ZZ-elder would 
arrange for a disabled person to walk around in the ZZ-Qia led by a 
child. They would strike a wooden bell and proclaim the Six Sacred 
Maxims:
"Honour and obey parents"
"Reverence and respect superiors"
"Work for harmony in the community"
"Instruct and admonish the young"
"Let each be content with his work"
"Avoid evil conduct"
In a l■'i-j'ia which was scattered over a large area there would be a 
wooden bell for each j'ia. The Z-i-elders arranged the sacrifices, 
especially the wine drinking ceremonies in spring and autumn, and they 
carried out instruction in the school, she-xue. During the wine 
drinking ceremonies and in the she-xue they would read the three parts 
of the Great Proclamation. When encouraging farming they would ensure 
that everyone in the li-jia attended to his duties even to the extent 
that a drum was sounded at the fifth watch at night so they could 
supervise that everybody left early for the work in the fields. In 
the fields they were to supervise mulberry, cotton and irrigation work. 
As for bandits within the li-ji-a area, the ZZ-elder would assemble 
the men of the Z'i-j'ia to apprehend them and after the culprits had 
been arrested they were sent to the officials.132 However in the 
sphere of public security it is worth noting that there was no mutual 
responsibility between the households in the 133
The system of Zi-elders seems to have declined rapidly after its 
introduction at the end of the Hong-wu period. This decline to some 
extent followed the general decline of the Zi-jia system as an 
instrument of local self-government. There were however also weak­
nesses in the system of ZZ-elders itself as described in 1428 by the 
magistrate in Xincheng District, Jinan. He complained that the Zi- 
elders used the law for their own benefit. With such opportunities 
there were people who bribed their way into the position of ZZ-elder
132 The Precepts are paraphrased in Wada (1939), pp.113-117, and 
translated in Elmquist, pp.277-301.
133 Wada (1939), p.117.
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so ihn L they could use it to slander officials to their superiors and
to make extortions from the people. The result was that old and
13 4upright people were no longer selected for the position.
The police duties of local self-government could also be 
performed by the zong-j-ia and xiao-gia. It is not known when these 
positions were created. Yamane thinks that they were established at 
the time of the decline of the Z-i-elders in order to take over the 
duties of public security. Their existence is mostly recorded in 
middle and southern China. There are no clear records to show their 
terms of service. In some cases they were selected on the basis of 
the subdistrict in others according to the number of households. In 
one such case one x'tao-g'ia was conscripted for each ten households and 
one zong-gda for fifty households.135
5. Tax captains
Above the level of the I'i-j'ia, the local self-government system 
was supplemented by the tax captains {l-iang-zhang) who were 
responsible for the collection and forwarding of taxes from the 'I'i-j'ia 
within their tax areas (qu). The normal size of this qu was an area 
which yielded 10,000 dan in taxes, but in practice they seem to have 
been smaller. The status of tax captain was originally considered to 
be closer to the status of officials than was normal for other corvee 
duties. Meritorious tax captains could be appointed officials and at 
the beginning of the dynasty they went each year to the capital 
(Nanking) to receive their instructions from the emperor in person. 
After the Hong-wu period, and particularly after the capital moved to 
Peking in 1420, their status changed to that of corvee. It was 
impossible to ask all the tax captains to come to the capital each 
year as the majority of them were from the middle and southern 
provinces. With the loss of the personal attention of the emperor, 
the tax captains became more easily the victims of excessive demands 
from officials. For some of them this led to their ruin while other
Wada (1939), p.118. 
Yamane (1966), p.63.
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tax captains were able to use their position to enrich themselves from 
the inhabitants of their tax area. The result was that the social 
esteem of the tax captains fell drastically.136
In Shandong, as in the other northern provinces, there is no 
evidence that Hang-zhang were appointed at the beginning of the 
dynasty or later. However, as first pointed out by Liang Fang-zhong 
and later by Japanese scholars, some kind of tax captains, the da~hu, 
were appointed at least during the second half of the dynasty in the 
five northern provinces of Shandong, Henan, Beizhili, Shanxi and 
Shenxi, and possibly in Sichuan. They are first mentioned in 1509 in 
connection with the Hang-zhang as extorting money from the people. 
This indicates that they had operated for some time before that 
date.137
FACTORS IN THE CHANGE AND DECLINE OF THE LI-JIA SYSTEM
The H-gia system was created for a static society and in this 
respect it must be regarded as a considerable achievement of the early 
Ming bureaucracy. Although there was no doubt a certain degree of 
under-registration of the population in the 1380s and 1390s the 
figures appear to have an accuracy which most pre-modern societies 
could be proud of and which in China was not attained again before 
1776. 1 38
The Yellow Registers were compiled from the outset with the 
purpose of providing a reliable instrument for the levy of taxes and 
corvee. It is a common feature of such population registers to 
develop serious under-registration if the methods of checking the 
registers are inadequate. This was the case in the Ming dynasty.
There is evidence that the Yellow Registers in some areas were not 
changed during the dynasty but only copied meticulously from the first
13 9registers.
136 Liang (1957), passim; Kuribayashi (1971), p.54.
137 Taniguchi (1969), pp.474-483.
138 Ho, pp.3, 22.
139 Wei, p.224.
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Ping-ti Ho claims that there was a change of emphasis in the 
Yellow Registers from 1381 to 1391 from being records of the whole 
population towards being records of the fiscal population. in my view 
the 1391 regulations were intended to clarify matters which had arisen 
out of the first registration. The order in 1391 that young males 
over the age of ten were to be enrolled in the regular register so 
that they were ready to perform corvee when they turned sixteen should 
be seen as a measure to ensure that they entered the corvee service at 
the right time rather than as a shift of emphasis towards fiscal 
population. It is possible that such amendments may subsequently have 
led to an emphasis on fiscal population, but there appears to be no 
change in official policy.140
The I'i-j'La system was based upon a mutual responsibility between 
the households in the Z■'L-j'La to supply the government with tax and 
services. For a reasonable functioning of such a system it was not 
only necessary that each Z■'i-jia had more or less the same economic 
strength but also that all the households in the Iz-jia had sufficient 
strength to meet the requirements. Such a situation apparently 
existed at the beginning of the dynasty when, after a considerable 
redistribution of land, most households were to some extent equal in 
economic strength. However subsequent development was towards 
concentration of wealth in fewer households and many households became 
too poor to meet the levies imposed upon them.141 The result was a 
certain degree of illegal migration or non-registration. Since the 
households who remained still had to contribute the taxes and services 
of the whole Zi-jia their burden became heavier thus forcing more 
households to abscond or to seek refuge with wealthy households or in 
monasteries. This development continued as a vicious circle until 
some li-jia became more or less depopulated at least in terms of 
registered population. Such developments are repeatedly described in 
the sources and are evidenced in practice by the reduction in the 
numbers of Z■'L-j'La in many districts, even if the evidence available to 
us today suggests population increase.142
1 4 0 
1 4 1 
1 42
Ho, p.ll.
Wada (1939), p.104. 
Wei, pp.200 ff.
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To keep the t'i-Q'ia functioning in its original form would also 
have required honesty on the part of those who undertook the 
registration and allocation of the duties in the i.e. the li-
leaders, the Z-'Z-registrars and the Z^-tax assessors. In the absence
of such honesty an effective method of checking their operation was 
required. The government was fully aware of malpractices and 
instituted elaborate procedures from the district level up to the 
national level where the registers were checked in the Lake Posterior
Archives in Nanking. Even if this control was backed up by heavy
punishment for cheating, it did not succeed and we must conclude that 
it was simply too ambitious considering the administrative 
capabilities of the bureaucracy. Furthermore, the punishments were so 
heavy that they would only have been applied with reluctance by most
14 3officials and they were subsequently modified drastically in 1451.
It was inevitable under such circumstances that there was considerable 
tampering with the Yellow Registers and there developed during the 
dynasty a whole vocabulary for the various manipulations of persons 
and property.144 It should however be noted that records of 
malpractices are more likely to have been included in the sources than 
records of law-abiding and smooth operations of the Z-Y-jYa, so our 
picture of the system tends to become distorted. However, there can 
be no doubt that there were numerous problems in the Z■z-j'La system for 
reliable and fair operation of taxes and corvee but it should also be 
remembered that the li-jia system continued to operate well into the 
sixteenth century.
143 DMHD 20/2, 6.
144 A convenient but by no means exhaustive list is given in Wei, 
p.108.
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CHAPTER II
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT AND TAXATION c. 1550-1570
INTRODUCTION
The chronological limits of this chapter have been determined 
by important events in the taxation system and by the availability of 
sources. The period covers the official introduction and abolition of 
the Single Whip by the provincial authorities. Following the various 
policies with regard to the Single Whip, it is possible to get some 
insight into the fiscal system of the province. Of equal importance 
is, however, the availability of sources. The entire period is 
covered by the SDJHL whereas the coverage provided by the local 
gazetteers is less satisfactory. None of the available gazetteers for 
Jinan Prefecture were compiled during this period. Indeed there is 
only one — the 1553 Lingxian gazetteer — still known to be extant.
This contrasts with eight gazetteers still in existence from the 
period 1570-1600 and six for the period 1601-1620.1
For some topics it may be an advantage to use later editions of 
the gazetteers as they sometimes contain information which had 
subsequently come to light or which had become less controversial so 
it could be included in them. However for the local self-government 
and the taxation system, which were closely connected, it seems in 
general to be an advantage to use gazetteers compiled during the 
period under investigation. This is probably true for the study of 
other local institutions subject to constant changes or adjustments. 
This is no doubt because the local gazetteers were not simply 
historical records but also reference works for district 
administrators, and a convenient introduction for newly-arrived 
officials to the district or subprefecture.
1 Wolfgang Franke, An Introduction to the Sources of Ming History
(Kuala Lumpur-Singapore, 1968), pp.268-273.
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The compilers of the local gazetteers in the Ming period seem to 
have put relatively low priority on material related to the self- 
government system. This is particularly the case with regard to the 
internal organization of the I'i-j'ia system. However some information 
can be obtained from the biographies of distinguished local officials, 
or from passages of writing which presumably had some literary value 
or were composed by well-known authors or officials. This apparent 
lack of interest in the functioning of the I'L-j'La system suggests a 
general lack of interest in the system throughout the period as long 
as it continued to fulfil its basic fiscal role.
But since the self-government system had this fiscal role, we can 
discover more about the functioning of the Zt-jta by examining the tax 
and corvee system. On the other hand, information about the tax and 
corvee system in many ways has the same shortcomings as those of the 
self-government system. Some of the Qing gazetteers do have detailed 
information on taxation reaching back to the Ming dynasty, but seldom 
before the Wan-li period. At that latter time the Single Whip and 
re-measurement of land caused a major change in the tax system. The 
figures produced for acreage and tax during these reforms were in many 
later gazetteers used as the base figures (yuan-e) for the calculation 
of taxes.
For the conditions before the Wan-li period the gazetteers give 
little information, even those compiled during late Ming. It is 
tempting to assume that the reason for this was that the tax records 
available for the compilers were too inadequate to make a detailed 
survey of the taxes of the previous period. Such an assumption 
conforms with the general picture of a tax system beridden by fraud 
and evasions which had been perpetuated since the early days of the 
dynasty. It is however difficult to believe that there did not exist 
some sort of coherent tax records which might have been included in 
the gazetteers if the compilers had so wished.
For the period 1550-1570 we have the SDJHL which gives abundant 
information on the tax system. For our purpose it has the weakness 
that it almost exclusively deals with taxation at the district level 
and rarely illuminates the situation at lower levels. For the 
historian the SDJHL also presents the problem that it was written for
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officials of the time. It is of course an advantage to have a source 
which appears to be an administrative document but it has the 
disadvantage that it only summarizes or makes amendments to 
regulations and customs which were probably well known in the 
bureaucracy but of which we have no other source of information. This 
disadvantage is common, particularly for the historian attempting to 
disentangle fiscal history. However it does create special problems 
when we use a fiscal source to examine functions and institutions with 
much wider implications for the common man.
TAXES
1. Land assessment and ownership
This scarcity of information on taxation means that we can only 
get a rather confused picture of the development in the taxation 
system until the middle period of the sixteenth century. Tax was 
levied upon land but there appear to have been no general regulations 
for levies applied over the whole province or even within Jinan 
Prefecture. The confusion is probably greatest for the historian, as 
perhaps it was for contemporary officials arriving in the districts 
and trying to understand the conditions of the tax system. For the 
people living in the districts, and for lesser functionaries and other 
clerical staff who kept the books in the yamen and had long experience 
of local conditions, the confusion was probably much less.
The tax to be paid from a given piece of land must have been 
fairly common knowledge even if it could not be deduced from official 
regulations. Tampering with the tax records could have resulted in 
inequalities in taxation but such inequalities were probably embodied 
in the price of the land when it was sold or mortgaged. So if there 
was a high turnover in land the tax to be paid in most cases must have 
been established fairly clearly. Unfortunately we do not possess the 
sources necessary to investigate the frequency of land transactions 
but it is unlikely that there was not a certain amount of these. The 
recorded changes in the population figures may not reflect the actual 
size of the total population but they can indicate changes involving 
landowners. There is furthermore evidence of migrations in the
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2province which would also have led to some transactions in land.
As was mentioned in Chapter 1 there was a difference in the 
northern provinces between land occupied by the people living in the 
provinces at the beginning of the dynasty and migrants arriving 
during the Hong-wu period. This difference was in fertility, location 
and relation to towns, and in the size of the mou. For the migrants
the mou would normally be 240 bu, while the large mou could be up to
1,200 bu.2 34 However there is not much evidence that this policy was 
widespread in Jinan Prefecture.
This does not mean that a uniform measurement existed in Jinan 
Prefecture. In one district the mou could be 600 bu in early Ming and 
later this was changed to 240 bu per mou. 4 In another district there 
could be 304 bu per mou before the later standardization.5 In both 
these cases the later revision of the mou resulted in an increase of
the acreage. A similar change in acreage is recorded in other
districts.6 However there are districts where the acreage did not 
change substantially during the dynasty, not even during the 
remeasurements of the Wan-li period. It is possible that the standard 
mou had been used in such districts from the beginning of the dynasty7 
but the lack of change in acreage can also be due to factors not 
revealed in the sources.
In addition to the different sizes in the mou for measurement, 
there was possibly also a classification of the land itself. There 
are indications that some kind of land grading took place perhaps 
according to fertility in Dezhou Subprefecture. This is mentioned in 
the introduction to the chapter on land taxes in the 1576 gazetteer.
2 SDJHL 4/1-2.
3 Kataoka, p.,142. The bu can more correctly be called 'square bu' .
In the Ming dynasty it was a square of five feet (chi). The size of 
the bu and chi varied according to location. The standard chi in Ming 
was 0.311 m. This gives c. 580 m2 for the standard mou of 240 bu. Wu 
Cheng-luo, Zhong-guo du-liang-heng shi (1937: Shanghai, 1957),
pp.54, 114-117.
4 Laiwu xian-zhi 1673/4/49.
5 Qingcheng xian-zhi 1612/1/4.
6 Leling xian-zhi 1762/3/46; Jiyang xian-zhi 1765/3/4.
7 Putai xian-zhi 1592/3/7.
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Whether such statements reflect the real situation in the sub­
prefecture is doubtful, but the fact that the gazetteer was written 
before the major reforms supports this. The Yangxin gazetteer from 
1683 states that the upper, middle and lower land in 1391 totalled 
2,520.96 qing thus indicating that a three-level grading of the land 
was applied in early Ming. This evidence may however be rejected, as 
the compiler of the gazetteer may simply have projected backward the 
grading of land introduced in the Wan-li period without actually 
possessing proof that this grading had existed in early Ming.9 As 
Dezhou and Yangxin are the only two subprefectures and districts for 
which information is available, the question of a systematical grading 
of the land in early Ming must be left unanswered for the time being.
However there were different kinds of land within the districts. 
The main division was between domain land (guan-di) and private land 
(;min—di) . The latter could be divided into good private land and 
saline private land. Other divisions could be silk-floss land (hua- 
vcng-di) and confiscated land (mo-guan-di), etc.10 The policy of the 
government from the beginning of the dynasty had been to tax domain 
land heavier than private land, regarding the difference in taxation 
as a rent paid to the landlord, i.e. the government.11 In Jinan 
Prefecture there is evidence of this heavier taxation ^ in Deping 
District where in 1512 the tax measured in dan of grain per mou was 
c. 6.25 times greater on domain land than on private land if the horse 
fodder (ma-cao) which was only levied on private land is not 
included. This heavy taxation on domain land was probably partly 
offset in the calculation process. In Binzhou it is reported that on 
good private land one dan equalled one dan. On domain land one dan
8 Dezhou zhi 1576/4/1.
9 Yangxin xian-zhi 1682/3/8.
10 Zichuan xian-zhi 1602/10/1.
11 DMHD 17/13.
12 Deping xian-zhi 1796/9/13. We have no indication of the value of 
horse fodder in relation to grain in 1512. A very tentative 
calculation using the overall provincial rates for commutation to 
silver of transferred summer and autumn taxes and horse fodder in 1542 
indicates that the horse fodder would increase the level on private 
land by c. 12%. This would still leave the levies on domain land as 
c. 5.6 times greater than on private land. SDJHL 3/4.
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was equal to two dan, and on saline land to three dan. In this way 
the tax on domain land was reduced by 50% and on saline land by 
66.6%. The difference between the different types of land was 
probably confused by manipulations of the kind described by Ray Huang 
for a district in southern China. The distinction between domain 
land and private land disappeared in Deping District in 1542 and in 
other districts progressively until the land measurement reforms around 
around 1581. The amount of domain land and other special categories 
was usually very small in Jinan, at the most a few per cent of private 
land.
In the middle of the sixteenth century some districts adopted the 
policy of remeasuring the land and calculating the size of the mou 
according to the fertility of the land. The most detailed description 
of this policy is found in the 1771 edition of the Licheng gazetteer 
translated by Ping-ti Ho. Unfortunately no date is given for the 
introduction of this policy but it corresponds well with other 
evidence for the period 1550-1570. In Licheng the land was divided 
into gold, silver, copper, tin, and iron land with the respective 
conversion mou rates of 1, 1.166, 1.5, 2.5, and 3.15 A similar system 
is described in 1562 by the governor Zhang Jian when he rebuffed the 
argument that the Single Whip with a uniform levy on all kinds of land 
was unequal by saying that in some districts land was graded into gold, 
silver, copper, and iron land.16 This system must have been 
introduced around 1550. The only reference we have to the actual 
introduction is probably for Shanghe District where the magistrate 
Shen Guang in 1550 ordered a re-measurement of the land. The people 
were to make personal depositions and each mou was to be 240 bu. The 
measure to be used was the ’great foot’ which was ~\h. times the 
official foot. The number of feet were to be according to the 
fertility of the land.17 Even if ’metallic' gradings are not 
mentioned in Shanghe it appears to have been the same system.
13 Bi-nzhou zhi 1701/4/14. Written by Zhao Da-gang (jin-shb 1541).
14 Huang, p.84.
15 Ho, p.105.
16 SDJHL 4/9.
17 Shanghe xian-zhi 1586/3/1.
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Li Kai-xian18 wrote around 1560 that the 'metallic' gradings 
according to the quality of the land had been introduced in the 
districts around Zhangqiu, and he advocated their introduction to that 
district as well.19 This indicates that the process had not started 
substantially before 1550 since a large district such as Zhangqiu had 
not changed in 1560. From the remarks of Li Kai-xian and Zhang Jian 
this policy seems to have enjoyed a certain popularity during this 
period but to what extent it was applied in all the districts of Jinan 
is hard to say.
2. Inequality of taxes
The sources covering this period give a slightly clearer picture 
of the differences in taxation between the districts than for those 
within each district. The introduction to the fu-lu chapter in the 
SDJHL describes how in the beginning of the dynasty the tax had been 
very heavy on the eastern prefectures of the province. The reason was 
that people absconded from these prefectures leaving a heavy tax 
burden for those remaining. In contrast to this, there were more and 
more people settling in the western prefectures, particularly after 
the canal from the north to the south had been opened in the Xuan-de 
period. With more people in these prefectures more land was brought 
under cultivation. This land was not necessarily reported in the 
national tax accounts so the burden of taxation in relation to 
population and cultivated land was lighter in the western prefectures. 
This inequality had been regulated when the tax payments were commuted 
to silver so that the tax in an eastern district was commuted to 0.2 
taels per dan of grain, while in a western district it was 0.7 taels 
per dan. This difference in commutation caused some discontent in the 
province, as some people thought that with these commutation rates 
taxation was much heavier in the western prefectures. It is 
interesting to note that the compilers of the SDJHL considered it 
necessary to explain this point in a work which was probably meant to
1 o
1 9
DMB, pp.835-837.
Li l(ai-xian ji (Shanghai, 1959), p.707.
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be consulted by officials and other administrative personnel. The 
explanation given is that in the eastern prefectures there were 
considerable amounts of uncultivated land so that one mou could pay 
tax for 2-3 mou, while in the western prefectures 3-4 mou could join 
together and pay the tax for one mou of land.20
The difference in commutation rates is clear for the 1550 figures. 
However they also indicate that the difference in taxation was not 
strictly according to prefectures. In that year the highest 
commutation rate for the summer taxes was in Puzhou, Dongchang 
Prefecture, with 0.7513 taels per dan, while the lowest was in Yizhou, 
Yanzhou Prefecture, with 0.2190 taels per dan. For the autumn taxes 
the highest commutation rate was in Caozhou, Yanzhou Prefecture, with 
0.9925 taels per dan, while the lowest was in Rizhao, Qingzhou 
Prefecture, with 0.4223 taels per dan. For horse fodder calculated in 
dan of grain the commutation rates were highest in Fanxian, Dongchang 
Prefecture, with 0.1484 taels per dan, while the lowest was in Qihe, 
Jinan Prefecture, with 0.0546 taels per dan. There were minor 
fluctuations in the annual levy on Shandong Province in summer and 
autumn transferred-revenue taxes and these fluctuations were used by 
the officials to adjust differences between districts. These 
adjustments however are very small. In 1550 they were also used to 
eliminate the smaller decimal digits in the tax figures, for example 
the commutation rate in Puzhou was reduced to 0.74 taels per dan. The 
officials recognized that the adjustments they made in 1550 were not 
adequate for all districts, some still had to be reduced and some 
increased. They preferred to postpone these adjustments taking 
advantage of the fluctuations in the annual levy on the province 
rather than to make an overall adjustment. Figures are not available 
to show the overall trend of such adjustments but in Jinan Prefecture 
we have the commutation rates for the autumn transferred-revenue taxes 
for 1550 and 1571 in four districts. In Licheng the commutation rate 
was increased by 8.5%, in Qingcheng by 18%, in Pingyuan by 13% and in 
Qihe by 9%. These figures should be compared to the increase in the 
total transferred revenue from the autumn taxes for the whole province 
of c. 4.5%.21 We cannot draw any unconditional conclusions from these
2 0
2 1
SDJHL 4/1.
Ibid. 3/6ff, 1/1-46.
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figures as they may have, been influenced by several factors such as 
the commutation rates for summer taxes and horse fodder, but they do 
indicate that the commutation rates were used as a convenient 
instrument to rectify inequalities without interfering with the basic 
tax levy calculated in dan of grain.
We do not know the actual degree of inequality between districts. 
The above description does however indicate that it was not too 
conspicuous — at least as seen by officials. The description also 
indicates that the officials regarded the figures and registers for 
the different districts with regard to population, tax payers and land 
as reasonably realistic.
Unfortunately we do not have concrete examples of adjustments 
between households or other fiscal units within a district. There is 
no doubt that inequalities existed between taxpayers in the various 
districts. The introduction to the section on taxes in the 1576 
edition of the Dezhou gazetteer — after praising the system at the 
beginning of the dynasty — states:
But after some time malpractices began. Although the officials 
planned and scrutinized [the tax records] very carefully, how 
could fraud be completely stamped out? Cases of reckless 
conspiracy by the powerful, clever tampering by the /-/-registrars 
and deceitful cheating by absentee landlords were numerous. 2 2There were fields with no taxes and taxes with no fields ...
Such cases where the rich were able to use their position for their 
own benefit are found in other gazetteers as well. The same thing is 
described in the documents in the SDJHL. In 1555 the provincial 
officials expressed fear that the tax system was being tampered with 
when land was sold by not keeping the tax and the land together. The 
land could be sold but the tax still had to be paid by the former 
owner who in this way got the immediate advantage of a higher price 
for the land but in the long run was disadvantaged by having to 
continue to pay the tax. The officials were aware of such practices
2 3but found it difficult to get sufficient information to prevent it.
How the common people felt about the unequal taxation we do not
22 
2 3
Dezhou zhi 1576/4/1. 
SDJHL 4/2.
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know. Many of the inequalities which are reported as contravening 
existing statutes could probably be dated back several generations.
The common people probably resented the advantages enjoyed by wealthy 
and powerful households. However, for the more wealthy in sixteenth 
century Shandong tax inequalities between different plots of land were 
probably evened out by inverse capital valuations. In this way 
inequalities may not have had too great impact upon the economic 
circumstances of the wealthy and they might have felt no pressing 
need for major reforms which could upset the balance between land 
prices and tax payments.
3. Granary rates
By means of the granary rates (cang-kou), taxes were levied at 
different rates according to the wealth of the taxpayers. These rates 
were levied not upon the land itself but on the tax payments. This 
meant that a tax payment with a high granary rate would pay more in 
silver per dan of tax calculated in grain than would be paid with a 
lower granary rate. The rate was determined according to the granary 
for which the particular tax payment was destined, and for deliveries 
to the capital or to the border defences the rate coirld be high. The 
allocation of granary rates was made within the districts and sub­
prefectures on the basis of tax classes, so that the households with 
the highest tax class would pay the highest granary rate.24 There 
were nine tax classes for the granary rates and there can be no doubt 
that they were the same tax classes used for corvee. In 1570 when the 
granary rates were reintroduced after' they had been at least partly 
non-operational under the early Single Whip it is specifically 
mentioned that the equal corvee registers were used for the allocation 
of granary rates. During the time when the granary rates had been 
inoperational sufficient attention had apparently not been paid to the 
division into tax classes in these equal corvee registers and many 
households had managed to change their tax class from upper to lower. 
So when the granary rates were reintroduced it was first necessary to 
upgrade some of the households.25
Memorial from the minister of revenue in 1567 Ge Shou-li(from 
Deping District, Jinan Prefecture ). GDSGWJ 3/13. Also in SDJHL A/14.
2 5 SDJHL 4/20.
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There are no records showing when the granary rates were 
introduced in Shandong. Ge Shou-li claims that this system had 
originated in the early years of the dynasty but his remarks are so 
general that they cannot be accepted as proof of such an early 
existence. However it is clear that the origin of the granary rates 
is to be found in the system of taxation before the taxes were 
commuted to payment in silver. When the taxes had to be paid in grain 
or other products it was the obligation of the taxpayer to deliver the 
grain at the designated granary or to pay the costs of 
transportation. When the tax payments were commuted to silver the 
cost of transportation was no longer significant but was maintained in 
the granary rates apparently as an extra source of income for the 
government. With the granary rate levied according to the tax classes 
it is reasonable to assume that originally transportation costs had 
been levied in the same way. The result would then have been the levy 
of higher taxes on the more wealthy households which in Shandong 
probably served to counter — to some extent — the advantages the more 
wealthy households enjoyed from favourable land holdings.
The amount of the granary rates varied with the distance to the 
granary. It is not possible to give a complete picture of these 
variations on the basis of existing sources. It was claimed in 1570 
that the granary rate could cause the payment for one dccn of grain to 
vary from 0.3 taels to 1.3 taels. Generally it is not easy to 
discover from the tax figures what the actual payments were because of 
the many ways of commutation. This is certainly true for the autumn 
taxes recorded for 1571 in Chapter I of the SDJHL. However a 
comparison appears to be useful between some of the transferred- 
revenue summer taxes measured in wheat (x'iao-ma'i) . The commutation 
rates per dan of wheat for all the districts of Jinan are given in 
appendix II.
With the granary rates allocated on the households according to 
the tax classes, the tax payments were not only a result of land 
holdings. In the north of China the land holdings played a much
2 6 
2 7 
2 8
GDSGWJ 3/12. 
Huang, p.40. 
SDJHL 4/21.
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smaller part in the assessment of tax classes than was customary in 
the southern parts of the country. The number of ding and other 
assets in the household played a comparatively greater role. The 
reason was that the land was of relatively lower quality in the north 
and climatic conditions made it difficult to improve productivity by 
using more labour, one factor being that there were extended periods 
of the year when labour could not be used in farming. From the point 
of view of conscription of corvee, the consequence of this was that 
personal services could be demanded from the adult males during the 
idle periods without interfering with farming. Consequently the 
number of adult males was more important for determining the tax 
classes than in areas where the labour could be used throughout the 
year for farming.
The fact that the granary rates were not levied according to the 
land itself but to tax classes could be more of a curse than a 
blessing for the less favoured people even if their purpose had 
originally been to help them. This is the impression we get from the 
sources in the sixteenth century, even from those admitting that it 
had originally been a good and fair system. The trouble arose 
from the strong incentive of the households in the upper tax classes 
to get their assessment lowered when both corvee and granary rates 
were levied according to tax classes. The influential households 
could do this by various illegal means with the connivance of 
officials, lesser functionaries or other personnel in the yamen or at 
least of the ii-registrars. They could tamper with the land registers 
and register their land under the name of other persons with or with­
out their knowledge, or they could divide their households so that 
each part would get a lower tax class. The list of ways of cheating 
with the land registers seems almost inexhaustible. With the tax 
classes also depending upon ding and assets other than land the 
possibilities for cheating were further enhanced as such items were 
often easier to conceal than the land itself.
An interesting aspect of Ming taxation policy was that it was 
often profitable for the owner of a plot of land to transfer the
2 9
3 o
Taniguchi (1961), pp.7-9; Yamane (1966), pp.188-191. 
SDJHL 4/10.
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nominal ownership to someone else, even If the original and actual 
owner continued to pay the taxes levied upon the land. By transfer­
ring the registered ownership he could obtain lighter corvee and 
granary rates than would have been the case if the property was still 
registered in his name. This was because the corvee and the granary 
rates served as a kind of progressive taxation on the people classed 
as wealthy in the registers. In this respect there are many 
similarities between corvee and granary rates and it could be argued 
that the granary rates should rightly be discussed together with the 
corvee. I have however intentionally included them with taxes, as 
they were closely connected with the system of taxation. This point 
is further justified as the discussion of granary rates was included 
in the chapters on taxation in the SDJHL.
CORVEE
1. General considerations
After the Hong-wu period the first major reform was the equal 
corvee introduced all over the country before 1488.31 The jun-gong-fu 
from the early years of the Hong-wu period were apparently never 
formally abrogated and they continued for some time around Nanking 
after the introduction of the Zi-jia system. In contrast the Z-i-gia 
was an instrument for conscription of corvee over the whole country. 
The basis for the conscription was changed from land to households for 
the regular Zi-gia corvee and to adult males {ding) for the 
miscellaneous corvee (za~yi or za-fan chai-yi). 32 The miscellaneous 
corvee consisted of various services for the government — either local 
or central — on a regular or irregular basis. From 1385 the 
miscellaneous corvee was conscripted according to the tax classes.
This meant that in comparison to a uniform levy upon each adult male 
the basis of the assessment was more complicated but also more 
realistic if a correct assessment could be maintained.
31 DMHD 20/11.
32 The term za-fan chai-yi or simply za-fan was often used in early 
Ming for the miscellaneous corvee. It was inherited from the corvee 
system of the Yuan dynasty. Yamane (1966), p.37.
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The miscellaneous corvee was distributed among the households in 
such a way that apparently a certain service was levied from a number 
of ding in households of a tax class appropriate to the effort 
demanded for that particular service. The households were to serve in 
rotation. The number of households in such a rotation was dependent 
upon the number of services and the number of households and ding 
available in the appropriate tax class. The services were graded 
according to the burden they were estimated to impose for the house­
holds. The heaviest services could be those performed at a consider­
able distance from home. Work in the Yizhou charcoal factory c. 150 
km west of Peking was such a service for the people of Shandong.34 
They could also be services where the households had to use their own 
wealth to guarantee successful completion, such as weighers (dou-ji) 
in the granaries.35
The general picture we get from the sources for the administration 
of the corvee system is that it was not a very systematic operation. 
However we have to concede that the sources are probably deceptive as 
in most cases we only have the initial orders for the system which — 
considering how the Ming bureaucracy allowed for local variation — 
only provided the framework. This had to be elaborated by local 
officials but the local sources leave us to a great extent in the dark. 
The operation of the system in a locality is usually only revealed by 
descriptions of shortcomings and corruption, rarely in a positive 
light. And no matter whether they are positive or negative the 
descriptions only faintly show the circumstances of individual house­
holds, if they are indicated at all. This of course is a problem for 
the historian, not for the household of that time. For the people who 
had to perform the work or pay the money there were no great 
uncertainties. With changing population patterns — and fortune or 
misfortune for the individual household — services or payments had to 
be transferred between households at the regular assessments of the 
corvee and there must have existed guidelines as to how this was to be 
done. It would be inconsistent with the emerging picture of the 
workings of the bureaucracy to assume that such guidelines did not
3 3
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DMHD 210/17.
Huang, p.57.
Yamane (1966), p.72.
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exist. This is further supported by the fact that wealthy and 
influential households made considerable efforts to manipulate their 
assets and ding in order to avoid services to which they were liable.
During the period under consideration the main complaints are 
these manipulations with the tax classes, so it appears that the rules 
for allocation of corvee to the households according to tax classes 
were still in force. One such case was that some households agreed to 
perform certain duties assigned to the tax class they would have been 
in had their property and ding been assessed properly. They 
acquiesced in performing the service as long as they could get the 
lower tax class.36
The view that there did exist at the local level administrative 
guidelines for the allocation of corvee is based upon the assumption 
that the administration worked on a rational basis and that it was 
generally in the interest of the officials to have the corvee and 
other duties allocated to households which had the strength to perform 
them. We can also assume that local powerful households had the same 
interest, at least to a degree which would have prevented major 
reforms of the corvee system which could infringe upon the advantages 
they had been able to obtain. This is probably a valid assumption for 
the early years of the dynasty when the miscellaneous corvee was still 
relatively light and only involved a few households each year from a 
ZZ-j-fa.37 However as the corvee became heavier the advantages from 
cheating became more obvious and some reform of the corvee system was 
needed.
2. The equal corvee
The solution to the problems of the corvee system was the equal 
corvee introduced in Jiangxi before 1430, and from there it spread to 
other parts of the country. It was probably introduced in Shandong
36 SDJHL 9/71.
37 Yamane Yukio, "Jügo jüroku seiki Chügoku ni okeru fueki rödösei 
no kaikaku", Shigaku zasshi 60.11 (1951), 47.
38 Friese, pp.94 ff.
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between 1483 and 1486 by the governor, Sheng Yu. The sources state 
that Sheng Yu introduced the nine tax classes (jzu-ce) and Taniguchi 
is probably justified in taking this to mean the introduction of the 
equal corvee. Of course this also means that the nine tax classes 
were introduced at this time at least in part of the province. It 
seems likely that other tax classes were in existence before this time, 
as the nine tax classes were not introduced in every district in 1555. 
Some districts had four tax classes, others five, and these were 
probably survivals from the system of tax classes in existence before 
1483.40
The equal corvee introduced by Xia Shi in Jiangxi in the 1440s 
functioned on the basis of the lz-jza. The regular Zz-jza services 
were performed by its members every ten years, and the equal corvee — 
as the miscellaneous corvee included in the new system came to be 
known — was performed five years later. This meant that in the year 
when jza no. 1 performed the regular services, the equal corvee 
services would be performed by jza no. 6. The equal corvee services 
to be performed by individual households among Z-Z-leaders and jza- 
heads were distributed according to their tax class and recorded in 
the equal corvee registers.41 In the Jiangnan area where the corvee 
was relatively light in relation to the capacity of the households 
conscripted to the equal corvee, it was possible and sufficient only 
to conscript the households once every ten years. The Da-xue yan-yz-bu 
from 1487 says that the equal corvee should not be introduced north of 
the Yangtze river. What is meant is probably that the equal corvee in 
a ten-year rotation could not be applied because it would put too 
great a strain on the households on duty. Instead we see in the north 
the equal corvee performed at intervals of two to five years of even 
every year.42 Writers in the sixteenth century Shandong complained 
that of all provinces annual service was only necessary there. Such 
statements cannot be taken as evidence for the situation in other 
provinces but we have no reason to doubt that they accurately 
described the situation in Shandong, as they are made in official
39 Taniguchi (1961), pp.4-5; Jznan fu~zhz 1839/35/3.
40 SDJHL 4/2, 7.
41 Yamane (1951), pp.49-51.
Da-xue yan-yz bu (1487. Taipei 1976 reprint), 31/15-42
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administrative documents and ate followed by an elaborate proposal on 
how to give the households one year of rest out of ten.43
In Shandong the equal corvee and the equal corvee registers were 
at least from 1529 assessed and compiled every second year, and this 
biennial compilation continued at least until the early 1570s.44 A 
biennial compilation could imply that the equal corvee was only 
performed by the households every second year but there is no evidence 
for this. Over the period under consideration here the services were 
apparently performed each year. The biennial compilation can be taken 
as a sign that the provincial administration regarded it as necessary 
to have more frequent compilation of fiscal registers than was the 
case with the Yellow Registers, and perhaps also as a sign that the 
administration had the capability to perform more frequent 
compilations than had been the case in the early years of the dynasty.
It is even possible that the equal corvee registers were used as 
legal population records. In 1533 when a new magistrate Li Xing 
arrived in Zichuan he discovered that a clan previously surnamed Gong- 
sun had changed this to Sun. He scolded the members of the clan for 
this inappropriate change of surname and at the following assessment 
of the equal corvee their name was changed back to Gong-sun.45 This 
does not rule out that the Yellow Registers were still regarded 
as legal records of family names. This took place one year after the 
previous compilation of the Yellow Registers. Hence the following 
compilation was nine years away and Li would have left the district 
before then. But in the meantime the equal corvee registers served 
his purpose.
The corvee in north China in the sixteenth century had several 
special features. The most obvious is the absence of a special 
category of militia corvee (min-zhuang). Such services existed in the 
north but they were levied as part of the equal corvee, whereas in 
other parts of the country they were often levied separately, e.g. by 
a certain number of men per li-jia.h  ^ The H-gia services in the
43 SDJHL 9/56-57.
44 Ibid. 9/57, 64.
45 Zichuan xian-zhi 1602/23/3.
46 Yamane (1966), p.160.
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north wore mostly connected witli the postal transport system and
supplemented such services. Many services which would normally have
been regarded as bi-jia corvee were listed under the equal corvee
4 7after their commutation to silver payment. This happened all over 
the country but was particularly prevalent in the north. The reason 
for this tendency to include the commuted ti-jia corvee (ti-jia-yin) 
in the equal corvee is not explained in the sources. The commutation 
of the li-jia services came later than the commutation of the equal 
corvee and this was most marked in the north. The commutation of the 
ti-jia corvee to Zi-jia silver was introduced gradually, so 
Kuribayashi deduces from this that it was more convenient for the 
officials to include the collection of the commuted items in the 
collection of the equal corvee silver.48 This explanation seems 
plausible but it should also be remembered that the equal corvee was 
assessed biennially, while the l-i-jia was assessed decennially, so it 
would have been easier to make a fair assessment by including as many 
items as possible in the equal corvee.
3. Commutation of corvee
The commutation of corvee to silver payments started generally in 
the second half of the fifteenth century, i.e. about half a century 
later than the commutation of taxes.49 In Shandong the first instance 
of corvee commutation took place around 1470. In 1468 the central 
government ordered commutation of the corvee in the Yizhou charcoal 
factory which provided fuel for the capital. This commutation must 
have applied to the workers coming from Shandong and the reason this 
item was chosen for commutation was the inconvenience of long travel 
for the workers. This order from the central government is reflected 
in Shandong where the governor in 1473 petitioned to commute to silver 
payment 20,884 wood choppers (kan-chai-fu) each paying three taels of 
silver.50 Fuel-men-silver (chai-fu-yin) is mentioned for Zhucheng
47 Ibid. , p.144.
48 Kuribayashi (1971), pp.129-130.
49 Yamane (1966), p.117.
50 Taniguchi (1961), pp.15-16.
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District in 1481 and a few years later for Zhanhua so it seems that
5 1this commutation actualiy took place.
Subsequent commutations appear to have been relatively gradual. 
Recorded instances are found in the 1510s and 1520s but as commutation 
seems to have been well established by 1533 it was probably applied to 
several corvee items already during the Hong-zhi and early Zheng-de 
periods.02 By 1571 all the equal corvee listed in the SDJHL are 
recorded in terms of silver, both the silver corvee (yin-ohaL) and the 
labour corvee (H-chai). This did not necessarily mean that silver 
was paid to the officials or tax collectors. The commutation figures 
served first of all as a convenient instrument for comparison between 
the different items of corvee when they had to be allocated on the 
households in the different tax classes. Silver corvee was collected 
in silver by the da-hu and the money was used by the officials to hire 
persons to perform the duties.53 The commutation figures probably 
represented the cost of the labour at the time the corvee was commuted, 
and was apparently not changed following later fluctuations in the 
cost of labour.
Labour corvee was different. It appears that these services were 
still the responsibility of specific households during the period 
until 1571 and probably until the corvee was entirely commuted in the 
Single Whip of the Wan-li period. They were conscripted from the 
households in the upper tax-classes and these households had the 
choice of performing the services by one of their members or hiring a 
substitute.54 The official commutation figures probably represented 
the price of the substitutes at the time the silver valuation was made. 
We do not know when this happened. It is possible that such a 
convenient instrument for allocating corvee between households was 
introduced together with the biennial compilation of the equal corvee 
registers in 1529. A review of the equal corvee in the whole province 
was apparently also conducted in 1549.55 The purpose of this review
51 SDJHL 9/35.
52 Taniguchi (1961), p.17.
53 E.g. SDJHL 7/26.
54 Iwami Hiroshi, "Kasei nenkan no rikisa ni tsuite", in Tamuva 
hakase shöju töyöshi ronsö (Kyoto, 1968), p.47).
55 SDJHL 8/12 ff.
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was to determine the distribution of corvee between districts and sub­
prefectures and for such a purpose it was no doubt helpful to have all 
the corvee items valued in silver. So it is also possible that 1549 
was the base year for the valuation of the labour corvee in silver.
The cost of providing substitutes for labour corvee rose during 
the period and this increase had to be paid by the households 
conscripted to the corvee, i.e. the corvee heads (tou-hu or zheng-tou) 
and their assisting households (tie-hu) . This surcharge was called 
da-tao. In some cases it was officially recognized (ming-bian) and 
was perhaps taken into consideration when the corvee was allocated. 
However there were also cases where the da-tao was not officially 
recognized (an-bian) and the surcharge thus became an extra fiscal 
duty of the households. As the burden of the labour corvee fell 
heaviest on the households in the upper tax classes this was a further 
inducement for these households to attempt to get into a lower tax 
class. This problem was apparently solved in 1569 when Governor Jiang 
Ting-yi ordered that the da~tao a household would have to pay for an 
item of labour corvee was to be registered in the household tax bill 
so that it could not be required to pay more for substitutes. This 
was for some reason not m'ing-b'ian, but it seems to have served the 
same purpose56 and the da-tao figures for all the labour corvee are 
listed in the SDJHL. For most items of labour corvee the da-tao 
figures are two to three times higher than the original silver 
valuation.
The problem with the da-tao could of course have been solved by 
changing all labour corvee to silver corvee. The reason this did not 
happen immediately in 1569 was probably because the officials were not 
confident that the various levels in the administration were able to 
handle the collection of silver and the hiring of persons to perform 
the services. Certainly, such problems had existed when other labour
 ^  ^ 5 7corvee had previously been transferred to silver corvee. It appears 
that transfers had proceeded gradually during our period; the last 
recorded was in 1570. But later in 1570 the new governor Liang
56 Ibid. 9/49-51.
57 Ibid. 9/7.
58 Ibid. 9/11.
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5 9Meng-long issued a prohibition against further transfers from labour 
corvee to silver corvee as part of his policy against the Single Whip 
and for a return to the situation existing before 1550.60 As with the 
Single Whip, this order was probably only effective for a short period 
but it is worth describing in greater detail as it gives some insight 
into the allocation of corvee in the sixteenth century.
Liang ordered a new valuation of the burden of the different 
kinds of labour corvee in the province. If the number of heavy corvee 
corresponded to the number of households in the upper three tax 
classes, each of these households would be conscripted as corvee heads. 
If the wealth and number of ding in any of these households were in 
excess of what was needed for the particular labour corvee, then the 
surplus wealth and ding would be assigned to light corvee duties. If 
any of the households did not have sufficient wealth and ding to match 
the heavy corvee, then assistant corvee heads (tie-tou) were 
conscripted from the households in the middle tax classes. If there 
were not sufficient households in the three upper tax classes for the 
heavy labour corvee then two or three households in the middle tax 
classes would jointly be corvee heads. Each of these households would 
only perform this heavy corvee from one half of their wealth and ding, 
the other half being assigned to light corvee as an alleviation. The 
other households in the middle tax classes were conscripted as corvee 
heads of light labour corvee. Only households in the upper seven tax 
classes could be conscripted as corvee heads, the eighth tax class 
could be conscripted as assistant households, this could not apply the 
ninth tax class. However if there was not enough wealth and ding in 
the upper eight tax classes to perform all the labour corvee, then it 
was permitted to levy 0.02 taels of silver per ding upon one-third of 
the households in the ninth tax class considered to be the most 
wealthy of the households in that tax class.61
59 DMB, pp.898-902.
60 Ibid. 8/85.
61 Ibid. 9/53.
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4. M e n-silver and din g-silver
The equal corvee in sixteenth-century Shandong was not only 
levied from ding according to tax class. In the 1533 edition of the 
Shandong provincial gazetteer the items listed in the SDJHL under 
equal corvee are divided into two groups. The first group is items 
levied on households as payments towards the expenses of the corvee 
(yi-hu-chu-zi-zhe) and the second group items for which ding were 
levied or conscripted to perform the corvee {yi-ding-chu-yi-zhe) . 62
It is possible that some of the miscellaneous corvee was levied 
on households instead of ding in Shandong and other northern provinces 
from the beginning of the dynasty. This is claimed by authors in the 
sixteenth century who wrote that the zu-yong-diao system of the Tang 
had been applied by the dynastic founders, the zu being land taxes, 
the diao being levies on households, and the yong being levies on 
ding.63 We have no evidence that this was actually the case and such 
statements should be regarded with caution. It is possible that the 
levies on households were introduced some time in the fifteenth 
century before the commutation of corvee really began. In other parts 
of the country there was a tendency during that period to change 
levies of the miscellaneous and later equal corvee from ding to 
land.64 This was probably a result of the increase in the corvee 
duties together with the concentration of land in the hands of fewer 
households. Under such circumstances it would have been increasingly 
difficult to levy all corvee on ding and it became necessary to find 
alternatives. The special circumstances of agriculture in the north 
compared to the rest of the country meant that it was probably less 
attractive in the north to make land the object of corvee levy, so the 
alternative was a levy on the households.
From the evidence available we can however only say with 
certainty that the levies on households were introduced in the first 
part of the sixteenth century, apparently together with the
62 Shandong tong-zhi 1533/8/21-24. This passage is repeated in 
SDJHL 7/1.
63 Yamane (1966), pp.205-208.
64 Yamane (1951), p.51.
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commutation of corvee. It appears that all the commuted items in 1533 
were levied on the households but this could not continue to be the 
case with additional commutations. The result of this would have been 
that the levies on the households were too heavy in relation to levies 
on ding and this would have created all the problems of cheating and 
evasions arising from too heavy levies. The solution was to levy 
silver on the ding as well. This apparently happened around 1540 and 
resulted in the creation of the terms ding-silver (ding-yin) and men- 
silver ([men-yin).6 5
Men (literally 'door’) is used in the following years almost 
interchangeably with household (hu) when talking about tax classes for 
the levy of corvee.66 The men were divided into nine classes and this 
division was determined by the household wealth which included land 
holdings, houses, animals, ready capital and promissory notes, or in 
other words the accumulated assets of the household. It is not 
clear whether ding in the household were included in the men grading, 
but as ding were definitely included in the normal grading of the 
households into the nine tax classes69 and as there is no evidence 
that these were not identical with those used for the men, they must 
have been taken into consideration.
As time went on the men-sllve.r and ding-silver were clearly 
defined so that around 1565 in Putai District they were as follows:
Tax Class Men-Silver Ding-Silver per Ding
1 4.0 taels 0.7 taels
2 3.0 f! 0.6
3 2.0 11 0.5
4 1.0 11 0.4
5 0.9 11 0.3
6 0.7 11 0.2 "
7 0.4 1! 0.2
8 0.1 11 0.15 "
9 0.0 11 0.07 "
65 Taniguchi (1961), pp.17-19.
66 F.ex. Ge Shou-li, SDJHL 4/13.
67 Taniguchi (1961), p.7.
68 SDJHL 9/75.
69 Ibid. 7/12.
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7 0The district corvee totalled at that time 3,758.46 taels. In 1571
the district levy was 3,756.18 or if the surcharge on labour corvee is
included, 5,029 taels. Unfortunately we do not have details of how
many households there were in each tax class so we are unable to
ascertain whether these figures were the sums actually collected or
whether they had to be increased in order to cover the district corvee
7 2levy. Such policies were apparently necessary in some districts.
During the reorganization of the corvee in 1571 Liang Meng-long 
ordered the levies of merc-silver to be 3.5 taels from the households 
in the first tax class decreasing by 0.5 taels per tax class to 0.5 
taels from the seventh class. The two lowest tax classes were not 
levied men-silver. The ding-silver was levied with 0.9 taels on the 
first tax class, also decreasing proportionately with the ninth tax 
class paving 0.1 taels per ding. 73 He further ordered that the wen- 
silver should primarily be used for silver corvee thus upholding the 
policy recorded in 1533 that the household levies were used for 
commuted corvee, while the labour corvee was conscripted from ding. 74
The ding does not appear to have been completely unrelated to the
number of male adults in the province. This supports Ping-ti Ho’s
7 5view that the north was different from the south in this respect.
Liang Meng-long complained in 1570 that many wealthy households with 
many ding had bribed the ZZ-registrars to remove the male adults 
(cheng-ding) from the register. To remedy this situation he ordered a 
thorough survey of the population in order to have all the cheng-ding 
registered for corvee. This shows that the presence of an adult male 
had up to that time made the household liable to pay ding-silver, but 
also that the registers had not been kept in sufficient order to 
strictly maintain this principle.76
70 Putai xian-zhi 1592/4/2.
71 SDJHL 5/24.
72 Ibid. 9/75.
73 Ibid. 9/72-73.
74 Ibid. 9/74.
75 Ho, p.31.
SDJHL 9/71-72.76
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OTHER SERVICES
In addition to the chapters on taxes and equal corvee the SDJIIL 
also has chapters on the Zi—jia corvee, postal services (yi-chuan) , 
horse administration (ma-zheng) and salt administration (yan-fa). The 
Zi-gia corvee will be described in Chapter III. The salt 
administration handled levies on the salt fields and does not appear 
to have had much connection with the local self-government 
organization or the taxes and corvee in general. The postal services 
and the horse administration show some of the problems generally 
encountered in the corvee system and as they affected most of the 
population in the province they will be briefly described.
1. Postal services
The postal service was an important levy in Shandong, as the main 
road from Peking to the south passed through the western part of the 
province. The people had to provide most of the burden of the service 
such as horses, donkeys, wagons, boats, hostels, and goods necessary 
for the travellers, in addition to personal attendance. In 1565 the 
contribution to the service for the whole province — which of course 
included the postal services within the province — was 277,480.54 
taels which can be contrasted with the equal corvee at the same time 
of 556,754.24 taels. The service had been organized in the Tian- 
shun period on a ten-year rotation. The ding from households of the 
upper tax classes were conscripted as corvee heads, while poorer 
households were to assist them. The ten-year assessment of this 
corvee continued until 1565 when it was changed to every five years, 
as the governor and regional inspector regarded the ten-year rotation
7 fias too heavy for the people.
The postal service corvee was different from the equal corvee in 
one important respect: the services'levied in a district were
determined according to the acreage of land in the district which was 
designated as station-land (zhan-di). From the beginning of the
77 
7 8
Ibid. 6/1, 11/39. 
Ibid. 11/31-32.
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dynasty the postal service corvee had been levied according to tax 
payments but there had been a general trend towards levying according 
to ding. 79 There is no evidence what the development was in Shandong 
but obviously it had been towards levying these services on land. The 
1533 Shandong gazetteer lists them under a category of ’levying 
person-corvee on land' (yi-di-ohu-yong-zhe)8 0 and in the SDJHL all the 
items conscripted are according to a certain acreage of station-land. 
It is not revealed how this station-land was chosen. In Pingyuan 
District where the total acreage had originally been 5,021.68 ging, 
2,375 ging was registered as station-land. It is clear from 
subsequent figures for acreage in the district that the station-land 
was not separate from other land, but only a special category from 
which the postal services were levied in addition to other taxes. 
Whether the station-land got concessions in normal tax payments or 
whether the postal services were used as an additional levy on this 
land is not clear.81
No explanation is given for how the corvee head and assistant 
households were conscripted from the land but the most likely way was 
that when, for example, a horse was levied from eighty ging of 
station-land one household from the upper tax classes would then be 
selected as corvee head and be responsible for the service of the 
horse. However the work or expenses provided by the corvee head was 
only to correspond to the amount of station-land owned by the house­
hold, while the balance up to eighty ging was to be provided by the 
assistant households either in labour, money or other goods.
The postal service followed the general trend towards commutation 
to valuation and payment in silver. Each ging of land was in most 
districts calculated as 0.9 ging of station-land, and with the 
commutation each ging of station-land was levied one tael, or 0.9 tael 
per ging according to the normal measurement..82 We do not know when 
the commutation started but it must have been well advanced in 1558.
Yamane (1966), p.166.
80 Shandong tong-zhi 1533/8/21-22.
81 Pingyuan xian-zhi 1592/1/19, 1749/3/5.
8 2 In Jinan Prefecture the conversion rate to station-land was 0.8 
in two districts and 0.7 in five districts. SDJUL 11/1-8.
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Tn that yon r the government ordered reduction in norvicon nt tin; 
postal stations and the savings were to be sent to tlic capital and
8 3used towards border defence expenses. Complete commutation was 
achieved in 1570 when the money was simply collected from the station- 
land and the hiring of labourers and other services became the 
responsibility of the officials. This meant that the corvee heads and 
assistant households were abolished and one can argue that the postal 
services ceased to be a corvee and changed into a tax. The levy on 
the station-land had been increased to 1.35 taels per qing of station- 
land and this continued after 1570. The reason given for the reform 
was that the corvee heads and assistant households had fallen too far
8 4into debt so that they could no longer perform their duties.
2. Horse administration
Horses were bred by the people for the defence purposes of the 
central government. The government provided the horses and those 
conscripted to this service was responsible for stabling and breeding 
so that new horses could be provided at given intervals. The areas 
designated for breeding were originally the metropolitan areas but 
when the burden became heavier this spread to Shandong and Henan.
Most sources date this introduction in Shandong to 1429, and some a 
few years later. Li Kai-xian claims that breeding was originally 
introduced in all the prefectures of the province and that the three 
eastern prefectures by crafty schemes later managed to unload the 
whole burden onto the three western prefectures. There is no evidence 
to support this claim; all other sources are unanimous that only 
the western prefectures were required to breed horses as conditions in 
the eastern prefectures were considered unsuitable at the time when 
this stabling service was introduced, and they were also too far away 
from the capital. The argument that the eastern prefectures were 
unsuitable for horse breeding was apparently not valid in the
83 Ibid. 11/32; DMHD 148/4.
84 SDJHL 11/39.
85 Li Kai-xian ji, p.707; Tani Mitsutaka, Mindai basei no kenkyü 
(Kyoto, 1972), pp.292-295.
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sixteenth century. A metropolitan censor complained in 1571 that much 
land was saline and there were no pastures in the western prefectures 
of Shandong, with the result that no horses were bred there. To 
maintain the delivery of horses, the households assigned to this 
service had to pool money together to buy a horse from the eastern 
prefectures for delivery to the government. He complained that it 
was not a good idea to requisition horses from prefectures which did 
not have the facilities to breed them, and that the eastern 
prefectures in this way made a profit by selling horses to the western 
prefectures.8 6
In the 1533 Shandong gazetteer it is said that the stabling
service was levied from the she (yi~she-ehu-zi-zhe) . In this context
the she could mean the Zi-gia but there is no further clarification.
From the beginning the breeding was levied upon ding, one mare per
five ding and one foal per three ding. In 1493 when the levy was
changed in Beizhili from ding to land, the levy in Shandong remained
on the ding but was changed to one mare per five ding and one foal per
ten ding. The ding got no exemptions from taxes or other corvee.87
Among the households assigned to stable service, one from the upper
tax classes were selected as corvee head, while the other households
8 8were assistant households.
Commutation of the stable service is reported in 1542 after a bad 
year in some districts which had heavy levies of horses. The 
government ordered in 1555 that commutation could only continue if 
there were severe economic hardships, and the provincial authorities 
were consequently forced to revert to delivery of horses from all 
districts. In the following year there were several attempts to 
commute and reduce the number of horses to be delivered. The 
provincial authorities realized that the delivery of horses was a 
heavy burden upon the population. It was no longer fair because the 
wealthy households had managed to get exempted from the service. The 
government was aware of the problem but it was still concerned about
86 SDJHL 12/44-45.
87 Ibid. 12/26. The date for the revision is given as Cheng-hua 6 
(1470) but this appears to be a mistake for Hong-zhi 6. DMHD 150/9.
88 SDJHL 12/38.
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sufficient supplies of horses. In .1567 the commutation was allowed
fi Qfor 50% of the horses, and this was raised in 1570 to 70%.
The assessment of the households for stabling service had 
originally been carried out every ten years. From the 1540s there was 
a movement to change this to assessment every five years. However 
when the equal corvee was assessed every two years confusion could 
arise if households had their tax class substantially changed during 
the biennial assessment. The solution to this problem was that 
changes would only be made in the stabling service assessment during 
the five-year period if any household in the biennial assessment was 
downgraded to one of the three lower tax classes. In such cases their 
service would be changed from corvee head to assistant household.
In Binzhou Subprefecture the provision of horses was in the late 1560s 
organized every five years and was based upon groups of ten households. 
Horses were delivered in spring and autumn. The ten households worked 
in rotation so that during the five years each of them would once be 
responsible for the provision of the horse, while the other nine 
households in each delivery were assistant households. After five 
years there would be a new assessment of the corvee. It was claimed 
by the magistrate who introduced the reform, Wan Peng-cheng, that this 
system was fair and that no household would suffer excessive 
exhaustion.91 The delivery of horses from Binzhou was sixty-three 
both in spring and autumn. Nineteen of these had to be delivered in
9 2kind while the rest were commuted at twenty-four taels per horse.
This meant that there would be sixty-three groups and as there were 
seventy-eight Zi-jia the households selected were probably all in the 
upper tax classes.
From the 1540s there was also a movement to change the levy from 
ding to other items. In 1544 it was changed to men in Zhangqiu 
District and this apparently spread to other districts.93 In 1561 the 
governor ordered Linyi District to change the levy from ding to land
89 Ibid. 12/27 ff.
90 Ibid. 12/45-47.
91 Binzhou zhi 1583/4/23.
92 SDJHL 12/4.
93 Ibid. 12/45.
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so that the households with most land were selected to be corvee heads 
while those with smaller land holdings were assistant households. The 
reform was introduced only in this district and the magistrate 
reported in 1567 that it had been carried out. In 1567 Governor Jiang 
Ting-yi ordered that the stabling services were to be levied by 40% 
from dingy 40% from men and 20% from land. Households with privileged 
exemptions were only allowed them for their own ding and the house­
holds with much land and in the highest tax class were still to be 
corvee heads. In this way the burden of the stabling service became a 
little more equal.94
THE DA-HU
1. The function of the da-hu
The da-hu are not given a special section in the SDJHL as is the 
case with the items of corvee discussed above. They are however 
mentioned frequently, so there is no doubt that they existed and that 
in the minds of the officials they were a corvee conscripted from the 
people. The reason they are not dealt with separately in the SDJHL is 
probably that they were conscripted in each district according to 
local need, and were not entered in the consolidated provincial 
accounts for corvee services and payments which were used to 
distribute the corvee between the districts. In this way they 
resemble the regular lia-gia corvee as li-leader and gia-head.
According to Ge Shou-li, writing in 1567, the da-hu were assigned 
to collect tax designated for a certain granary from the taxpayers and
. 9 5to forward it. At this time such taxes had a granary rate but to 
the extent that the da~hu had been in existence before commutation to 
silver payments their duty would have been to receive the grain and 
forward it to the designated granary. The amount of tax they handled 
was small compared to that handled by the Hang-zhang in the southern 
provinces. Li Kai-xian writes that the da-hu originally had to 
collect and forward 100 taels in silver or 100 dan in grain.96 This
9 4 
9 5 
9 6
Ibid. 12/38.
GDSGWJ 3/12.
Li kai-xian gi, p.708.
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figure is corroborated by a story from Zhangqiu District. During the 
Jia-jing period a man in the district found 100 taels which had been 
lost or left behind by a da~hu from Yizhou Subprefecture in the 
eastern part of Yanzhou Prefecture. The man, Hou Zhi-sheng, picked up 
the silver, handed it over to the officials and later refused to 
accept a reward. The district official was delighted and Hou Zhi- 
sheng was given a tablet to display on his house saying: 'The House
of a Righteous Man'.97 The figure of 100 taels in this affair is so 
striking that it strongly supports the claim by Li Kai-xian that this 
was the sum a da~hu was expected to collect and forward. This is 
further supported by the fact that in the Single Whip system proposal 
of 1555 two petty da-hu were to be selected to forward 200 taels.98
Li Kai-xian continues his description of the da-hu by saying 
that they were in his time collecting and forwarding 200-300 taels.
The 1583 Binzhou gazetteer says that in that subprefecture there were 
ninety da~hu and each collected about 500 taels of silver. This is 
the highest figure available for the districts and subprefectures but 
admittedly information is very scarce.99 These two statements 
indicate strongly that there was a considerable increase in the amount 
the da-hu had to collect. The reason could be that the administration 
did not wish to increase the number of da-hu along with increase in 
the collections assigned to them, either because this was not thought 
necessary or because there were not sufficient households available to 
perform the duties.
The da-hu was responsible for delivering the money or grain at 
the designated granary. There are indications that they were allowed 
to charge the taxpayers for the transport of the grain. In the 1560s 
it is said in a discussion of grain destined for the frontiers that 
the regulated transport surcharge of 0.035 taels per dan of grain per 
100 l-i was not sufficient when the da~hu had to use three or four men 
to perform the service. As a result a calculation was made of the 
transport cost between Licheng District and the granaries in Dezhou 
with the result that the da~hu were then allowed transport
97 Zhangqiu xian-zhi 1596/27/47.
98 SDJHL 4/3.
99 Binzhou zhi 1583/2/50.
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expenses of 0.06 taels per dan per 100 Z--z!.100 It is likely that the 
da-hu were allowed to pass on the cost of transport to the taxpayers, 
but the system does not seem to have worked, as one of the major 
reforms of the da~hu during the period was that they no longer had to 
forward the tax to the designated granaries but only to the 
prefectural administration so that they could avoid ruining them­
selves.101 Another way of solving the financial difficulty of the 
da~hu was to levy money on other households to assist them. This 
happened in Binzhou Subprefecture in the late 1560s. When the da~hu 
were conscripted assistant households were organized who would pay a 
fixed amount of ten taels so that they all knew exactly what they had 
to pay. Moreover the collection of the da-hu was fixed to 150 taels 
and 150 dccn of grain, and in this way the ruin of their families was 
avoided. 1 0 2
With the introduction of the silver corvee the da~hu were also 
required to collect the silver used to hire persons for this work. 
There are several references to this collection and we must assume 
that it was general for all silver corvee. The money was normally
handed over to the officials after the collection had finished but in 
the case of some of the corvee of military nature the da~hu could be 
involved in a way which resembles the corvee heads of the labour 
corvee. If the collection had not been finished so that the wages for 
the soldiers sent on training could not be paid, then in the case of 
labour corvee the corvee head would have to pay the money while in the 
case of silver corvee the da-hu would have to pay.104 Other instances 
where the da~hu had to perform functions similar to the corvee head 
was in the procurement of certain goods for the central government. A 
number of live deer requisitioned for sacrifices had been commuted to 
silver payment at some date, but in 1555 the Ministry of Works 
suggested that this was not convenient, presumably because it was 
difficult for the government to buy live deer. The solution was that 
the da-hu were to continue to collect the silver and then buy the
100 SDJHL 4/28.
101 Ibid. 9/1.
102 Binzhou zhi 1583/4/22.
103 SDJHL 7/26, 8/78, 9/5.
104 Ibid. 9/6.
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animals and forward them. As this involved considerable effort on the 
part of the da-hu, the silver to be collected was doubled from eight 
to sixteen taels so that the da-hu were not ruined. Another instance 
was in the procurement of military clothing. After it had been 
commuted to silver the da-hu were ordered, when they had collected the 
money in the fourth month, to buy cloth and have it dyed, and when the 
cotton was harvested in the seventh month they would have the clothing 
made with padding. The finished clothing was forwarded to the 
prefecture before the tenth month.105
In some cases the da-hu actually performed duties which were 
normally regarded as equal corvee or l■'i-Q'ia contributions. In 1567 it 
is mentioned in the middle of a list of small Zi-j'La contributions for 
branch offices of the central government in the province that the 
da-hu should pay four taels as wages to the clerks (shu-shou) in a 
branch office of the Ministry of Revenue.105 In 1569 the weighers in 
the granaries of> the Confucian schools in Jinan Prefecture were 
abolished, and da~hu were ordered to manage the collection and 
reimbursement of the silver in these granaries. Both duties were
probably on a very small scale but are mentioned here to indicate the 
flexible attitude the administration apparently had towards the duties 
of the da-hu.
2. The da-hu and the li-jia
The origin of the da-hu has so far been impossible to establish 
as no sources relating to this have been found. However Kuribayashi 
Nobuo has attempted to explain their origin during his researches on 
the li-jia system. He begins with a description of the introduction of 
the Single Whip during the early years of the Wan-li period in Caoxian 
District, Yanzhou Prefecture. The account which was written by the 
magistrate Wang Qi says that according to the old system there were 
over 200 da~hu who collected the taxes and corvee silver. As these 
duties were traditionally those of the Z-f-leaders, Kuribayashi thinks
105 Ibid. 9/2-3.
106 Ibid. 8/62.
107 Ibid. 8/78.
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LimL- the da-hu was simply another word for /"/-leaders. However from
the writings of Yu Shen-xing he realizes that the /"/-leader and the
da-hu were not necessarily the same person. He deduces that the da-hu
were originally created by dividing the duties of the /"/-leaders when
they became too heavy, so that the da-hu collected taxes while the /"/-
10 8leaders continued to perform the other duties.
Taniguchi Kikuo, who has so far done most of the work on the
da-hu, disputes Kuribayashi*s point of view. He does it most strongly
in a review of Kuribayashi*s work109 but the argument is more fully
presented in an earlier article. He bases his argument on the
description given by Ge Shou-li stating that the da-hu were assigned
to granaries, in which case it would be difficult to maintain
Kuribayashi*s argument. Furthermore he cites cases from some northern
provinces other than Shandong where the da-hu are clearly mentioned
as part of the equal or miscellaneous corvee, and he also points out
that in several districts the number of da-hu did not correspond to
the number of l i - g ia . This was certainly the case in Caoxian which
had seventy-four /'Z-j'/a110 and in Jinan Prefecture this is supported
in Binzhou mentioned above and in Zhangqiu where the da-hu before 1586
numbered 116.111 Taniguchi further points out that the number of
da-hu increased when they had to collect the commuted corvee payments,
and possibly with increases in other burdens following the commutation
1 1 2of the land taxes.
The weakness of Kuribayashi*s argument is that he has overlooked 
the statement by Ge Shou-li and also that he has not counted the 
number of Zi - j i a  in Caoxian, so on the evidence available we must 
reject his conclusion that the da~hu originated directly from a 
division of the duties of the /"/-leaders. However as pointed out by 
Taniguchi the service as da~hu can be regarded as a part of the 
regular l i - g ia  corvee, in the same way as the Hang-zhang are in many
108 Kuribayashi (1971), pp.172-173.
109 Taniguchi Kikuo, "Kuribayashi Nobuo, Rikösei no kenkyü", Töyöshi 
Kenkyü 31.2 (1972), 118.
110 Hou-hu zh i 2/52.
111 Zhangqiu x ia n -zh i 1596/12/86.
Taniguchi (1969), pp.114-124.1 1 2
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sources listed under this category. This view is supported by the 
fact that the da-hu corvee is not listed in the SDJHL.
There is moreover evidence that the da~hu were conscripted on the 
basis of the li-jia. In the order of 1571 by Liang Meng-long to 
revert to the old system, it is stated that the conscription of the 
da-hu was to be according (bi-zhao) to li-jia and the service was to 
be in a ten-year rotation. From the jia (ben-jia, probably the jia on 
duty) the two wealthiest households were to be considered as da-hu, 
one who could write and one who could calculate. The allocation of 
the duties to these da-hu was to be according to the size of the li- 
jia. 111 It is not clear what the exact arrangements were but it is 
clear that the da-hu were conscripted on the basis of the li-jia.
This is further confirmed in the 1602 Zichuan gazetteer where it says 
that the da-hu were still to originate from the li-jia. 114
THE SINGLE WHIP
1. Granary rates
As has been seen, there were manipulations with the tax and 
corvee system, so that people who were In a favourable position 
vis-a-vis the keepers of the tax records had their payments or 
services to the government reduced. Such manipulations were mostly 
for the benefit of wealthy households or the families of government 
officials. The latter also enjoyed privileged exemptions from some 
taxes and corvee. These exemptions were regulated for the whole 
empire in 1545 to stop abuses, such as claiming exemptions above the 
amount to which a given official was entitled or extending exemptions 
beyond the households.115 However this regulation does not appear to 
have immediately stopped the abuses.
The main problem for the provincial authorities in the 1550s was 
the manipulation of the granary rate.and the da-hu. In 1555 Governor
113 SDJHL 4/27.
114 Zichuan xian-zhi 1602/13/1.
DMHD 20/19-20. Translated from the SL in Friese, pp.33-35.1 1 5
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conclusion ihey reached was that the Single Whip (yi-tiao-bian-fa) 
should be introduced where conditions allowed it. The prefect in 
Jinan Prefecture reported that the Single Whip had been in operation 
in Licheng and Changqing Districts for some time, probably from 
1551.116
The Single Whip in Licheng was applied to tax collection and 
eliminated the granary rate. The total tax from Licheng was 13,673.21 
dan> of which 9,800 don was transferred revenue. Each dan of trans­
ferred revenue was originally commuted to 0.43 tael of silver giving a total 
of 4,214 taels. Under the Single Whip, tax was paid at a uniform rate 
regardless of the tax class of the owner and whether or not he was an 
absentee landlord. The retained and transferred revenue was levied on 
each dan of tax according to their percentage in the total district 
tax. In this way the transferred revenue from each dan was 0.71673 
dan, or when commuted to silver at the rate of 0.43 taels per dan it 
was 0.308194 taels per dan. The retained revenue per dan was then 
0.28327 dan which was not commuted. To this was added a melting 
charge of 8% giving a total of 0.3059316 dan. The melting charge was 
probably imposed to make payment in kind equal to payment in silver, 
since in the latter case the taxpayers had to make up the losses when 
the silver was melted. In addition a small charge was made of 0.00435 
tael in mat-cover silver (xi-oao-yin) per dan of retained revenue.
The only unclear point here is that the original (yuan) commutation 
rate is given at 0.43 taels which suggests that there had not 
previously been any difference in the payment of silver per dan. How­
ever during the deliberations, statements that the tax classes should 
be disregarded and that it was no longer necessary to specifically 
determine the granary rates for each dan of collected tax show clearly 
that the object was to eliminate the granary rate. The commutation 
figure of 0.43 taels per dan must then be regarded as the average 
figure for previous commutations.
The governor ordered in 1555 that a similar system should be 
introduced in the other districts but it is doubtful whether the
116 *For a discussion of the date of the introduction of the Single 
Whip in Shandong see: Leif Littrup, "The Early Single Whip Policy in
Shandong, 1550-1570", Papers on Far Eastern History 15 (1977), 65-68.
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provincial authorities expected that this could be applied immediately
in every dislrict. At any rate, during the deliberations it was
maintained that suitable conditions for the Single Whip existed in
districts where there were not too great differences in the quality of
the land and in the wealth of the people. In districts where this was
not so, it would be better to continue with the collection of tax
1 1 7according to tax classes, i.e. granary rates.
The provincial authorities also took the opportunity to continue
a policy of reducing the number of decimal digits in the calculation
of taxes. This had been going on at least since 1550 where it was
118enforced with only two decimal digits in district tax figures. 
Recommendations were made in 1555 that this should continue for the 
districts and that in addition the da~hu should not be allowed to 
calculate payments from the individual taxpayers to more than two 
decimal digits.119 The reason for this — according to an order from 
the governor in 1561 — was that trifling amounts could be used to 
imperceptibly increase the levies on some households to the benefit of 
others. The sources give many figures to more than two decimal
digits so we must have some doubts about the implementation of this 
policy. It is however interesting to see that the officials were 
prepared to sacrifice complete equality in the levy of taxes, by 
abandoning the application of minute decimal digits — in order to 
simplify the administration and supervision of the tax system which in 
the end would benefit ordinary taxpayers.
There can be no doubt that the order to introduce the Single Whip 
in 1555 was followed at least in some districts. In a letter to Liu 
Cai probably in 1557, Ge Shou-li wrote that it had been necessary to 
change the uniform levy and instead create three grades as it was 
difficult to use the Single Whip when poor and rich were assessed at 
the same rate. What Ge meant by that remark is not clear as he did not 
elaborate, but it is evidence that the Single Whip had been applied 
sufficiently to show that there had been problems in its application
117 SDJHL 4/2-6.
1,8 Ibid. 3/7.
119 Ibid. 4/3.
120 Ibid. 4/7.
106
12iwhich had to be adjusted.
Discussions of the Single Whip took place again in 1561 and 1562. 
Officials were ordered to hold meetings with the people to inquire 
about those who had been impoverished by the tax system and how the 
allotment of the taxes could be improved. The conclusion of the 
deliberations was in favour of continuing the Single Whip. The reason 
for this was clearly stated to be that the Single Whip had removed a 
considerable part of the fraud in the tax system and that it was more 
suited to a situation where many officials did not have the necessary 
competence or moral standards which were required if the previous 
system was to be successfully continued. It was further argued that 
inequalities which could have arisen when land of different quality 
was levied at the same rate were to a certain degree offset through 
the new ’metallic’ gradings of the land. There could still be cases 
where the 'metallic’ gradings had not been introduced or where they 
did not provide complete equality. In these circumstances the local 
officials were granted a certain discretion of action. It was however 
forbidden to give special consideration to single households. If 
special consideration was granted it was to be to a whole Z'i-Q'La to 
prevent individual households from obtaining unfair tax advantages 
over other households in the Zd-cda. At the same time instructions 
for the management of the Single Whip were given to some subprefectures 
and districts in Dongchang Prefecture. This may indicate that the 
Single Whip was only introduced in these districts at this time. This 
gradual introduction is further shown by a clear statement in the 
discussions that a uniform policy could not be enforced in all 
districts of the province. Local discretion was allowed but the
12 2general trend was to be towards the introduction of the Single Whip.
2. The da-hu
With the elimination of the granary rates it became easier to 
reform the da-hu services. The concern of the provincial authorities
121 GDSGWJ 13/25.
122 SDJHL 4/7-10.
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was that the system of the da-hu was no longer effective for the 
collection and delivery of taxes because some of the da~hu were 
apparently not efficient. ’Combined collection and separate 
forwarding' (zong-shou-fen-jie) was now to be substituted for the old 
system where each da-hu had been responsible for both collection and 
forwarding, or 'separate collection and separate forwarding' (fen- 
shou-fen-jie). Each district was to be divided into a number of tax 
areas (q u), eight in large districts and six or four in smaller 
districts. In each tax area a tax chest (gui) was to be set up to be 
managed by wealthy and honest da-hu. It is mentioned during the 
deliberations, but not in the governor's decision, that there were to be 
two da-hu for the taxes paid in silver and two for taxes paid in kind, 
the latter being mostly for retained revenue. Registers {ohi-li) were 
compiled for each tax chest and the da-hu were to supervise the 
reception of the taxes at the chest. In this they were to be assisted 
by the /-/-leaders who would direct the shi-pai to lead the households 
to the chest where they would personally deposit their taxes. The 
obvious purpose of this was to prevent the taxpayers from being 
exploited by intermediaries. For forwarding of taxes, the officials 
were to match the content of each chest with the deliveries to the 
different granaries so that payments to a granary did not have to be 
drawn from more than one chest. For the delivery itself two petty 
da-hu (xiao-da-hu) were conscripted for each 200 taels of silver.123
It is not possible to ascertain whether this system of collection 
and forwarding was actually established in 1555. Li Kai-xian, writing 
around 1560, mentions tax chests in Zhangqiu District.124 Dongchang 
Prefecture reported that the order to introduce the 'combined 
collection and separate forwarding' was received in 1562 and the 
Left administration commissioner in 1570 wrote that after the 
introduction of the Single Whip the tax was still divided into summer 
and autumn tax; and granary rates and da-hu conscription were still 
operative. This had later been changed to the Single Bellstring 
method (yi-chuan-ling-fa) with 'combined collection and separate
123 Ibid. A/3, 7.
124 Li Kai-xian ji> p.708. For the dating of the writings of Li Kai- 
xian, see Littrup, "Single Whip", p.74.
SDJHL 4/17.1 2 5
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2 2 6forwarding' and summer and autumn taxes paid together. However
this had apparently not been the case in Dongchang Prefecture in 
1569. 127 The conclusion must be that the reform of the da-hu was 
introduced gradually beginning in the late 1550s but as with the 
granary rates there was considerable allowance for variations 
according to local conditions.
3. Corvee and Ge Shou-li's
opposition to the Single Whip
The Single Whip considered in the provincial adminstration in 
1555 was only concerned with land taxes and their collection and 
forwarding. This is an indication that the term Single Whip was used 
for almost any reform which was carried out at that time with the 
intention of increasing simplicity and uniformity in the tax and 
corvee system. It is generally assumed that the Single Whip policy 
had as its primary purpose the regulation of the corvee system which 
had become more and more unmanageable as more items were included and 
the illegal manipulations created greater inequalities. It should 
however be noted that authors writing about the Single Whip tend to 
perceive it as an instrument to regulate the particular part of the 
tax and corvee system in which they had or have an interest. This is 
illustrated in modern times by Kuribayashi's statement that the Single 
Whip was mainly aimed at regulating the li-jia contributions,128 while
2 2 9Tani writes it was mainly aimed at regulating the stabling service.
As stated above, the granary rates can be regarded as corvee 
because they were levied according to the tax classes, but by 
contemporary officials they were conceived as part of the tax system. 
There were however movements in Shandong in the 1550s, at least in the 
later part of the decennium, to apply the Single Whip to corvee.
Single Whip in connection with corvee usually meant that the corvee 
was levied according to land holdings, either by incorporating the
126 Ibid. 4/19.
127 Ibid. 4/18.
128 Kuribayashi (1971), pp.152 ff.
129 Tani, p.248.
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the payments for corvee into the land tax or by converting land 
holdings to ding. The main opponent of the Single Whip in Shandong at 
this time, Ge Shou-li, concentrated his opposition on the point of 
levying corvee on land. He also expressed concern over the uniform 
tax rates and the ’combined collection and separate forwarding’, but 
the levy of corvee on land seems to have been his greatest fear when­
ever he heard the phrase Single Whip, ever since he had first seen the 
consequences of such changes when governor of Henan in 1549-1550.
The problem with the levy of corvee on land was that the house­
holds that made a comfortable living — not to speak of great profit — 
from trade or other non-primary professions did not have to contribute 
to the corvee. This had been the case when corvee was levied 
according to men where assets besides land holdings were included in 
the assessment. When corvee was transferred to the land it was levied 
from the people who also paid the taxes. In the view of Ge Shou-li — 
while minister for revenue in 1567 — this could endanger the payment 
of taxes which were more important for the central government and the 
military forces on the northern border. He apparently refused — at
least in his writings — to admit that the previous system had become 
unequal following concentration of land holdings and various 
malpractices. Those with great land holdings only had to perform 
corvee according to ding and men, and even if they were in a high tax 
class their total contribution was low in relation to those with 
smaller land holdings. This at least seems to be the major argument 
for the introduction of the Single Whip for corvee.
Provincial consideration of the levy of corvee on land is first 
recorded in 1563 when it was approved for some areas, but it had 
already developed in some unspecified districts in earlier years. The 
approval in 1563 came too late for it to be applied for all corvee 
during the equal corvee assessment in progress, so to give some 
immediate relief it was decided to transfer some items completely from 
the equal corvee to be levied on the land. These items were material 
money (Ziao-yin), charcoal money (ehai-tan-yin) and fuel money (mu- 
ohai-yin) which had increased in recent years so that even if they 
only amounted to c. 50,000 taels compared to a total of 600,000 taels
1 3 o GDSGWJ 3/9-15, 13/25; Littrup, "Single Whip", pp.81-83.
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for all equal corvee the change was probably.significant for the tax- 
payers. This was further enhanced by the fact that material money
had increased comparatively more in the districts which were not 
directly adjacent to the Grand Canal. The districts on the canal had 
complained that money or labour to be provided for corvee work on the 
canal from distant districts had not arrived, so their burden had 
become excessive. The solution was to levy the canal corvee on the 
adjacent districts and then transfer to the more distant districts the 
material, charcoal and fuel money previously levied on the adjacent 
districts for delivery to the capital. For the distant districts this 
meant a real increase in their corvee burden as they had previously by
 ^ 13 2illegal means been able to avoid some of the canal corvee.
When Ge Shou-li became minister for revenue in 1567 he got the 
chance to enforce his own ideas about the Single Whip in Shandong and 
for that matter in other parts of China as well. In 1567:5 he 
obtained imperial approval for a memorial stressing that the officials 
should have the welfare of agriculture constantly in mind because that 
was the basis of the state,and that in particular the levy of corvee 
on land should be prohibited and that the ’combined collection and 
separate forwarding’ should be abolished. His opposition to this 
method of collection was based upon the experience that officials took 
first from the tax chests the silver needed for the most urgent tax 
payments,so that there was no money at all for the less urgent 
payments if all taxes were not collected. At the same time the da~hu 
supervising the tax chests withheld for themselves any surplus that 
may have accumulated in the chest and which under the old system could 
be used for making up losses during the forwarding. Now the petty 
da-hu had to make up the deficits themselves. Finally it seems that 
the book-keeping procedures were not adequate to cope with the changes, 
so it was difficult to keep control of the tax from payment to 
delivery when it had to pass through several hands. This created a 
special problem when remittances were to be made to districts after 
bad harvests, particularly when no distinction was made between summer 
and autumn taxes, and things became almost impossible when calculations
131 SDJHL 8/37-38, 9/59-62.
132 Ibid. 9/29.
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had to be made for the general remittance of tax arrears from before 
1564.133
Ge Shou-li’s memorial gained approval for a general return to the 
old system of taxation, so he seems to have won a complete victory. Had 
this policy been carried out it would probably have meant a complete 
dismantling of the Single Whip. However he had to relinquish office 
the following month,134 and even if there is no evidence that the 
imperial sanction to his memorial was later withdrawn it certainly was 
a setback for its implementation. It would have demanded a very 
vigorous policy from the central government to reverse the trend 
towards the Single Whip. After all,there is no evidence that the 
reforms carried out in Shandong since 1555 had obtained approval from 
the emperor or the central government.
4. The Single Whip after 1567
Jiang Ting-yi who as governor had to act upon Ge's memorial did 
return the material money, etc., from levy on land to the equal corvee, 
but at the same time he introduced a Single Whip for the whole equal 
corvee. Investigations had revealed that even if the corvee was paid 
according to regulations and there were no manipulations, the stronger 
tL-gia still had advantages as they could use their position to get 
assigned the less urgent corvee, while the weaker I't—g'ia had to 
perform the more urgent corvee which was more difficult to fulfil.
This seems to indicate that the corvee was still to a large extent 
levied with the I'i-g'ia as a unit. The solution was to calculate all 
the silver to be paid for corvee in a district and then distribute it 
over all the objects on which corvee was levied. So the arrange­
ments of Jiang Ting-yi complied with the very specific government order 
that the material money, etc., was to be returned to the equal corvee, 
but his ’Single Whipping’ of all equal corvee can hardly have met with 
the approval of Ge Shou-li. It also seems that Jiang did not enforce
133 GDSGWJ 3/10-15; SDJHL 4/11 ff.
134 Ming-shi (Peking, 1973 edn.) 112/3470.
135 SDJHL 9/54-55.
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the return to the equal corvee of other corvee which in the previous 
years had tended towards levy on land in the districts. Anyway, Ge 
Shou-li wrote in an otherwise laudatory letter when Jiang left his 
position as governor that Jiang had allowed the levy of corvee on 
land.136
Jiang Ting-yi also reviewed the ’combined collection and separate 
forwarding’. As mentioned previously it was then revealed that this 
method had not been used in Dongchang Prefecture. Most districts in 
Jinan Prefecture preferred to return to the 'separate collection and 
separate forwarding’. As a result greater flexibility was allowed 
than had apparently been officially endorsed before, but ’combined 
collection and separate forwarding’ was generally preferred.137
In 1570 the new governor Liang Meng-long ordered an almost 
complete return to the tax and corvee system of before 1555. Corvee 
could not be conscripted according to land, only according to men and 
ding. There were to be granary rates and -da-hu to collect and forward 
taxes by ’separate collection and separate forwarding’. The tax 
classes were to be reassessed, households that had been discontinued 
were to be removed from the registers and newcomers included. Men- 
silver at specific rates was to be assigned to silver-corvee, and 
ding-sllve.r also assigned at specific rates to labour corvee. One of 
the few concessions allowed by Liang was towards the problem of corvee 
levied on ding, which was very heavy on the less wealthy peasants. He 
ordered that in all households assets other than land were to be 
converted to ding, so that the wealthy could get a number of ding, and 
the households with provileged exemptions could get some ding in 
excess of these. It was finally decided that the land belonging to 
absentee landlords was to be levied at 0.03 taels per mou towards the 
cost of the corvee. Liang also gave concessions to the da~hu, who now 
had to manage both the collection and forwarding of the taxes, so that 
deliveries from now on would only be to the prefectural offices and
13 8not to granaries outside the prefecture.
136 GDSGWJ 14/18.
137 SDJHL 4/18-19.
138 SDJHL 4/23-25, 9/70-76.
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To what extent the Single Whip was actually introduced in the 
province is impossible to establish. There were obviously allowances 
for local variations. However the officials appear to have worked 
from the assumption that developments were under way which were worth 
pursuing and encouraging, or in the case of opponents were worth a 
considerable effort to resist, including a memorial to the emperor.
It has been impossible to get any picture of the development from the 
district gazetteers. The only references in the local gazetteers are 
in Putai District where material, charcoal and fuel money in 1565 are 
listed under land taxes. In Binzhou Subprefecture the Single Whip
is mentioned in the late 1560s. The gazetteer says that the summer 
and autumn taxes were levied after the Single Whip and divided 
according to granary rate for reception and forwarding. The exhausted 
li-jia were first to be selected and amalgamated in the tax registers. 
After that the da~hu were to draw lots in the yamen for the granaries 
so that the /-/-registrars could not tamper with the burden of each 
granary.140 The term Single Whip is used by the gazetteer but 
elements of the former system also seem to have survived. This 
reinforces the impression that the Single Whip was introduced 
gradually.
139 Putai xian-zhi 1592/3/9.
140 Binzhou zhi 1583/4/22.
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CHAPTER III
THE LI-JIA BEFORE THE SECOND SINGLE WHIP
INTRODUCTION
The subject of this chapter is the li-jia organization, the H -  
jia corvee and the involvement of the li-jia with other kinds of 
corvee from c. 1550 to the early years of the Wan-li period. This 
upper time-limt has been chosen as the Single Whip policy introduced 
during the Wan-li period had profound influence on the 'local self- 
government system. The introduction of this second Single Whip took 
place at different times in the various districts so no definite time­
limit can be established. For the formal structure of the li-jia 
organization we have to rely on information supplied in the Wan-li or 
later gazetteers. We cannot be absolutely sure that this information 
is unconditionally reliable for the situation which existed thirty to 
forty years before the compilation of the gazetteers. However the 
impression I get from the gazetteers is that the organization 
described in them was probably much the same as it had been for at 
least the last few decades. In some cases the gazetteers purport to 
describe the situation which had existed throughout the dynasty, while 
in Pingyuan and Laiwu it is specifically stated that the description 
given in the district gazetteer was of the organization which had been 
abolished with the introduction of the Single Whip.1 With regard to 
the function of the li-jia in the wider context of the tax and corvee 
system the SDJHL remains the main source. In the latter part of this 
chapter the upper time-limit can consequently be set at 1571.
1 Pingyuan xian-zhi 1590/1/20; Laiwu xiccn-zhi 1673/4/4.
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THE LI-JTA ORGANIZATION 
1. Li-leaders, shi-pai and jLa-heads
In the reform of tax collection discussed and perhaps partially 
introduced in 1555 with the creation of tax chests, the Z-L-leaders 
were to assist the da~hu and instruct the shi-pai to escort the tax­
payers (hua-hu) to the chest. This shows clearly that the officials 
regarded the Z-L-leaders and the shi-pai as the persons in the li-jia 
who normally assisted the bureaucracy and the da-hu in fiscal 
administration. The jLa-heads are not mentioned in this or any other 
source, indicating that they had administrative or supervisory duties 
over other households in their li-jia. They are only mentioned as 
members of the li-jia conscripted to certain corvee duties. In 1548 it 
is mentioned that messengers (jie-di-zao-li) were to be selected among 
the people working on transport corvee in the districts along the 
canal, while in all other districts they were to be selected among the 
incumbent jLa-heads whenever there was a need for such services.
Moreover jLa-head runners (jia-shou-zao-li) were conscripted until
2they were abolished in 1569.
The shi-pai were the non-incumbent Z-L-leaders (pai-nian li-zhang) 3 
and were apparently permanently assigned to their jia. This is shown 
in Laiwu District where before the introduction of the second Single 
Whip the situation is described as follows:
Ten households formed one jia and ten jia formed one li-jia.
Each jia had one man as shi-pai to press taxes. One jia
performed the corvee each year in a ten-year rotation.
According to this text the shi-pai in Laiwu District could have 
been one of the ten jLa-head households in the jia. However the 
position of the shi-pai is further made clear in Pingyuan:
Each li-jia had nine shi-pai. Together with the incumbent Z-L-
leader there were ten persons. They served in a rotation over
2 SDJHL 7/12, 10/44.
3 Rai-nian li-zhang usually means the non-incumbent Z-L-leaders but 
is also used for all the ten Z-L-leaders serving in rotation. Shi-pai 
is obviously derived from the latter meaning and means the 'ten pai- 
nian' . Littrup, "Yellow Registers", p.84.
4 Laiwu xian-zhi 1673/4/4.
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ten years.
In Zhangqiu District there were also ten shi-pai per ii-jia6 but 
in Binzhou Subprefecture the situation is not evident from the sources. 
The 1583 edition of the district gazetteer mentions one Zi-leader and 
ten shi-pai per I'i-j'ia and this is repeated in the 1701 edition. 5 67 We 
cannot establish whether this is an error which was then continued in 
the latter gazetteer or whether it describes the actual situation in 
the subprefecture. If the latter is true this indicates that the 
office of incumbent ZZ-leader was no longer rotated among the shi-pai 
but was of a more permanent nature. The shi-pai were then not 
potential Zi-leaders waiting for their turn in the rotation but were 
the leaders of each of the ten jia serving more or less permanently 
under the direction of the ii-leader. Such an arrangement would not 
have been consistent with the original structure of the i'i-j'ia, and 
also conflicts witli the policy —  to be described below —  that the 
i'i-j'ia corvee were still to be performed in a ten-year rotation.
Another example of the relationship between the ZZ-leaders and 
the jia comes from Zichuan, where from the beginning of the dynasty:
One leader (zhang) administered ten households which made up one
jia. Ten jia made up one i'i-j'ia.
The compilers of the gazetteers must have described the situation as 
known to them, which probably means that this description is accurate 
for the sixteenth century. We cannot be absolutely sure that they 
described the situation as it had existed from the beginning of the 
dynasty but at least we can see that in the opinion of the compilers 
there had been no major changes during the intervening two hundred 
years, that is until changes were made about thirty years before the 
compilation of the gazetteer.8
If the compilers were correct we can then answer some of the 
questions raised in Chapter I about the relationship between the ii- 
leaders and the jia-heads. For pressing and collecting taxes the ii-
5 Pingyuan xian-zhi 1590/1/20.
6 Li Kai-xian j i, p.711.
7 Binzhou zhi 1583/2/42, 1701/4/31.
Zichuan xian-zhi 1602/13/1.8
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leaders were each year assisted by the non-incumbent Zi-leaders (shi- 
paz) who exacted the annual taxes and corvee from the gia of which 
they were permanent heads during the decennial rotation. For the 
Zi-gia services provided on a rotational basis, the incumbent ZY-leader 
was the only one responsible among the ten Zi-leaders and he was 
assisted in the performance of services or payment of money by the gia 
to which he was assigned. The j-fa-heads had no administrative 
functions, their only duty being to assist the incumbent ZY-leader 
with the Zi-gia corvee and possibly other expenses within the Zi-gia.
In other words the power over other households in the Zi-gia 
rested in the hands of the ten households which, according to the 
registration in the Yellow Registers and/or perhaps other tax 
registers, were considered to be the most powerful in wealth and ding. 
It is open to doubt whether these ten households were actually the 
most wealthy in the Zi-gia. Tampering with the tax classes, as seen 
above in the discussion of the granary rates, must also have 
influenced the selection of ZY-leaders. The simple fact that these 
were selected from the upper tax classes, as is stated in one source,9 
would further induce the powerful households to change their tax class 
when granary rates, equal corvee and Zi-gia duties all fell most 
heavily upon them.
The position of Z-Y-leader could be hazardous if the members of 
the Zi-gia were not able to pay their taxes and other contributions, 
leaving the ZY-leader to make up the deficiencies. They could however 
get some advantages from the position, as in Binzhou Subprefecture 
where it had been necessary to have the taxpayers pay directly to the 
da-hu because the demands of the shi-pai were excessive.10 When the 
shi-pai could act in this way they must have been among the more 
powerful households. Perhaps the officials also wanted the Z^-leaders 
and shz-paz to be persons with a certain standing in the community, 
otherwise they could hardly be expected to function effectively. This 
is suggested further by the experience of Taian Subprefecture where 
during the Jia-jing and Long-qing periods the corvee was so heavy that 
even the gentry (gin-shen) could not avoid service as ZY-leaders.11
9
1 0
SDJHL 10/30.
Binzhou zhi 1583/2/50-51. Note 11 over.
118
2. The ZZ-registrars
Besides the incumbent ZZ-leader and the shi-pai the ZZ-registrar 
was an important person in the fiscal work if the ZZ-jZa. In the 
sixteenth-century sources they are usually called li-shu, but they 
were probably identical to the shu~shou of the early years of the 
dynasty and appear to have combined this function with that of the ZZ- 
tax assessors (suan-shou). In the gazetteers of the Wan-li period 
they are only mentioned to have existed in Zangqiu District until 1586 
under the title of tax assessing shu-shou (pai-li-ang-shu-shou). 12 
Even in that gazetteer they are not listed together with the ZZ-jZa 
officeholders and this together with their absence from similar 
listings in other gazetteers indicates that their position was without 
the legal basis enjoyed by other officers in the ZZ-jZa.
The ZZ-registrars are however mentioned frequently in the SDJHL 
documents, so their positions were recognized by the officials and 
appear to have been firmly established in the sixteenth century.
During the 1555 reforms the seal-holding officials in each sub­
prefecture and district were ordered to personally supervise the ZZ- 
registrars in compiling a register of the land and tax of each house­
hold, and they were also ordered no longer to distribute trifling
1 3amounts of tax between the households.
The importance of the ZZ-registrars is perhaps best illustrated 
by an incident described in the "Tablet for Good Government" written 
by Li Kai-xian for the magistrate of Binzhou Subprefecture in 1546, Ji 
De-pu. Li Kai-xian first describes how the corvee in Shandong was 
very heavy and how the people involved in the assessment cheated for 
their own benefit. One of the problems as Li saw it was that as soon 
as a district official had managed to understand and improve the 
corvee assessment he would be transferred, so officials never really 
got a chance to master the situation in their districts. During the 
biennial assessment of the equal corvee in 1546 the provincial
11 Taian zhou-zhi 1671/2/8. Probably a verbatim quote from the 1603 
edition.
1 2
1 3
Zhangqiu xian-zhi 1596/12/69. 
SDJHL 4/3, 6.
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treasury considered the corvee in Binzhou District to be particularly 
heavy. From Li’s observations and the subsequent action this probably 
meant that the corvee was particularly heavy on the less wealthy 
households. The provincial administration issued an order for a 
particularly careful assessment of the equal corvee in Putai District 
which was under the jurisdiction of Binzhou Subprefecture. Ji De-pu 
went personally to Putai to assist with the assessment but as he was 
not familiar with the district he found it difficult to get quick and 
reliable information. Under the pretext of doing other business he 
then travelled around the district and summoned the ^-registrars to 
the pavilions. Without revealing his real intentions he then got the 
^-registrars to report on property and persons within their li-jia. 
The Z-t-registrars did not conceal their feelings —  that is, they were 
not suspicious —  and freely reported the facts. Their reports were 
subsequently recorded in the registers and when the official assess­
ment were later undertaken this information was used and malpractices 
eradicated.14
A story like this, reported in a laudatory essay for a 
meritorious official,probably gives too much credit to his achieve­
ments. We must of course doubt whether the Z-i-registrars 
unsuspiciously revealed all facts and that the information obtained 
by Ji was accurate. However the figures for property and persons 
given to him were probably sufficiently at variance with those in the 
previous equal corvee registers as to warrant the claim that he had 
achieved a fairer assessment. For our purpose here, it is more 
significant to see that Ji De-pu knew which kind of persons he had to 
contact in order to get the information he wanted. His action 
furthermore proves that the position of the Z-i-registrars was of a 
permanent nature, as 1546 was almost half way between two compilations 
of the Yellow Registers in 1542 and 1552.
The sources give no information about the recruiting of the ii- 
registrars and the only indication that they received any remuneration 
for their work is that the tax-assessing shu-shou in Zhangqiu were 
assessed at ten taels per year, and we cannot be sure that this applied 
during the period. If they did not receive a formal salary they were
1 4 Li Kai-xian ji, pp.644-645.
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definitely able, to compensate themselves for their efforts by informal 
or illegal means. They received bribes from people who wanted favours 
in the assessment of taxes and corvee, and worked in collusion with 
rich families to contrive tax frauds.15 The Z-^-registrars in turn 
bribed dishonest officials and other government personnel and one of 
the reasons for the introduction of the Single Whip after 1555 was to 
stop such malpractices.16 With the elimination of the granary rates 
the opportunities for the ü-registrars to make manipulations were 
diminished. However no attempts to abolish the service of the Zi- 
registrars were apparently made during the period, and they are still 
reported in 1571 when they were involved in the assessment of stabling 
services together with the shi-pai.17
3. The zhi-shi and zong-cui
In Zhangqiu District the officeholders in the Zi-jia are listed 
in the 1596 gazetteer as Z-t-leader and Zao-ven serving in each Zi-jia 
{tu), while in each jia there were also one zong-cui and one zhi-shi. 
The zong-cui was responsible for the distribution of tax bills and for 
pressing taxes. As this function appears to be identical with the one 
assigned to the shi-pai, the zong-cui may be another word for the non- 
incumbent //-leaders, but this is not certain.
The zhi-shi in each jia were responsible for the ’purification' 
of the soldiers in the hereditary military households. This work 
would have included supervising the military households and registers, 
sending soldiers off to their service and perhaps also reporting on 
deserters passing through or temporarily living in the jia. The 
district gazetteer states that the number of military households was 
very high in Zhangqiu in relation to the number of civilian households. 
In previous registers the military households had numbered over 
10,000, and in the gazetteer compiled c. 1530 the total number of all 
households had been 13,170.18 These figures provided in a very casual
15 SDJHL 4/8, 26.
16 Ibid. 4/7, 20.
17 Ibid. 12/45.
18 Zhangqiu xian-zhi 1596/14/96 and the preface to the former 
gazetteer included in the 1596 edition.
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way are the only ones available for Zhangqiu so it is impossible to 
say anything definite with regard to the size of the military 
population of the district. The relatively high proportion of 
military households in that part of the province is however evidenced 
in Zichuan District to the east of Zhangqiu where, as has been seen in 
Chapter I, c. 25% of the households were registered as military in the 
sixteenth century.
Despite the fact that there were such large numbers of military 
households in some districts their administration is virtually not 
mentioned in the gazetteers. This is perhaps because the military 
households had to some extent lost their earlier significance as the 
mainstay of the military forces. They were however still sufficiently 
important to be mentioned in a memorandum concerning military 
administration, and particularly the problems involved in raising 
troops, written by the magistrate of Lingxian District between 1550 
and 1553. He stated that it was important to be careful with the 
examination of the Zi-gia registers in order to keep track of the 
military ding for the service. He implied that this had not been done 
and that consequently it was difficult to raise the necessary troops. 
This memorandum was probably written in connection with the 
compilation of the Yellow Registers in 1552 which shows that in this 
magistrate’s view these registers still had some useful function as an
1 9instrument for population control.
No indication is given in Zhangqiu as to when the zhi~shi were 
introduced in that district. They appear to have been functioning at 
the time the gazetteer was compiled or at least not long before, as 
their description is followed by complaints that some troops had to 
serve each year and that the common people were unhappy about this.
The cost of sending off a soldier could be as much as thirty to forty 
taels. The gazetteer implies that the households actually had to 
provide manpower for the army but the cost figures given could mean 
that military households were only levied expenses and that the duty 
of the zhi-shi were mainly fiscal.
1 9 Lingxian zhi 1845/16/23.
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4. Elders, zong-jia, xiao-jia and huo-fu
For the non-fiscal duties in the li-jia, the Z-i-elders continued 
to serve to some degree in the districts of Shandong during the 
sixteenth century. In 1521 the /-/-elders were ordered to report on 
bandits in Deping District20 and they are mentioned along with the ti- 
leaders, zong-oui and zhi-shi in the 1596 Zhangqiu gazetteer. Each 
li-jia had one elder who was responsible for security at least in the 
sense of vouching for the inhabitants of the Zi-gia (bao-jie) .21
One of the main functions of the elders had originally been to 
settle local disputes thus relieving the bureaucracy of this burden.
In this respect the elders appear to have lost their usefulness. In 
1569 the magistrate of Binzhou, Wan Peng-cheng, laid down regulations 
to be followed in litigation between the inhabitants of the sub­
prefecture. He complained that small matters at issue between the 
common people dragged on excessively. The families involved suffered 
from this prolonged litigation, both losers and winners. But even 
worse, the innocent witnesses were under heavy economic strain when 
some cases could drag on for years. Wan now introduced a procedure 
whereby the families involved could avoid prolonged litigation by 
using Instruments of Conciliation (yi-he-dccn). If the contending 
families were prepared to draw up such a document and take it to the 
officials with a petition that the case be settled then they could 
avoid having to present evidence. If they demonstrated sincerity the 
officials would then grant permission to close the case. Elders are 
not mentioned and the need for such procedures shows that they were no 
longer active in a judicial role. These procedures show that Wan 
did not consider any use of local self-government in settling legal 
disputes when he gave the initiative to the families involved. This 
however does not preclude assistance by community leaders in arranging 
such conciliation.
In the maintenance of public order the elders were assisted or 
superseded by the zong-jia, xiao-jia and night fire-watchers (shang- 
su-huo-fu). Li Kai-xian lists these latter services as one of his
20 Deping xian-zhi 1796/5/7.
21 Zhangqiu xian-zhi 1596/14/96.
22 Binzhou zhi 1583/4/23.
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minor grievances against the existing corvee system. To grasp the 
details of his grievances is not easy from his description. However 
it is clear that the zong-jia, xiao-jia and huo-fu were responsible 
for security against thieves and other miscreants. The services were, 
in Li's opinion, disliked by the people so they attempted to evade 
them by guile. The zong-j'ia conscripted from wealthy households had 
been used since the time of Zhao Zuo-shan. Assuming that this man was 
magistrate of Zhangqiu District he is probably to be identified with 
Zhao Ying who held this office from 1531 to 1534 and was the first in 
the Ming dynasty with this surname according to the 1596 gazetteer. 
About ten years later the magistrate was Zhao Jie-fu, but according to 
the gazetteer Zhao Ying appears to have been the most active of the 
two.23 Li Kai-xian moreover writes that the system of zong-j'ia was 
excellent when first introduced,which indicates that some time had 
elapsed between its introduction and his criticism. So the zong-j'ia 
were probably introduced in the early 1530s, if not before by an 
unknown Zhao. The zong-j'ia in Zhang-qiu had to serve terms of three 
months and the households designated to serve for a term used all the 
influence they could muster in order to evade it. The huo-fu, who may 
be identical with the xiao-jia> had to serve once every few days.
Li Kai-xian continued by describing the policies introduced by 
Wang Guo-sheng (H. Ye-shan) when the latter was magistrate in Tangxian
2. 4District of Beizhili around 1550. Wang was a native of Zhangqiu and 
a ju-ren in 1528, the same year as Li Kai-xian,25 who probably heard 
about these policies directly from Wang. Wang had abolished the zong- 
j'ia and huo-fu in Tangxian so it was no longer necessary to impose 
upon the wealthy households and burden the poor. These services had 
now been allocated among the townspeople and also among those 
performing corvee as min-zhuang and kuai-shou, which in Shandong were 
parts of the equal corvee. From the description of Li Kai-xian it 
appears that the services as zong-j'ia, xiao-jia and huo-fu were levied 
outside the normal and regulated equal corvee and that the resentment
23 Zhangqiu xian-zhi 14/24-25, 21/73.
24 Baoding fu-zhi 1607/8/32. Eighteen magistrates followed him 
before 1607.
25 Zhangqiu xian-zhi 1596/11/44-45.
26 Li Kai-xian ji, p.711.
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of the people was more directed towards this irregularity than towards 
the services per se, or in other words the resentment was towards 
using the li-jia to conscript additional services.
Elders are only referred to in a few instances in the gazetteers 
and they had apparently lost their non-fiscal functions by the 
sixteenth century. In the SDJHL they are however mentioned several 
times in fiscal functions so they must have been fairly widespread.
The elders participated in the fiscal process as advisers to the 
officials in 1562 during the Single Whip reforms. Li-elders are 
specifically mentioned in this context but only together with more 
general groups such as the ’rural population' (xiang-min) or the 
'people of the ti-gia and subdistricts', so whether or not they enjoyed 
special status while advising the officials is open to doubt. In 
1563 it is stated that the division of the men into tax classes 
depended upon verbal reports from the /"t-elders. This must have been 
the case for a long time previously, as it was now recommended that 
registered land should be included in the assessment as well. This 
could be done by relying on registers rather than verbal reports, but 
after the assessment was determined and checked according to the 
Yellow Registers, the Zi-lao were still invited to give their 
opinion.28 In Binzhou Subprefecture the elders were even involved in 
the pressing of taxes and there is no reason to believe that this was 
exceptional.2 9
The fiscal work of the elders even went as far in some cases as 
using them for services normally provided through the equal corvee.
In 1563 the doormen (men-zi) were abolished at certain altars and 
pavilions in the provincial administration and also in the districts. 
These services had been performed by elders and local people and it is 
possible that these particular services were regarded as carrying some 
honour so the use of elders was appropriate.30 However the doormen at 
the office of the regional inspector were abolished in 1559 and the 
premises were then attended by elders. The same happened in the
27 SDJHL 4/9-11.
28 Ibid. 9/58-61.
29 Binzhou zhi 1583/2/41.
30 SDJHL 8/41.
31 Ibid. 8/15.
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Yizhou Military Defence Circuit in ]561 where they shared the duty 
with the zong-jia.32 Such developments can only mean that the social 
prestige of the elders was no longer the same as in the early years of 
the dynasty; at least the administration by using them directly in 
fiscal work did not act in a way which added support to the non-fiscal 
duties of the elders. In the case of their use as doormen it is 
possible that the elders themselves wanted such positions because they 
were able to benefit from them, but then the mere acceptance by the 
officials of such a thing indicates the administration’s attitude 
towards the elders.
THE LI-JIA IN THE FISCAL SYSTEM 
1. The li-jia and fiscal administration
From the previous description of the /i-registrars it can be seen
that the li-jia was still during this period regarded as an important
organization for assessment of taxes and corvee. The recurrent claim
that the li-registrars exploited their position for their own benefit
further suggests that the regulations allowed them a certain degree of
discretion in determining taxes and corvee within their li-jia. At
the same time they were supervised by officials as evidenced by the
fact that the ZZ-registrars bribed them to turn a blind eye to
3 3tampering with the registers.
No description of the procedures for the daily supervision of the 
ZZ-registrars has been found. In 1544 the horse administration was 
changed in Zhangqiu District from levy on ding to levy on men. When 
this reform was extended to other districts in the province, the 
officials in the twenty-five districts concerned subpoenaed the li- 
registrars and shi-pai together with registers for the equal corvee 
and for the households who had previously been responsible for the 
delivery of horses to the district offices in order to make a fair 
assessment.34 This was a special occasion, as was Ji De-pu's action
32 
3 3 
3 4
Ibid. 8/30.
SDJHL 4/7, 7/15. 
Ibid. 12/45.
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in Binzhou Subprefecture. Together these examples indicate that the 
administration had the capacity to undertake major re-assessments and 
also thought that useful results could be obtained. At the same time 
they indicate that daily supervision was less thorough, which of 
course does not preclude the possibility that the ZZ-registrars were 
individually in regular contact with the officials.
The Zi-jia continued to play an important role in the 
registration of the taxpayers. During the deliberations for the 
introduction of the Single Whip in 1555, the prefectural officials 
proposed that the seal-holding officials in subprefectures and 
districts should be ordered to establish registers for each li-jia. 
They were to order one wealthy household (fu~hu) with a good knowledge 
of local conditions to go to each household and check it carefully. 
Each li~jia was to compile a register (shou-ce) in which the summer 
and autumn taxes and the number of ding would be clearly stated for 
each person and each plot of land. The registers, which were to be 
compiled every ten years, would then be sent to the subprefecture or 
district to be stamped with the official seals and copies were to be 
made for granaries and treasuries. The registers were then to be sent
3 5to the prefecture.
In the governor-'s order of 1555 this procedure was changed. He 
ordered the officials in subprefectures and districts personally to 
supervise that the ZZ-registrars prepared the registers with figures 
for land and tax for each taxpaying household. In the yamen the 
officials were then to enter this information in two registers, one 
for retained and one for transferred revenue. These registers were 
then to be issued to the da-hu as tax collecting registers {ohi-ti).
A tax bill was to be issued to each household which would at the 
appropriate time take this bill together with the tax to the da~hu who 
in turn would match it against his chi-ii. The subprefectures and 
districts were also to compile registers of all the taxpayers and send 
them to the prefecture. From these registers the prefecture was to 
extract information on taxation and print this on a proclamation which 
would be posted in each village so that the taxpayers could know their 
tax commutation rates. The intention was to diminish the reliance of
3 5 Ibid. 4/3-4.
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the taxpayers on the Z-'Z-registrars and to make cheating by the latter 
more difficult.36
The difference between what was proposed and what was finally 
ordered may have some importance. The governor's order seems to 
require the involvement of local officials even at the primary level 
of compilation of the registers in the Z■'L-j'ia. The original proposal 
does not mention the /^-registrars, which could indicate that the 
prefectural officials did not want them to be the main agents in the 
compilation, or at least that they wanted them to be scrutinized care­
fully by wealthy households. According to the regulations we would 
normally expect a wealthy household in a Z.i-jia to be either Z-'Z-leader 
or shi-pai. The fact that these households were not part of the 
formal Z-i-jia structure may indicate that the officials putting 
forward this original proposal held the opinion that the households 
with wealth and power in most li-jia were not identical to those 
registered in the upper tax classes from which the shi-pai were 
selected. In other words these wealthy households had themselves 
cheated considerably with their registration and the officials knew 
this. However the officials may have preferred to use the wealthy 
households in this informal way, as they probably had very little 
chance of preventing them from cheating no matter what was done. The 
wealthy households were perhaps in a better position to give a reason­
able assessment of the less wealthy in the Z-i-jia than were the Zi- 
leaders and Z-Z-registrars and at the same time they could safeguard 
their own position. To the local officials this may have been an 
acceptable compromise. On the other hand, the governor appears to 
have preferred to rely on the Z-^-registrars but at the same time also 
set up procedures to prevent some of the cheating. We should of 
course bear in mind that the Single Whip was among other things 
designed to diminish the cheating of the Z-i-registrars.
The original proposal and the governor's order also differ in 
that the latter does not mention the use of the li-jia in guiding the 
taxpayers to the tax chest, but this may be because the governor's 
order does not elaborate on the procedures to be followed at the 
chests. The proposal that the da-hu should order the Z-i-leaders to
3 6 Ibid. 4/6.
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ensure that the shi-pai guided their households to the chest was 
repeated in the order by Governor Jiang Ying-yi of 1569. He ordered 
that da-hu were to be selected together with households from the upper 
tax classes which were to be heads of the tax chests. The seal­
holding officials supervising the tax administration would prescribe 
the time limits for the different procedures in collection and 
forwarding. The shi-pai would be supervised, presumably by the heads 
of the chests, and they would in turn ensure that the taxpayers 
delivered their tax in person at the granary. The order does not 
specify which granary, but it must have been one of the local granaries 
within the district. These granaries then operated as tax chests.
Tax was to be paid three times during the year. One time was 
presumably the summer tax to be paid from the fifth to the seventh 
month, the other the autumn tax to be paid from the tenth to the 
twelfth month and the third may have been the collection of the horse- 
fodder tax but no clarification is given. When all three taxes had 
been received the da-hu would draw lots for the granaries to which the 
tax had to be delivered and they would then forward it separately.37 
This was introduced in Binzhou around 1569 and the reason for drawing 
lots was to prevent the Zi-registrars from profiting from the 
allotment of granaries to the da-hu. 38
Dongchang Prefecture reported in the same year that 'separate 
collection and separate forwarding' was still operating in that 
prefecture. The provincial administration allowed Dongchang to 
continue this procedure as the land was level and taxes were easy to 
collect without excessive fraud. The administration also allowed a 
certain flexibility in other parts of the province but expressed 
concern that with 'separate collection and separate forwarding' the 
li-jia was too heavily involved in tax collection. In some cases all 
tax was collected within the li-jia and only on the last day handed 
over to the da-hu for forwarding. Under these circumstances the shi- 
pai could keep some of the collected tax for themselves, to the 
disadvantage both of the taxpayers and the da-hu, so the administration 
preferred 'combined collection and separate forwarding' where the shi-
37
3 8
Ibid. 4/17.
Binzhou zhi 1583/4/22.
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pai did not touch the tnx payments before they were handed over to the 
da-hu. 3 9
The Yellow Registers were still compiled in the province and are 
mentioned in 1571 as the basis for the organization of the Zi-jia.40 
There is however good reason to doubt that they contained accurate 
descriptions of the conditions in the province because the governor in 
1555 ordered other registers to be compiled in the Zi-jia every ten 
years. Probably the Yellow Registers did not play a significant role 
in the allocation of taxes and corvee but they are mentioned in 1563 
in connection with the Single Whip. In that year it was decided that 
in parts of Yanzhou and Dongchang Prefectures the corvee could be 
levied according to ding and land, as the land was predominantly 
spacious and level so satisfactory results could be expected. In 
neighbouring districts in both Nanzhili and Beizhili a land remeasure­
ment had equalized taxes and corvee levied on ding and land. This had 
been made easier by the appointment of capable officials. The same- 
policy could be adopted in parts of Yanzhou and Dongchang, while in 
other parts of the province where the conditions were different it was 
considered better not to levy corvee on land but to continue levy on 
the basis of tax classes. The districts in Yanzhou and Dongchang did 
not want to levy corvee entirely on land, or for that matter entirely 
on ding or other assets, as each method could create inequalities, so 
they were allowed to organize the tax classes according to land, ding, 
and other assets. When the assessments had been made they were to be 
compared with the Yellow Registers and the opinion of the Zi-e.lders 
was to be heard.41 The reference to the Yellow Registers may be 
because they had been compiled the previous year so they were fresh in 
the memory. The officials may also have felt that the Yellow 
Registers had some usefulness shortly after they had been compiled. 
However they were only to be consulted after the assessment had been 
made, presumably according to the equal corvee and other available 
registers.
3 9
4 0 
4 1
SDJHL 4/17-18. 
Ibid. 10/33. 
Ibid. 9/60-61.
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2. The li-gia and the equal corvee
The general impression we get of the levy of equal corvee is that 
the allocation of the services was on the basis of the wealth of 
individual households, and not by dividing all the services in a 
district with the number of l-i-jia and then levying the same amount on 
each li-jia. However the number of Zi-jia in a district could be used 
to determine the level of certain services levied upon it. In 1563 it 
is reported that the material money supplied to ministries in the 
capital had originally been levied on the equal corvee of the 
districts according to their number of li-gia. This was no longer 
appropriate because the number of 1■'i-j'ia no longer corresponded to the 
actual situation in the districts after many households had absconded. 
The solution was to transfer the levy of material money from equal 
corvee to land.42 Another instance of levy according to the number of 
li-jia is mentioned in 1553. In determining the number of wall- 
defending militiamen (Ghou-oheng-ming-zhuang), the frequency of 
official travel and the number of the li-jia in the district had to be 
taken into consideration.43 This may be a special case as in other 
parts of the country the min-zhuang services were often conscripted 
from the l-i-gia. In 1569 the military circuit intendant in Caopu 
Defence Circuit proposed that the min-zhuang and kuai-shou. were to be 
fully supported by their respective li-gia, i.e. all the households 
which through equal corvee levies supported a given man were to live 
in the same Zi-gia so that they knew each other. In this way all the 
money levied for the service of each given man would be easier to 
collect.4 4
As stated in the previous chapter, items of corvee which were 
normally regarded as part of the l■'i-j'ia contributions were in Shandong 
included in the equal corvee. During the period under review there 
are instances of this change but the opposite also happened. Moreover 
the li-gia was used to levy services included in equal corvee when the 
levies were increased between the biennial assessments. This happened 
for the material money in 1552, 1555 and 1557.45
42 Hrid. 8/37.
43 Ibid. 7/61.
44 Ibid. 9/6 Note 45 over.
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Services as treasury men (ku~zi) at the subprefectural and 
district treasuries were in 1570 changed from labour to silver corvee 
to be levied on the ninth tax class. The people hired for this 
service were only to guard the treasuries, while reception and 
disbursement were to be in the hands of a person performing corvee in 
the yamen or a rich and honest peasant. Dezhou petitioned that for 
the ku-zi watchmen they could first conscript from the No. 1 jia in 
each li-jia twelve men from households with comparable strength in 
ding so that one man served one month in rotation. This presumably 
meant that the following year twelve men from No. 2 jia would serve in 
rotation, and so on in a way which would resemble the corvee to be 
levied on the li-jia. The proposal was not accepted by the provincial 
administration.4 6
In 1569 a discussion took place whether or not 'public-use 
silver’ (gong-yong-yin) instead of on equal corvee should be levied on 
the li-jia. This silver was used to cover expenses in the offices of 
the various yamens and expenses in connection with visits by officials, 
presents, etc. The gong-yong silver for use in districts and sub­
prefectures had already been transferred to the li-jia under the name 
of gong-ying silver, so the discussion was really only about whether 
the silver for the prefectures and the provincial administration 
should also be transferred. A decision had apparently been made to 
this effect but Governor Jiang Ting-yi intervened. He ruled that the 
transfer would of course be beneficial to equal corvee. However in 
equal corvee the burden was each year divided upon the ten shi-gai in 
each li-jia, while a levy on the li-jia would mean that the gong-yong 
silver was only to be levied upon one shi-gai (the incumbent li- 
leader) each year. He consequently ordered that the gong-yong silver 
was to remain in the equal corvee so that the li-jia was not 
excessively burdened, and in the equal corvee it would still be levied 
in an equal way.47 This discussion was only on relatively small 
amounts, between ten and a hundred taels for a whole district, except 
Licheng where the levies for the provincial administration were
45 Ibid. 7/47, 7/80, 8/1.
46 Ibid. 9/12-13.
47 Ibid. 9/16-18.
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particularly heavy.48
Yanzhou and Dongchang Prefectures reported in 1567 that in many 
districts the salaries for clerks in the circuit yamens (shu-shou) and 
the kuai-shou (yamen police) were levied on the li-jia. This was done 
because there was apparently no other authorized way of providing the 
money. The provincial administration decided then that the salaries 
for the clerks were to be paid from local treasuries and from fines 
received by provincial and circuit administrations. The kuai-shou 
were to be incorporated in the equal corvee and their number 
determined according to local conditions. At the same time there had 
been some complaints that the Zi-jia had to provide the prefectural 
officials in charge of punishments with their necessary equipment.
This was now to be paid from fines received by subprefectures and 
districts.4 9
As a direct consequence of the above irregularities the 
provincial administration ordered that one register had to be printed 
with the regulations for equal corvee and one with the regulations for 
l-i-jia corvee. The equal corvee was to be performed annually, those 
of the Z-i-jia in rotation. No levy was permitted of corvee not 
included in these registers. If such levies took place they were to 
be regarded as extortion and were to be punished without mercy.50
THE LI-JIA CORVEE 
1. The corvee performed by the li-jia
In the sources for Shandong for the period 1550-1570 no mention 
has been found of the terms shang-gong or gong-fei- which I have 
previously translated as ’ Z-i-jia contributions'. The services 
performed by the Z-i-jia were not different in nature from other corvee, 
as had probably been the case earlier in the dynasty. The only 
difference now was the method of levy where the Z■'i-Q'ia were collected
48 Ibid. 5/1 ff.
49 Ibid. 8/59-63.
50 Ibid. 8/64-65.
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decennially and the equal corvee annually. This at least was the 
difference seen by Jiang Ting-yi in 1569. As an indication that the 
nature of the services was no longer significant I have chosen in 
this chapter to rename the Zi-jia contributions ' Zi-gia corvee’.
The Zi-gia corvee listed in the SDJHL was heavily directed 
towards services in the public transport system. The heaviest 
services were the qing-fu (blue-men) and bai-fu (white-men) who 
assisted in the postal or transport system. Their exact duties and 
the difference between them are not described during this period but a 
reform in Binzhou in c. 1582 may give an indication. The qing-fu were 
after this reform to transmit public documents and escort prisoners, 
while the bai-fu attended to the transport duties when official 
travellers arrived and left the subprefecture.51 These titles were 
unique for Shandong Province but similar services existed in other 
provinces under other designations.52 Other Zi-gia corvee which were 
levied in 1571 were lamp-men (deng-fu), prisoner escorts and 
messengers (jie-ren-ji-song-gong-wen-fu), prison warders (shang-su- 
kan-jian-fu), transport horses and mules, and horse-men (zou-di-ma-Zuo 
and ma-fu), ’bedding’ (pu-chen) and public-contribution silver (gong- 
ying-yin). Some other corvee items which were still demanded from the 
Zi-gia but no longer levied separately are listed together with the 
above items. These were the sedan-chair men (giao-fu), key-holders 
(ti-suo-fu), treasury watchmen (kan~ku), gia-head runners (gia-shou- 
zao-ii) and drummers (zhong-gu-fu).
For Zi-gia corvee the districts in Shandong were divided into 
five grades according to their geographical position in relation to 
official travel routes. The grades were I (shang-chong), II (ci- 
ohong), III (xia-ehong), Zero A {shang-deng-bu-chong) and Zero B {ci- 
deng-bu-chong). In Jinan Prefecture Grade I districts were Licheng, 
the provincial capital, and Dezhou, the northernmost subprefecture in 
the province on the trunk road from Peking to the south. Grade II 
districts were Pingyuan, Yucheng, Qihe, Changqing, and Feicheng on the 
trunk road, and Taian Subprefecture in the south of the province.
Grade III districts were Zhangqiu, Zouping, and Changshan on the road
5 1
5 2
Binzhou zhi 1583/2/50. 
Yamane (1966), pp.51-52.
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east from the provincial capital, and Linyi and Jiyang on the road 
from Pingyuan to Zhangqiu which provided a shortcut from the eastern 
prefectures in the province to Peking bypassing Licheng. Wuding 
Subprefecture which must have been a centre for the northeastern 
districts was also Grade III. Grade Zero A districts were scattered 
mostly around the northern and eastern part of the prefecture. They 
were all levied exactly the same amount of 1-i-jia corvee in 1571. 
Grade Zero B districts were Laiwu and Xintai in the southern 
mountainous area, and Lingxian southeast of Dezhou. These three 
districts had previously together with Linyi been regarded as a 
special category of Grade III districts.53 Linyi District had now 
been upgraded to regular Grade III while the other three were down­
graded. If they had been included in the Zero A grade their ii-jia 
corvee would have been reduced by several hundred taels and that was 
apparently not acceptable so a special category was created in Grade 
Zero.5 4
2. Administration of li-jia corvee
The list of ti-jia corvee in the SDJHL gives the impression that 
these services were well arranged on an orderly basis and incorporated 
in the overall fiscal system. The regulations had on the provincial 
level only started in 1566 but the problems of the ti-jia corvee had 
attracted official attention before then. In the years 1536 to 1547 
the governors held deliberations together with the regional inspectors 
and provincial and circuit officials in order to find ways to regulate 
the ti-jia corvee. Some officials stated that the frauds of the shi- 
pai were excessive and they considered remedying this by collecting 
silver. This was however not possible because many households in the 
three lower tax-classes preferred to continue to perform the corvee in 
the form of labour instead of paying silver. Others proposed the 
ti-jia corvee to be distributed equally upon the I'i-j'ia according to 
an evaluation of their respective strength. This proposal met with 
sympathy and may have been applied in some districts, but in the end
5 3
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SDJHL 10/34. 
Ibid. 10/1 ff.
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it was recommended that no fixed regulations should be adopted as
5 5circumstances differed from district to district.
Some of these differences are described in the introductory 
remarks to the yin-ge section of the SDJHL. The li-jia were organized 
in jia according to the Yellow Registers. Each jia served one year in 
rotation. One method of levying the corvee was that all the ding in a 
subprefecture or district were calculated according to their tax class 
and silver collected from them. Other methods were the levy of li-jia 
corvee according to the ten-part-tapestry (shi-duan-jin) method, levy 
according to tax classes and finally levy on the incumbent jia serving 
in rotation.56
The ten-part-tapestry method is usually connected with the levy 
of equal corvee in parts of the empire where this latter corvee was 
levied every ten years, as had been the original intention of the 
equal corvee. When in these areas the differences in economic 
strength between the jia within a li-jia or between li-jia had become 
too pronounced it had been necessary to create devices to equalize 
burdens. The policy adopted was the ten-part (shi-duan) method in 
which all land in a district was divided into ten parts of equal size, 
in some cases with the ding converted to mou as well, and the equal 
corvee was then levied each year from one of these parts. The ten- 
par t- tapestry method was a development of this policy. If the ten 
parts were not equal in size, either because they had not been 
measured correctly or more likely because no adjustments had been made 
for later changes, then this method allowed the deferment of corvee 
levy on some of the land in the stronger parts so that this land could 
be levied in the years when the weaker parts had to provide the equal 
corvee.5 7
The main feature of the ten-part and ten-part-tapestry methods 
was the strong emphasis upon the levy of corvee on land. It is 
unlikely that this was generally adopted in Shandong for the li-jia 
corvee but some development in that direction can of course not be
55 Ibid. 10/33-34.
56 Ibid. 10/33.
57 Yamane (1966), pp.119-127; Friese, pp.106-110.
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completely excluded. The other aspect of the ten-part-tapestry method 
is the flexibility between the ten parts. Whether this flexibility 
was applied in Shandong between ten different parts of the districts 
concerned without regard for the existing Zi-gia or whether it was to 
be applied between the gia within the Zi-gia is impossible to say. I 
would favour the last interpretation.
The use of a ten-part-tapestry method must mean that the Zi-gia 
corvee was levied in a ten-year rotation. The same happened where the 
corvee was levied from the incumbent gia. The levies on ding graded 
according to men and on tax classes could indicate that the Zi-gia 
corvee in districts where such policies were adopted was levied each 
year. If this was the case it cannot have been widespread, as we have 
seen that the officials assumed that Zi-gia corvee was levied in ten- 
year rotations. The allocation of the Zi-gia corvee according to ding 
or tax classes can mean that such criteria were used for the 
allocation of the corvee between the l-i-gia within each district, as 
had been approved, but not enforced, during the deliberations from 
1536 to 1547. If this interpretation is correct then the gia still 
served in rotation, but their burden was adjusted to their strength. 
This could further mean that such adjustments had not been made in the 
districts where the old system of the gia serving in rotation was 
still reported.
3. Problems with the Zi-gia corvee
The Zi-gia corvee imposed a heavy burden upon the population 
because even if some regulations already existed in the districts 
before the provincial regulations began in 1566 they were not enforced. 
The energy of the people was ’wasted’ and this increased constantly.58 
The problem of the Zi-gia corvee is described most vividly by Li Kai- 
xian. According to him the statutory amount for the gong-yong silver 
was in Zhangqiu District 200 taels in 1560. However many 
miscellaneous expenses were levied upon the Z'L-g'ia so the total amount
5 9exceeded 10,000 taels. These expenses could be supplementary 
58 SDJHL 10/34, 47.
5 9 f tHe said that the amount is not limited to 10,000 which may mean 
a lot but not necessarily 10,000.
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salaries to officials and lesser functionaries (guan-li-zhe-feng) , 
winter clothes for orphans and old people, utensils for officials 
arriving to take up their posts, travelling expenses for officials 
from the Ministry of War who were assessing the levy of horses, 
expenses for offices and ceremonies, repair of buildings, etc. In one 
year a Zi-jia could pay as much as 200-300 taels and in the year 
before he was writing private persons had paid 700 taels. The people 
were ruined under such circumstances and there was an urgent need to 
regulate the situation.60
Zhangqiu was on the main road from the provincial capital to the 
eastern prefectures and this created special problems in the district. 
According to Li it happened all too often that an official announced 
that he planned to arrive in Zhangqiu at a certain time and then when 
the time came did not arrive with his entourage. At the time for his 
scheduled arrival the bells in the district town began to ring, 
officials and other people in the district dressed up especially for 
his benefit and provisions for his travel were prepared. When he did 
not arrive the bells could go on ringing for days and nights and all 
the preparations had to be made over again. The burden of this fell 
upon the Z-i-jia. To avoid such situations one person was stationed in 
the provincial capital and one at the Longshan postal station between 
that city and Zhangqiu. These men reported back when officials 
started their journey from Licheng so that the officials in Zhangqiu 
knew exactly when they had to be prepared. This was considered 
cheaper but the expenses to keep the two persons stationed on the road 
still had to be paid by the li-jia. Once the official arrived, lavish 
banquets were provided and precious gifts were presented to please him, 
even if he was not very important, and the li-jia had to pay for this 
as well as catering for his entourage. To charge such expenses to the
l-i-jia was illegal61 and according to Li such prodigality had only
6 2started within the previous ten years.
The li-jia in Zhangqiu were further disadvantaged as no 
reorganization had been undertaken according to changes in population
60 Li Kai-xian ji, pp.705-706.
61 DMHD 20/12.
62 Li Kai-xian ji, p.712.
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such as the ones in districts like Xintai, Jiyang and Zhucheng. In 
some li-jia in Zhangqiu there were only two to five shi-pai. Li 
therefore proposed to amalgamate the li-jia so that their number would 
be reduced by about one-half. It is interesting to note that Li 
mentioned only the shi-pai as an indication of the size of the 1-i-jia. 
He had said immediately before this statement that the statutory 
number of households in the Zi-jia was 110. This may suggest that in 
the 1i-jia only the shi-pai were of real importance and that there 
could be any number of households at the level of jia-head even if 
only 100 of these had to be enrolled in the Yellow Registers.63
For details of the li-jia corvee such as those given above Li 
Kai-xian is our only source during this period. However his state­
ments should not be accepted uncritically. Many of his grievances are 
undoubtedly well-founded such as the different items charged upon the 
H-jia and at least some of his observations concerning the number of 
households in the H-jia. This situation was widespread and would 
have been fairly common knowledge and easy to authenticate. But with 
regard to the figures for the levies of the different services he may 
not be so reliable. He was complaining about the plight of the people, 
i.e. the taxpayers. However throughout his writings on the conditions 
in Zhangqiu he made references to other districts, so he was really 
complaining about the plight of the taxpayers in Zhangqiu and he 
appears to advocate that at least some of the excessive burdens should 
be shifted to other districts. With this aim in mind he may have 
greatly exaggerated his figures.
To alleviate the plight of the li-jia, Li Kai-xian suggested that 
some of the money could be obtained from transactions at the markets. 
Unregistered people who indulged in drinking and gambling were in 
charge of weighing at the markets (dou-oheng-hu) and in large markets 
they could receive as much as 3,000-5,000 wen and in smaller markets 
several hundreds. He suggested that one wealthy and honest elder 
should be selected together with one man from each Z-i-jia. The latter 
were to supervise the transactions at the market, collect the money 
and bring it to the elder who was to be stationed in a pavilion. The 
elder was to keep records of the receipts for every item day by day
6 3 Ibid. , p.706.
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and at the end of the month the seal-holding official was to audit 
these records. If the collection was not adequate to cover the cost 
of the li-gia corvee, then the balance was to be collected from the 
li-gia.5 4
We have no evidence to show that Li's proposal was adopted but
the idea of a commercial tax to pay for the li-gia corvee was kept
alive. In 1568 the magistrate in Putai District petitioned that the
amount in excess of twenty taels of the tax on shop-signs should be
used together with a salt tax to pay the gong-yong silver of the
li-gia corvee. This petition may have been approved as it is included
in the 1592 gazetteer under the tax section. However probably only
small amounts were involved, as the tax was. 0.001 tael per shop-sign
• 6 5and 0.002 tael per yvn of salt.
4. Regulation and commutation of li-gia corvee
Regulation of the li-gia corvee began in 1566 when this was 
proposed by the general administration circuit intendant in Jinan,
Zhou Shi-yuan, together with other officials. As was seen in Zhangqiu 
some of the li-gia corvee had already been commuted to silver payments 
or at least calculated in silver. This development towards 
commutation continued after 1566 and was regarded by the provincial 
administration as resulting in lighter burdens on the people. However 
such commutation and regulation apparently met with some resistance. 
The sources state:
The feelings of the people are governed by ancient principles.
which can and probably does to some extent mean that the people 
resented any changes, but in this specific case changes in levies 
would have disturbed the balance between households and until such a 
balance had been restored under the new regulations a certain 
uneasiness would probably have been common among the taxpayers. The 
attitude of the people was apparently unable to prevent a unanimous 
feeling among the officials in the province that reforms were
6 4 
6 5
Ibid., p.706.
Putai xian-zhi 1592/3/10.
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necessary.
The corvee services continued to be levied upon the li-jia, and
their number in each subprefecture and district was determined in 1566
together with their degree of commutation. The qing-fu and bai-fu in
Licheng District had to perform corvee entirely in the form of labour.
In the other Grade I subprefecture, Dezhou, the services were levied
in equal corvee,probably because their number was very high there. In
Grades II and III in Jinan the qing-fu and bai-fu performed corvee at
two-thirds in the form of labour and one-third in silver, while in
Grade Zero they were all to perform it as labour. Sedan-chair men for
the officials were no longer to be conscripted separately but were
selected among the bai-fu. Lamp-men were completely commuted, the
rate being 0.45 tael per month. The lamp-men levy in Licheng District
was particularly high but also in Dezhou where the officials often
worked at night. Key-holders were to be levied at one tael per month
on wealthy /--/-leaders, while the jia-head watchmen (kan-jian jia-shou)
were commuted at 0.6 tael per month. Treasury watchmen were to be
taken from the wall-defending min-zhuang and the key-holders, while
the jia-head runners were selected from the key-holders and the qing-
fu. Drummers were levied at 0.8 tael per month and the ’public-use
silver' was of course also commuted as were the H-jia horses in Grade
Zero districts, while in Grades I-III two-thirds were provided in kind
and one-third was commuted. ’Bedding’ to be provided for travellers
was not levied in districts with postal stations , but in the other
districts this was all to be provided in kind, its quantity depending
6 7upon the grade of the district.
In 1569 Governor Jiang Ting-yi introduced further regulations for 
the li-jia corvee. All items were now listed in silver except perhaps 
the ’bedding’, where only the wages to be paid to attendants were 
commuted, while the provision of materials was apparently still made 
in kind. At the same time the governor reduced some of the levies in 
the districts. The commutation rates for qing-fu were set at 0.7 tael 
per month in Grades I, II and III districts, and at 0.6 tael in Grade 
Zero. The bai-fu were commuted at 1.05 taels per month in Grades I,
6 6
67
SDJHL 10/47-48. 
Ibid. 10/34-35.
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II and III, and at one tael in Grade Zero (and also in Licheng 
District). Both qzng-fu and baz-fu were to perform half of the 
service as labour and half in silver. Jiang Ting-yi stated that this 
was the same as had previously been in operation so there may have 
been a change in this respect since 1566.
The sedan-chair men were still to be taken from the baz-fu, The 
lamp-men were conscripted with a certain number for each official and 
in addition there was to be a reserve on stand-by to attend superior 
officials travelling through the district. The payment was 0.4 tael 
in Grades I, II and III districts, and 0.3 tael in Grade Zero. Prison 
escort and messengers, treasury watch-men and jza-head watch-men, who 
had hitherto been levied among the jza-heads, were to be abolished, as 
were the key-holders, the jza-head runners and the drummers. The 
Iz-jza horses were commuted at 24 taels in Grade I districts and 22 
taels in all other districts. The money was paid annually to the 
officials who would then have to buy and maintain the horse. The 
commutation for the Iz-jza mules was at 22 and 20 taels; similar 
rules applied to donkeys but they were not levied in Jinan Prefecture.
Apart from minor adjustments in the levied amounts , no changes 
were made to the public-use silver. For the ’bedding' there appear to 
have been considerable reductions, as only one-half of the money for 
wages was to be collected and apparently there was also a reduction in 
the number of beds to be provided. 'Bedding' was to be administered 
by the lesser functionaries in the Military and Treasury Bureau in the 
local yamen, which could indicate that they were situated in the 
vicinity of the yamen in or around the district towns. If there were 
changes in the Iz-jza> the seal-holding official would personally 
arrange them; the two lesser functionaries would certify the changes 
and all would be entered in the appropriate registers.68
Most of the 1569 regulations were still in force in 1571 but 
minor adjustments had to be made. The qzng-fu and baz-fu in Grades I, 
II and III districts were to be levied in a way which resembles labour 
corvee. Silver was no longer to be collected for the district 
treasury to hire people. Instead a list was drawn up with the order
6 8 Ibid. 10/42-47.
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in which the people (or perhaps the Zi-gia) had to serve. The 
commutation rates were the same as in 1569 but they must now have been 
only for the valuation of the corvee, which was now called 'actual 
corvee1 (shi-.yi) . In Grade Zero districts where these services were 
only required at irregular intervals the districts were not allowed to 
collect silver each month. The names of the people to serve were also 
registered and they were then summoned when their service was required, 
and at least for the qing-fu they could then each be required to
6 9report for duty with two helpers.
Some kind of labour corvee was also introduced for the prisoner 
escorts and messengers and the key-holders. They had been abolished 
by Jiang Ting-yi because they had a bad reputation. Their duty was to 
escort prisoners but when there was no such work they were used for 
minor administrative work in which they often did harm to the people 
by tampering with property. After their abolition the escort service 
had been performed by the qing-fu in rotation but then there were not 
enough of these for transport work. The solution was in 1571 to 
designate ten Zi-gia runners in each district as prisoner escorts and 
messengers to perform these duties in the form of labour, and they 
were listed in a separate account in the SDJHL.70
At some unspecified time before 1571 the qing-fu and bai-fu in 
Licheng district had been transferred from the Zi-gia to equal corvee, 
as was the case in Dezhou. The reason was that the number of these 
services levied in Licheng was relatively high and it had not been 
possible to collect all the silver. When the change was made to equal 
corvee these services had been levied upon ding at 0.9 tael per year 
in the first tax-class declining to 0.1 tael in the ninth tax-class. 
The total collection had then been 4,670 taels per annum but the 
expenses for the qing-fu and bai-fu had only been 3,600 taels. Even 
if not all the silver was collected after the transfer to the equal 
corvee, as some households had absconded, there was still a surplus 
and this had been pocketed by the people who collected it. To avoid 
this the levy of qing-fu and bai-fu in Licheng was in 1571 
re-transferred to the Zi-gia. The people would then only have to
6 9
7 o
Ibid. 10/28-29. 
Ibid. 10/52.
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serve once every ten years and would have plenty of time to recover 
from the service.71
The prisoner escorts and messengers, and the jia-head watch-men 
acting as gaolers, who had all been abolished in 1569, were 
reintroduced in 1571 and were levied upon the jia-heads. If some 
districts did not need all the messengers they were allowed to reduce 
the number at their own discretion. For the lamp-men, each official 
was allowed a certain number and the money for those not serving 
constantly with one of the officials was to be collected each month. 
When the local officials went out on inspection and needed additional 
lamp-men this money was to be used to hire additional people. The 
same happened when superior officials arrived, and if the funds in 
this account were insufficient then the local officials were to lend 
one of their own lamp-men to serve temporarily as it was not allowed 
to make additional levies upon the ti-jia on such occasions.72
The silver for the Zi-jia corvee in 1571 was to be levied at 70% 
on ding and 30% on land. This had already been in operation for some 
unspecified time but presumably only for a few years following the 
general trend to levy corvee on land since the 1550s. A certain 
amount of silver was to be collected from each mou of land and each 
ding. Tax bills (you-tie) were issued to the households, and the 
people who did so and collected the silver had to explain the levies 
in simple terms so that the common people were able to understand them. 
The payments were to be divided into four seasons, from each tael 0.25 
tael would be collected in each season to make it easier for the less 
wealthy to pay. The /-/-leaders belonging to the upper tax-classes 
would collect the silver but they were to have no part in its 
disbursement. Two wealthy elders with a good reputation for honesty 
were to be selected together with a lesser functionary with a clear 
handwriting. They were to draw up two registers and between them to 
arrange the disbursement of the H-jia silver. The district officials 
were to verify these registers, stamp the seal and sign them. The 
elders only had to serve for one-half year. At the end of the summer 
two other elders were to be selected to serve in autumn and winter,
7 1
72
Ibid. 10/51. 
Ibid. 10/28-30.
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but the elders could only be replaced after a full year. The reason 
for this was probably that the accounts for the whole year in which 
these elders had served had to be settled and possible irregularities 
during their term of office investigated before they could be 
completely relieved of their responsibility. On the other hand a 
rotation between at least two pairs of elders was probably designed to 
prevent them from using their positions to embezzle money continuously 
over long periods. The ^-leaders were only allowed to spend two 
mornings each month to handle money and taxes (qiccn-liang) and they 
were to devote the rest of their time to farming so they would not be
7 3exhausted economically.
Linyi District reported in 1571 that it had received the 
regulations for the assessment of the Z-i-jia corvee and that it would 
collect the silver for the Z-i-jia horses from the incumbent jia at 70% 
on ding and 30% on land.74 The silver collected by the Zi-leaders was 
probably delivered to the district treasury and from there disbursed 
according to the registers mentioned above. The elders appear to have 
had only a supervisory role in disbursement as it is stated a few 
times that the granary servants (cang-zu) in the local treasuries used 
the treasury money to hire labour or horses to perform the li-jia 
duties.7 5
A certain flexibility was allowed in the disbursement of the 
silver from the district treasury. Linyi District reported in 1571 
that the Zi-jia corvee of the qing-fu and bai-fu was performed by 
fifteen men in rotation. If this number was not sufficient to carry 
out the transport duties then silver had been taken from the account 
of the commuted li-jia horse silver to hire additional labour. The 
problem in Linyi District was that in the years before 1571 traffic 
through the district had increased considerably,as travellers from the 
eastern prefectures who were entitled to use the public transport 
system took the short-cut through the district on their way to Peking 
and thus avoided the provincial capital. The result of this report 
from Linyi District was that the combined number of qing-fu and bai-fu
73 Ibid. 10/30.
74 Ibid. 10/49.
75 Ibid. 10/50.
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was increased by four men and the number of horses and mules by two 
each so that hiring of additional labour was no longer needed. This 
of course indicates that such flexibility was not regarded by the 
provincial administration as a normal state of affairs. This is also 
seen in the previously mentioned case of the lamp-men, when the local 
officials had to lend their own lamp-men to serve superior officials 
instead of making extra levies on the H-gia or, as would have been 
the alternative, instead of taking the silver from other accounts.
Commutation to silver payments of the H-gia corvee was 
apparently generally accepted in 1571 although some services were 
still best performed in the form of labour. The objections made by 
the lower tax classes mentioned in the deliberations between 1536 and 
1547 are not repeated. Problems were however reported in Pingyin 
District, Yanzhou Prefecture, just south of Changqing District. The 
bai-fu in the district had previously been levied on the ding in the 
incumbent gia. Four or five persons had jointly provided one man who 
had performed the service for one month. When his term of service was 
over he returned to farming and both the people and the officials had 
reported that this system was convenient. However a few years before 
1571 commutation of the bai-fu had been implemented so that the silver 
needed for wages, 14.4 taels per year, was deposited in the district 
treasury to hire labour when the need arose. The district was Grade 
III so there was not much traffic and apparently urbanization was not 
very advanced, as the sources claim that most people lived in the 
countryside. When the granary servants offered silver to hire labour 
for the bai-fu service they received no response. The collection of 
silver was moreover difficult, threats of flogging had to be applied, 
and both the people and officials claimed that this was harsh. The 
decision was then made to revert to the former system so the people 
acted as bai-fu in a decennial rotation, without resentment.77
From the point of view of economic development it is interesting 
to note that the people in Pingyin District could not be enticed to 
work for money at that time. This stands in sharp contrast to the 
situation in Shanghe District which a little later reported that
7 6
7 7
Ibid. 10/49. 
Ibid. 10/50.
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commutation of corvee was beneficial as it gave jobs to vagrants who 
competed to be the first to be hired. The explanation for this 
difficulty in Pingyin District may be that the officials did not want 
to hire certain kinds of people to perform baz-fu services. They may 
have preferred people with a certain standing in the community, i.e. 
taxpayers who were registered and who could be punished if they did 
not perform the services properly. They may not have wanted to hire 
vagrants or other people over whom they had little control and whose 
integrity they may have had reason to doubt.
7 8 Shanghe xzan-zhz 1586/3/6.
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CHAPTER IV
THE LATER SINGLE WHIP AND LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
THE SINGLE WHIP AND LIANG MENG-LONG
The Single Whip method of taxation was officially abolished in 
Shandong in 1570 after it had been applied in various degrees and 
probably with several variations between districts for about twenty 
years. The order was given by Governor Liang Meng-long with the 
approval of the Ministry of Revenue.1 In his order to return to the 
former taxation system Liang emphasized that the cultivated as well as 
the uncultivated land in each district was to be calculated. The 
acreage in each she was to be established and granary rates allotted 
for all households in the nine tax classes of each she. Tax 
collection registers for the da-hu (chl-H) and tax bills for the 
households (you-tie) were to be issued and, as seen in chapter II, the 
Zl-jla were in some way to be the basis for the conscription of the 
da-hu. The she and Zl—jla were probably identical; the difference in 
terminology may have been to emphasize that taxes were to be collected 
on land and corvee only according to ding and households.2
There can be no doubt that the abolition of the early Single Whip 
was the policy of Liang Meng-long and his provincial administration.
To understand the reasons for the later reintroduction of the Single 
Whip in relation to the social and economic conditions of Shandong it 
is however necessary to understand why Liang ordered the Single Whip 
to be abolished.
Liang Meng-long was from Beizhili3 and as a northerner he may
1 SL 1570:Q:bing-wu.
2 SDJHL 5/26-27. I have previously suggested the possibility that
all land in a ll-jla {she) was to have the same granary rate. This is 
however an overextension of the sources. See Littrup, "Single Whip", 
p. 91. Note 3 over.
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have had the same reservations towards the Single Whip as some people 
in Shandong, notably Ge Shou-li. These reservations are illustrated 
by Ge in his preface to an appraisal of Liang when the latter was 
transferred from Shandong to the governorship of Henan. Ge quoted 
Liang as having said:
The levy of corvee on land suits the needs of the south. To cure
the illness of the north with the policies of the south may be
compared to the similar situation with food and drink. It would 
be like asking the people to eat shrimps and clams each day.
There would be few who would not fall sick.3 4
Although most of what is said by Ge Shou-li about the Single Whip must 
be treated with caution because of his bias, there can be little doubt 
that Liang did at some time express such things. We must assume that 
what Ge wrote was for public consumption and must have been seen by 
Liang so he could hardly have attributed false or misleading state­
ments to Liang.
Liang apparently also sought the advice of Ge Shou-li when lie 
became governor of Shandong, as we have Ge's reply with which he 
enclosed copies of his 1567 memorial and a letter to Jiang Ting-yi.5 
Liang cannot have been unaware of Ge’s thoughts so his own ideas at 
that time must have embraced an acceptance of the abolition or at 
least substantial modification of the Single Whip in the province. We 
must however also consider the political consequences of his 
association with Ge.
Ge Shou-li had retired as Minister of Revenue only about one 
month after his Single Whip memorial had obtained imperial approval in 
1567. The reason for his retirement was that he supported Gao Gong, 
one of the grand secretaries, in the latter’s struggle with another 
grand secretary, Xu Jie. Gao Gong lost at that time and Ge Shou-li 
was retired. Gao Gong was re-appointed grand secretary and also 
Minister for Personnel in 1569:12 and showed his gratitude to Ge Shou- 
li by having him appointed Minister for Justice in 1570:2.6 So 
Liang's approach to Ge Shou-li and his subsequent adoption of his
3 DMB pp.898-902.
4 GDSGWJ 10/25.
5 Ibid. 14/24.
6 Ming shi 112/3471, 214/5667.
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ideas must also be viewed as a way to establish good relations with 
the men in power in the capital.
Liang Meng-long was also a close associate of Zhang Ju-zheng who 
at this time was increasing his power in the Grand Secretariat.
Zhang’s general policy was to create stability in the central govern- 
ment and assert its predominance over local administrations, and 
Liang’s actions in Shandong bear the distinct imprint of being part of
Dthis policy. He also said that he did not expect the policy he had 
introduced to last for a long time. When abuses became marked 
corrections would have to be made. This view contrasts sharply with 
that of the opponents of the Single Whip like Ge Shou-li, who advocated 
a return to the old system which had functioned so well since time 
immemorial and which in their view could continue to do so in the 
future.
I therefore conclude that the main reason for the abolition of 
the Single Whip in 1570 may not have been that it was unsuitable for 
the conditions in the province. Administrators including Liang Meng- 
long may have questioned the suitability of the Single Whip, and as 
will be seen later such reservations were valid for some parts of the 
province. The introduction of the Single Whip had no doubt created 
local problems for which adjustments had to be made, and Liang’s 
policy seems to have been aimed at creating the administrative climate 
for devising a taxation policy which would be most suitable for the 
province. However as far as timing was concerned the general 
political situation may have been more decisive in its abolition than 
the general opposition to the Single Whip. *.
Contemporaries probably realized that the abolition of the Single 
Whip in Shandong did not mean that a return to the former method of 
levying taxes and corvee could be permanent even if the careful 
assessments which Liang ordered were carried out. The Single Whip was 
on the ascendant. It obtained imperial approval in Jiangxi Province 
in 1570 and evidently reforms along these lines were inevitable.7 8910 A
7 DMB pp.54-55.
8 SDJHL 9/69.
9 Ibid. 9/70.
10 DMHD 20/15.
* Littrup, ’’Single Whip” , p p . 93~95-
150
number of officials in the province were probably also well acquainted 
with the Single Whip policy and favoured its introduction as a 
solution to the taxation problems. The Left administration 
commissioner under Liang Meng-long was Wang Zong-mu who is credited 
with being the first to use the term Single Whip in a publication and 
to have given it a precise definition, after he had participated in 
experiments with such reforms in'Jiangxi around 1560. He may 
incidentally also have been the compiler of the SDJHL.11 A couple of 
years after 1570 Ge Shou-li complained in a letter to the Grand 
Coordinator for the River (he-zong) Wan Liang-xi (probably Wan Gong 
serving c. 1572)12 and a little later to the Governor Li Shi-da13 
about them wanting to use the Single Whip and levy corvee on land.
The Single Whip was introduced into various districts of Shandong 
during the Wan-li period when it became the policy of the central 
government to introduce it in all provinces. 14 This chapter attempts 
to follow the introduction and the effects it had upon the local self- 
government system, and also what other fiscal roles this self- 
government system had to perform in the last quarter of the sixteenth 
century. The sources for this are the local gazetteers supplemented 
by the private writings of the officials. The uneven coverage 
provided by the local gazetteers makes an assessment at a provincial 
or prefectural level difficult, as details are not available even for 
all districts of Jinan.
11 DMB pp.1440-1441. The claim that Wang was the first to use the 
term Single Whip in a publication raises the question whether he 
interpolated the term into the SDJHL documents. The term was however 
used about Shandong by Ge Shou-li in his letter to Liu Cai c. 1557 and 
was used about other provinces in documents from 1531 onwards. Liang 
Fang-zhong, "Ming-dai yi-tiao-bian-fa nian-biao", Ling-nan Xue-bao 
12.1 (1952), 19.
12 GDSGWJ 14/40.
13 Ibid. 14/46.
14 Ming Shi gives the date for the empire-wide introduction of the 
Single Whip as 1581 but it appears to have been a more gradual process. 
Wada (1957), p.218.
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THE SINGLE WHIP OF THE WAN-LI PERIOD
1. Developments in the south around 1570
The first Single Whip in Shandong had primarily been concerned 
with the collection of taxes and their granary rates but also with the 
levy of corvee on land. This latter tendency had been emphasized in 
the south during the 1560s when the Single Whip had been promoted by 
such men as Pang Shang-peng. In Zhejiang the general opinion was that 
the reforms of the corvee system introduced by Pang Shang-peng in the 
last years of the Jia-jing period marked the beginning of the Single 
Whip in that province. As regional inspector he introduced a reform 
in two districts, perhaps modelled after Wang Zong-mu's attempted 
reforms in Jiangxi,15 and this later spread to other districts in 
Zhejiang. The reform was called 'equal level' (jun-plng) and was 
mainly concerned with the ll-jla corvee,but also with some of the 
heavier items in the equal corvee which were still levied in a ten- 
year rotation. The corvee of a whole ll-gla was consolidated and 
levied upon the land tax with an annual levy on all households in the 
H-jla so that the decennial rotation ceased. If households had both 
ding and land then the ding were commuted to a certain number of mou 
of land and these households would pay according to the total figure. 
Households without land were to pay according to their ding.16
The Single Whip was also introduced in two districts of Jiangxi 
in 1568:3 after the reforms in which Wang Zong-mu had taken part had 
been obstructed by local opposition. All the corvee was to be 
commuted to payment in silver and all items assessed including the 
surcharges. The amount of silver needed each year was to be levied on 
ding and land, and the households were divided into three classes. 
Those with only ding were in the lowest class and paid ding-silver. 
Those with both some ding and some land were in the middle class, and 
those with much land and few ding or much land and many ding were in 
the upper class. Tax bills were to be issued to the households with 
time limits for collection and the services as corvee heads (bou-hu)
1 5 
1 6 
1 7
DMB, p.1441
Kuribayashi (1971), pp.146-147. 
Ibid. p.150.
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and assistant households were abolished. According to the compilers 
of the DMHD this was the beginning of the Single Whip.10
2. The Single Whip in Shandong 
according to Yu Shen-xing
The new wave of Single Whip which flowed over Shandong in the 
Wan-li period was much more concerned with corvee than the first 
Single Whip. One of its main aims was to abolish the t'L-j'ia corvee 
which in many districts also resulted in the abolition of the li-jia 
positions.
Among senior officials and statesmen who were concerned with the 
Single Whip in Shandong in this period Yu Shen-xing stands out, not 
least because some of his writings on the subject have survived. Yu 
was born in Donga District, Yanzhou Prefecture, in 1545 and obtained 
his Q'in-sh'i degree in 1568. Most of his subsequent career was passed 
in the two capitals on literary or historiographic duties. In 1586 he 
became Minister of Rites and in 1589 concurrently Chancellor of the 
Han-lin Academy. Beginning in 1590 Yu on several occasions entreated 
the Wan-li emperor to choose a successor but without success and he 
was allowed to retire from office on 1591:9:16 after being accused of 
a minor misdemeanour. He only returned to office in 1607 and 
presumably spent a good deal of the intervening period at home in 
Donga District.19 He was the compiler of the 1596 edition of the
2 oYanzhou Prefectural gazetteer and from his writings he seems to have 
been well acquainted with conditions in Donga and also the 
neighbouring Pingyin District which bordered on Jinan Prefecture.
His writings about the Single Whip are in a letter to the 
governor of Shandong Song Ying-chang who was promoted from the 
governorship on 1592:8:18 to become vice minister of War and supreme 
administrator of the defences against the Japanese in Shandong, Ji, 
Liaodong and Baoding.21 This letter was therefore probably written
18 DMHD 20/15.
19 DMB, pp.1614-1615.
20 This gazetteer was unavailable for use in this thesis.
21 DMB, p.832.
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at the end of 1591 or in the first half of 1592. About ten years 
later Yu composed a tablet about the corvee system introduced by the 
magistrate Yao Zong-dao in Pingyin District in the middle of the 
Wan-li period.
The Single Whip was introduced into Donga District in 1573 or 
shortly thereafter. Yu writes in his letter to Song that it started 
in early Wan-li, about twenty years before writing. Yu's letter to 
Song is obviously part of a discussion of the Single Whip. It is 
not polemic but rather intended to inform the governor about the 
situation in Donga District with some reflections on why it was 
suitable in that district while it was said to be unsuitable in other 
districts. We do not know the other parts of this discussion. It may 
have been a general discussion in the province at that time as a 
continuation of the previous discussions in which Ge Shou-li and Guang 
Mao had opposed the Single Whip, in the case of Guang Mao with a 
specific protest in 1577 against its introduction in Donga. However 
the controversy may have flared up in 1591 when the official who had 
originally introduced the Single Whip in Donga, Bai Dong, had a short 
spell as circuit intendant in the general surveillance circuit for 
Yanzhou and Dongchang Prefectures.24
Yu Shen-xing made it quite clear in his writings that as far as 
he was concerned the issue at stake in the introduction of the Single 
Whip was not whether or not corvee was levied on land. That was only 
secondary to more important issues of regulating some of the problems 
in the corvee system and removing some of the malpractices. He was 
aware that the Single Whip was not a specific term to be used for one 
type of reform. The term could be used when the granary rates were 
abolished and the tax handled by 'combined collection and separate 
forwarding'. It was also used when the household tax-classes were 
abolished and the corvee was only levied according to ding or when tax 
and corvee were amalgamated and levied entirely on land. The Single
22 GCSGWJ 34/15.
23 SL 1577:1:xin-hai.
24 Bai Dong was appointed magistrate of Donga in the Long-qing 
period and continued in Wan-li. Yanzhou fu-zhi 1685/11/66. He was 
appointed circuit intendant in 1591 and relieved the same year. Ibid. 
11/17.
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Whip for ding was used when the ding were not graded according to tax 
classes but all paid the same amount in silver, and the Single Whip 
for land was when the land was not graded.25
In Donga District the Single Whip included abolition of granary 
rates, and ’combined collection and combined forwarding' (zong-shou- 
qi-jie) of taxes. Corvee was levied according to ding and land. The 
tax classes were abolished and the land was not graded, so poor and 
rich paid the same amount for their ding and the land was levied a 
uniform amount without regard to its fertility. The money was paid 
into a tax chest and was then used to hire people to perform the 
corvee services. The silver for the li-jia corvee was included in the 
levy.
Yu realized that such a system had advantages and disadvantages. 
The advantages were: 1. Corvee heads (yi-tou) were no longer
conscripted. 2. Da~hu were no longer conscripted. 3. The li-jia 
corvee was abolished. 4. The equal corvee was no longer assessed.
Previously households from the upper eight tax-classes had been 
conscripted as corvee heads while those in the ninth tax-class had 
been assisting households. In addition to these the official corvee 
system in the district had also included ’agents' (dai-dang) , who 
apparently were people who had the time (xian-min) to actually perform 
or arrange the corvee work. They received money from the corvee heads 
who in turn collected from the assistant households. The agents were 
issued a certificate showing the amount of silver they could collect 
from the corvee heads, including the surcharges (da-tao). The 
collection of money by these households had presented problems. The 
amount collected from each assistant household could be as little as a 
tenth or a hundredth of a tael, and if they lived scattered over a 
considerable area the corvee heads could find it difficult or 
inconvenient to collect all the silver so they had to pay some of it 
out of their own pockets. They also tried to shift some of the 
deficit upon the agents with the result that both suffered losses and 
that they were generally on bad terms with each other. From the 
introduction of the Single Whip the households paid the corvee silver
2 5 GCSGWJ 34/15.
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into the tax chest according to their ding and land. The silver was 
then paid to the agents who thus avoided the burden of insufficient 
pay.
In the collection and forwarding of taxes the previous system had 
created hardship for the da-hu so that they had to sell their property 
in order to perform their duties. Yu did not specify which system had 
previously existed in Donga but in Pingyin District this had been 
'combined collection and separate forwarding', which had either not 
been abolished in 1570 as ordered by Liang Meng-long or had been 
introduced thereafter. In this respect Yu's ideas seem to correspond 
to the views of Ge Shou-li on 'combined collection and separate 
forwarding'. After the Single Whip reform in Donga only one chest 
head was conscripted to supervise the reception of taxes. He only 
ensured that the correct amount was entered but had no further part 
in the administration of the taxes. The subsequent handling and 
forwarding of the taxes was probably managed by the officials without 
assistance from da-hu, as was the case in the Single Whip of Pingyin 
District. 2 6
The advantages of abolishing the H-jia corvee and incorporating 
them into the general levy was that the households would no longer 
have to face excessive expenses involved during their year of 
incumbency once every ten years. Even the nine years of rest were not 
sufficient to build up the necessary economic strength. Yu did not 
elaborate on this point but we must assume that one of the 
difficulties was the lack of facilities to save money during the rest 
period.
When the equal corvee was abolished the need for biennial 
assessment of the household vanished. Consequently there would be no 
more manipulations on the part of the /"/-registrars, the favourably 
placed households (shi-fu), the //-elders or the officials involved in 
the process of reporting and registering household assets.
In the opinion of Yu Shen-xing this system was working well in 
Donga and had the approval of the people in the district. He did not
2 6 Ibid. 13/33.
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specify which people approved but did mention that he was aware of 
possible disadvantages to some people in the district. With the 
abolition of the equal corvee the men-silver disappeared and with it 
the assessment and levy of corvee on assets other than land. He said 
that this was to the advantage of merchants with no land but the land- 
owners suffered. The abolition of the equal corvee also placed 
relatively larger burdens upon the ninth tax-class. The men-silver 
had only been levied on the upper eight tax-classes. Now corvee was 
only levied on the ding and the ninth tax-class paid the same per ding 
as the others, and in addition they were also levied corvee on their 
landholdings. Even so, he claimed that the Single Whip was justified 
in Donga because of the four advantages listed above.
He was aware of problems with the Single Whip in other districts 
where the conditions for the landowners were not as favourable as in 
Donga. He was referring in particular to the districts in north­
eastern Jinan Prefecture where the productivity of the land was low 
because of high salinity and to districts in the southeast of Yanzhou 
Prefecture which had considerable tracts of uncultivated land liable 
to taxation. In such places a levy of corvee on land would be ill- 
advised when there were already difficulties in collecting the land 
taxes,so that the ^-leaders (incumbent and non-incumbent; 1-i-pai) had 
to make up deficiencies. He saw however no reason why difficulties in 
such districts should prevent the use of the Single Whip with levy of 
corvee on land elsewhere.
Even in the districts with less favourable conditions some kind 
of Single Whip could, in Yu's opinion, be introduced. This would 
involve some degree of levy of corvee on land. If this was not done 
the assessment of the households for the usual corvee had to be 
continued in order to levy men-silver. However the levy of corvee on 
land was possible if it was classed into three grades, and the levy on 
ding would not be too unbearable if grading of ding into the nine tax 
classes was continued. Some regulations would also be needed to make 
the merchants contribute to corvee. He did not explain what he had in 
mind but it would presumably have been commutation of assets other 
than land either to ding or to mou of land. When grading of ding was 
to be retained the tax classes would still have to be assessed,so this 
system does not appear to have been any great improvement on its
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predecessor. The only simplification was the abolition of the men- 
silver. However the improvements must have been noticeable, as Yu 
said that if such a system was introduced then the inhabitants of all 
the districts of Shandong could obtain the benefit of the Single Whip 
without excessive hardship.
The Single Whip did not solve all the problems in the tax and 
corvee system. Yu stated (and this was also mentioned in other 
sources concerning the Single Whip in Shandong),27 that the whole 
question of the Single Whip was related to the larger question of 
'government by man' or ’government by law'. The Single Whip was 
obviously an attempt to stress 'government by law' but this could not 
be complete as the officials still had to be allowed to make adjust­
ments to regulations and registers in order to avoid malpractices.
This presumably meant that adjustments were to be made in response to 
changing conditions and certainly required a certain degree of 
'government by people'.
One problem which could not be completely solved by the Single 
Whip involved the agents for the corvee. There were corvee services 
of varying urgency, and different dates for the collection of the 
corvee silver. If the silver was not received on time then the 
officials or the agents who were responsible for the corvee work had 
to borrow from money lenders and a great deal of the silver collected 
to pay for the corvee services would have to be used towards paying 
interest on such loans. The result was that the agents did not 
receive sufficient compensation for their efforts, so that the hard­
ship of the corvee heads now fell solely on them. Yu Shen-xing did 
not give details about who were conscripted as agents. He only said 
that corvee heads and agents had previously been selected among the 
people according to convenience, and that the agents were 'idle 
people'. Originally their services cannot have been regarded as 
corvee because they were to receive full compensation for them, but if 
both before and after the Single Whip reform they had to waive some of 
this compensation then a new kind of corvee service had apparently 
been created.
2 7 Zkangqiu xian-zhi 1596/12/63.
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Yu Shen-xing ended his letter to Song Ying-chang by refuting the
charge by the opponents of the Single Whip that it was not in
accordance with the ancient laws of the dynasty. He claimed —  with
jusitification — that the Single Whip did not abrogate the original
laws of the dynasty, as there had already been successive changes.
More important is his point that the Single Whip followed the spirit
of the early laws. In these, the people were divided into tax classes
because the lawmakers wanted to create equality between them and this
2 8was precisely the goal of the Single Whip as he saw it.
THE SINGLE WHIP IN LICHENG AND ZHANGQIU
1. Licheng District
The 1640 edition of the Licheng gazetteer enumerated ten points 
which, according to its compilers, were the advantages of the Single 
Whip in that district. These ten points have a more general interest 
as they are similar to ten points paraphrased by Kataoka from the 1589
2 9edition of the gazetteer for Anqiu District in Qingzhou Prefecture.
This use of ten specific points indicates that they had obtained a 
certain degree of acceptance where the Single Whip had been adopted.
The Licheng gazetteer began the Single Whip section by stating 
that laws were only changed if they resulted in 'a hundred benefits'.
Of the laws for taxes and corvee none were better than the Single Whip, 
which had ten advantages. Such statements can have been used in the 
gazetteer to emphasize the advantages of the Single Whip but may also 
indicate that in the view of the compilers reforms ought to bring 
considerable benefits if the laws were to be changed. In other words, 
we are left with an impression that a certain degree of conservatism 
prevailed with regard to the fiscal system. This conservatism is of 
course also seen in the rather slow introduction of the Single Whip 
reforms in the sixteenth century.
According to the gazetteer the ten advantages of the Single Whip
28 GCSGWJ 34/15-20.
29 Kataoka, pp.153-154.
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were:
1. Hardship and ease were distributed equally upon the ten jta in 
each 1'i-j'La so that the levies upon ding and taxes were equal and 
households liable to corvee did not suffer excessively.
2. Households with privileged exemptions from taxes and corvee could 
not shift excessive burdens upon other households as they could not 
get exemptions beyond the authorized amount.
3. The silver was paid to the officials and there was no possibility 
of extortion.
4. People were not forced to sell some of their property in order to 
make up deficits in the collected taxes and corvee. In this way they 
avoided ruin.
5. All the various corvee items such as silver and labour corvee and 
public and private expenses for the officials were amalgamated so that 
one person did not have to be corvee head for several different items.
6. The distinction between corvee heads and assistant households was 
abolished so that rich and poor became equally taxed.
7. A system was introduced for the payment of salaries and allowed 
no room for graft.
8. People hired to perform corvee work were paid by the officials 
and did not have to demand or exact further payments from the people.
9. The rich could not evade their responsibilities and the poor did 
not suffer from illegal extra burdens.
10. With fixed figures for the silver to be paid for each item, the 
registers were clear and provided no opportunities for manipulations.
Because of these ten advantages the people respected the Single 
Whip as they respected fortune-tellers and they loved the men who had 
introduced the Single Whip as they loved their ancestors. The Single 
Whip in Licheng may have been a good system but apparently was not 
good enough. After it had been in operation for some time it fell 
into confusion. In addition the Single Whip did not possess 
sufficient flexibility to meet new demands. Later when the need arose 
to increase the levies considerably to cover the costs of military 
expenditure da~hu had to be re-introduced. No date is given for this
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change but it may have been as late as the 1630s.30
2. Zhangqiu District
The Single Whip was introduced into Zhangqiu in 1586 or 1587 by 
Magistrate Mao Guo-jin.31 Zhangqiu is singled out for special treat­
ment here because the 1596 edition of the district gazetteer contains 
one whole chapter in twenty-six pages under the heading: Single Whip.
This edition was compiled by Magistrate Dong Fu-heng who held office 
from 1593 to c. 1598.32 The chapter on the Single Whip is obviously 
written by Dong himself; he referred in the personal form ’I* to 
decisions which he had to take in the aftermath of the introduction of 
the Single Whip and which are described below. Given the sparse 
amount of information on the Single Whip and the local self-government 
system in most gazetteers an extensive discussion of this chapter 
seems justified particularly in view of the important qualifications 
of the author. Zhangqiu was also one of the larger districts in Jinan 
Prefecture — the largest in terms of number of Zi-jia — and its location 
immediately east of the provincial capital made it a fairly average 
district compared with the busy west and the more desolate northeast.
Only little information is available on the Zi-jia and fiscal
system in Zhangqiu before the Single Whip. Savings in the Zi-gia
corvee (sheng-Zi-jia) were made around 1560 as mentioned in the
biography of Magistrate Dong Wen-shen. Subsequent magistrates also
3 3made alterations in the tax system to the benefit of the people.
Details of these are not given but they must have incorporated some of 
the measures ordered by the provincial government during this period, 
perhaps including a codification of the equal and Zi-gia corvee.
By 1586 the local self-government system for assessment and 
collection of taxes and corvee in Zhangqiu comprised c. 1,352 persons. 
These included c. 116 da~hu in charge of the tax chests, 10 chests for
30 Licheng xian-zhi 1640/5/40-41.
31 Zhangqiu xian-xhi 1596/21/75.
32 Ibid. 1596/10/28, 1691/4/9.
33 Ibid. 1596/21/74; Jinan fu-zhi 1839/36/11.
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taxes, 10 for corvee and 6 for horse-payment money (ma—jia). The 
number of da~hu at each chest is not specified but a simple 
calculation would indicate that there were 6 da~hu per ma-qia chest 
and probably 4 at each of tax and corvee chest. In addition to the 
da-hu each li-jia had one tax-pressing Zt-leader and one tax-assessing 
ZZ-registrar, i.e. 103 of each. Each jia also had one tax-pressing 
zong-cui, i.e. 1,030 in all. The services were assessed to 12 taels 
for the da-hu, 5 taels for the ZZ-leaders, 10 taels for the li- 
registrars and 5 taels for the zong-cui. The total annual assessment 
was thus 8,087 taels. Dong Fu-heng wrote that these were the expenses 
(fei-yin) for these services but he did not make it clear whether the 
silver was actually received by the district administration and later 
paid out, or whether it was regarded as part of the household corvee 
which was then deducted from their corvee payments. He also appears 
not to have been too accurate in his adding of the figures. He gave 
the total number of persons as 1,700 and the cost as 8,000-9,000 taels 
per year. The reason for this lack of precision cannot be ascertained; 
we can only note that he was writing about things which had existed
before his time in the district.34
\
After the introduction of the second Single Whip, Mao Guo-jin had 
the ten advantages of this policy engraved upon a tablet but Dong Fu- 
heng does not list them all. He only outlines the three main points:
1. The equal corvee was not assessed.
2. The ti-Qia [corvee] was not established.
3. Corvee heads were not conscripted.
The taxes and corvee were in the Single Whip levied upon land and 
ding. 35 The land was divided into three grades so we must assume that 
Zhangqiu was one of the districts in which a complete Single Whip was 
not feasible but where it could be used with some modifications as 
suggested by Yu Shen-xing. Examples of such modifications must there­
fore have already been in operation when he made his suggestion in 
1592. Dong Fu-heng eulogized the Single Whip, saying that the people 
were happy and returned to the land even if the levies of taxes and
34 Zhangqiu xian-zhi 1596/12/68-70.
35 Ibid. 12/64.
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corvee for the whole district had not been reduced and there had been 
no increase in acreage in 1586.36
The registered acreage had however increased by about 30% 
following the re-measurement of land in 1581. The last recorded figure 
was 10,567 qing in 1529, and in 1581 the acreage was 13,678 qing 
divided into upper, middle and lower land. The registered acreage in 
1369 had been 10,379 qing. 37 The reason for the 1581 increase could 
either be that land which had been brought under cultivation during 
the intervening 200 years had been left unregistered until now, or 
that a new standard of measurement had been adopted. In the latter 
case the land hardest hit by the re-measurement was that to which a 
generous measurement had previously been applied and which was 
probably owned by the more wealthy and privileged landowners. No 
matter what the reason was, the levy of one mou of registered land was 
reduced in 1581 by c. 25% and this was probably to the advantage of 
the marginal taxpayers, so this reform would already have encouraged 
such people to return to the land.
The above information is supplied by Dong Fu-heng at the end of 
the chapter but he seems to have overlooked it in his initial eulogy 
of the Single Whip in which he wrote that the acreage had for several 
decades been over 13,000 qing. A re-measurement of land could have
taken place between 1529 and 1581 but this seems unlikely. He rather
overstressed the case for the Single Whip and, after all, the fifteen 
years between 1581 and 1596 were almost ’several decades'.
Minor adjustments to the acreage were made in 1587, so the total 
in that year was 13,666 qing divided into:
first grade land 7,236.97 qing
second grade land 2,846.59 qing
third grade land 3,582.95 qing
The ding in the district numbered 57,126 of which 1,185 were exempted 
from corvee by privilege, so the taxable ding totalled 56,941. Among 
these 46,339 belonged to landholding households, while 9,602 belonged
36 Ibid. 12/63.
37 Ibid. 12/78.
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to landless households. In addition, the returned households had 
1,415 persons.3 8
For the collection of taxes and corvee all positions in the local 
self-government system were abolished except thirty-seven chest heads 
to supervise the reception at the tax chests. They received a monthly 
salary from a small levy upon the tax payments. Mao Guo-jin fixed 
this levy at one wen (0.001 tael) per 0.035 dan of grain in tax 
payment. His successor Zhang Qi-cheng continued this practice and 
made it an integral part of the regular tax payment, not just a
3 9surcharge.
In 1593 the district received an order from the governor to 
abolish the chest heads and instead to conscript li-leaders to receive 
taxes.40 This order met with considerable opposition in the district 
and ways were found to circumvent it. Before describing how this 
happened we must examine the terminology for the title of the governor 
used in this chapter of the gazetteer. The term used is gun-men, which 
in the Ming dynasty was used for the commander of the training 
divisions in Peking and possibly also for other trusted senior 
military commanders. Cartier describes this office as that of a 
supra-provincial official in charge of land taxes for coastal 
defences.41 In the Qing dynasty the gun-men was the epistolary title 
for the provincial military commander-in-chief.42
In Shandong in the 1590s the title must have been used for the 
provincial governor. Two officials with the surnames Sun and Zheng 
are given this title. The successor to Song Ying-chang as governor 
was Sun Kuang, and his successor was Zheng Ru-bi. Between them they 
held the governorship from 1592 until 1595-1596.43 The coincidal of 
surnames proves beyond reasonable doubt that the title gun—men must
38 Ibid. 12/81-82.
39 Ibid. 12/65.
40 Ibid. 12/65-66.
4 1 Cartier, p.54.
42 H.S. Brunnert and V.V. Hagelstrom, Present Day Political 
Organization of China (Shanghai, 1912), p.337.
43 Jinan fu-zhi 1839/25/3.
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have referred to the governor. The question here is why this title 
was used consistently by Dong Fu-heng instead of the usual xun-fu. I 
suggest that the reason was that the governor was acting in a capacity 
connected with the military emergency in the north, over which Song 
Ying-chang had been appointed supreme administrator.
If this suggestion is correct then the use of this title 
indicates that the governor's interest in the administration of tax 
collection was connected with raising funds to meet military 
expenditures, a role similar to that described by Cartier. This need 
for additional funds is clear, as Dong Fu-heng when he was enumerating 
the taxes stated that orders had recently been received to collect 
2,176 taels in military-supply silver in addition to normal taxes.44 
The logical conclusion must be that the governor did not regard the 
tax collecting institutions under the Single Whip as adequate when 
urgent additional levies had to be made. The li-jia system, or 
similar institutions, were more suited for that purpose as there were 
in them a relatively small — but not too small — number of people from 
whom extra levies could be extorted quickly; these people were then 
left with the task of recouping at least some of the money from the 
rest of the population. This seems to be in accordance with the 
re-introduction of the da~hu in Licheng District.
The 1593 order of the governor also indicates that he did not 
expect that the ti-jia system had been completely abolished after the 
introduction of the Single Whip system. Probably the li-jia still 
existed in connection with the compilation of the Yellow Registers, 
while its tax collecting function had been discontinued following the 
introduction of the Single Whip.
RECEPTION BEADS
1. Zhangqiu District
The order of Zhangqiu in 1593 to abolish the chest heads could 
not be neglected by the district authorities but they were under some
44 Zhangqiu xian-zhi 1596/12/87.
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pressure from the local people to find ways of circumventing it. The 
order was even followed by a further order from the regional inspector 
to recover the money which had been paid to the chest heads. This 
could indicate that the original reform in Zhangqiu had not obtained 
approval from the provincial istration but no positive evidence
for this effect is available. However the interest of the regional 
Inspector left the local officials in no doubt that they had to take 
action in accordance with the order of the provincial administration.
When the order to abolish the chest heads was received in the 
district, Dong Fu-heng had only occupied the position of magistrate 
for a short period. He consulted the inhabitants and found that they 
did not want to have the li-leaders conscripted to collect taxes.
They were afraid that this would be similar to the re-introduction of 
the da-hu and thus of the financial strain on the households who had 
to perform such duties.46 The people he consulted were the elders and 
possibly the gentry (the text is slightly damaged here) and they were 
probably the people who would be hardest hit if such tax-collecting 
corvee was re-introduced. They regarded the Single Whip which had 
abolished all such duties as a blessing or ’like receiving the well- 
counselled instructions of the Sage'47 and thought of the officials who 
had introduced the Single Whip as their 'father and mother’.48 The 
exact words here may be an exaggeration but as the work was published 
in the district at that time they must have reflected the sentiment 
among the people, at least the influential people who had been 
consulted by the magistrate.
A compromise was needed and was found by replacing the chest 
heads with reception heads (shou-tou) . This modification of the 
governor’s order received sufficient approval from higher authorities 
to keep the local officials free of any accusation of disobedience.49
45 Ibid. 12/67.
46 Ibid. 12/65-66.
47 Quotation from the Shu-jing. James Legge, The Chinese Classics, 
3 vols. (Hongkong-London, 1865), III, pt. 1, 163.
48 Zhangqiu xian-zhi 1596/12/70.
49 Ibid. 12/65.
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Dong Fu-heng quotes extensively from three submissions made to the 
provincial authorities. Final approval was only received after the 
third submission. The governor had already changed from Sun Kuang to 
Zheng Ru-bi before the first submission which declared — perhaps a 
little flatteringly — that in Zheng's view policies should be adapted 
to local customs and not be enforced slavishly. Both the governor and 
the regional inspector were of the opinion that they could not go 
against the wishes of the people, but on the other hand they could not 
go against the order of the governor. So the stage was set for a 
compromise. Unfortunately the text describing the compromise is 
ambiguous. It reads as follows:
When among the incumbent /-/-leaders each Id-gza has to select a 
single energetic and duly qualified person to be conscripted as 
reception head — with this to be regarded as a corvee service for 
the year, and with the received tax to be the responsibility of 
the private family — then nothing must prevent a suitable 
compromise if there are small t'i-j'ia or small jza which are poor 
and cannot be charged with this service. Such a compromise will 
be that one or two persons are conscripted from the larger Zz-jza 
or larger jza, while the smaller Zz-jda and jza are ordered either 
to pay a salary acting as joint-service households (peng-hu), or 
to deliver personally, or to hire privately. In general,payments 
will be made daily according to the registers and will be 
deposited in the treasury every day. The officials will not have 
to pay salaries and the people will not have to manage directly. 
In this way neither rich nor poor households will be ruined and 
the sufferings of the former da-hu will not exist. The title of 
the present chest heads will be abolished and their wages will be 
saved. Extreme malpractices will be impossible. This will be 
convenient to the officials and not troublesome to the people.
It will be in accordance with the new policy of the governor and 
not against what the knowledgeable men (shz-fu) of the whole 
district have recommended. This is a law which can operate for a
5 0long time with neither public nor private fraud.
This text from the first submission does not clearly define the 
persons to be appointed as /"/-leaders for tax collection. Each Zz-Qza 
had only one incumbent /-/-leader so the selection of a person of good 
standing from among the incumbent /-/-leaders within the Zz-jza is 
difficult to explain. We must leave this problem unsolved and ascribe 
it to an ambiguity in the text which may have been a result of 
condensing the original submission. The proposal however accepts the 
connection between the Zz-jza and the tax collection. In the stronger
5 o Ibid. 12/66-67.
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li—gia one or two households would he. in charge, while in lihe weaker 
Zi-gia several ways were proposed to avoid one single household from 
being held responsible for the tax of the whole Zi-gia or even one gia.
The argument that the weaker Zi-gia could not be expected to 
select one or two households is not immediately easy to understand. A 
weak Zi-gia would only own relatively small amounts of property and 
have few ding, so it would have to pay correspondingly less in taxes 
and corvee. However since this argument was used it must have carried 
some weight. One explanation could be that when the service had to be 
performed in a rotation there were insufficient numbers of affluent 
people in these Zi-gia who could guarantee the tax collection with 
their own assets. Another explanation could be that the people 
expected impositions on the Zi-gia that would not be distributed 
according to the respective strength of each Zi-gia. The people of 
the district feared that the reform would not only ruin the /-/-leaders 
but would also be a heavy burden upon the whole Zi-gia.0  ^ They 
obviously tried to avoid the use of the Zi-gia for collecting taxes 
and corvee, either because they were afraid that the Zi-gia 
organization was incapable of this service or because they feared that 
any relationship between the Zi-gia and the collection of taxes might 
stimulate a notion among higher officials that extra levies could 
easily be imposed upon the Zi-gia.
The second submission is mainly concerned with a detailed 
description of the advantages of the Single Whip and the disadvantages 
of the new policy but offers no specific proposals. However in the 
third submission the district officials allowed themselves to deviate 
from the principle of a direct connection between the Zi-gia and tax 
collection. They stated that in the view of the local people 
reception heads should be selected from among the gong-tong, gong- 
zheng, and elders (Zao-ren).bZ The gong-tong are not mentioned in 
other parts of the district gazetteer but the gong-zheng were part of 
the non-fiscal self-government structure in 1596. The district was 
divided into thirty granary divisions {she) each with one granary for 
the prevention of famines. A gong-zheng was in charge of such a
5 1
52
Ibid. 12/68. 
Ibid. 12/72.
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granary and he also had certain functions in the supervision of the 
xiang-guc and bao-jia (see Ch. V below). The title of gong-zheng 
appears to have been used for persons who performed the duties of 
elders. Kuribayashi quotes a case of the fifteenth century in Taizhou 
Prefecture, Zhejiang, where the li-lao-ven had ceased to function and 
had been replaced by gong-zheng.°3 In Jinan Prefecture gong-zheng had 
participated in a re-measurement of land in Lijin District c. 1572 
where they received the results of the re-measurement and made a 
register which was sent to the district administration.54 in Binzhou 
Subprefecture gong-zheng 1-ao-ren had been ordered to supervise the 
da-hu after a reform of 1582 , so their presence in the prefecture was 
not unusual.55
The number of people selected among the gong-tong, gong-zheng and 
elders in Zhangqiu as reception heads was to be thirty-seven, i.e. the 
same number as the chest heads they had to replace. Payment of a 
salary was considered but this was rejected as it would be against the 
order of the governor. The solution was to distribute the 462.5 taels 
per year paid to the reception heads on all the ii-jia in the district 
according to ding and land so they would be paid, but not directly by 
the officials.56 The chest heads had only supervised the reception of 
taxes at the tax chest and the following day the money was transferred 
to the district treasury, so they did not actually handle the money. 
The reception heads would have had greater responsibility in handling 
taxes if the order of the governor had been fully applied. However 
the fact that the number of chest heads and reception heads was the 
same and that they received the same remuneration indicates that the 
duties of the reception heads were not considerably different from 
those of the chest heads. The only significant difference I can find 
is that the reception heads were not hired by the officials. They 
were formally selected among the people as a kind of corvee and in 
this respect they were in compliance with the governor's order. 
Governor Sun Kuang had apparently also objected to the long term 
service of the chest heads and preferred a rotational service of the
53 Kuribayashi (1971), p.252.
54 Lijin xian-zhi 1673/10/27.
55 Binzhou zhi 1583/2/51.
56 Zhanqiu xian-zhi 1596/12/72-73.
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H-leaders.57 As we do not know the terms of service of the gong-tong, 
gong-zheng and elders, not to speak of that of those selected as 
reception heads, we cannot determine whether or not the order was 
complied with in this respect.
2. Tangyi District, Dongchang Prefecture
The detailed description given above of the introduction of the 
reception heads in Zhangqiu was necessary not because the change from 
chest heads to reception heads resulted in any great changes in the 
actual tax collection procedures of the district but because the 
change may have had some consequences outside Zhangqiu. One such 
example may be the introduction of reception heads in Tangyi District 
in 1608. This may not have been a direct result of the Zhangqiu 
experience, as reception heads might have been introduced 
simultaneously in other districts. In that case the submissions from 
Zhangqiu must have been at least noteworthy contributions to official 
discussion of the reception heads. The method introduced in Tangyi 
District possibly sheds some further light on the role of the 
reception heads.
The Tangyi description was written by one of the compilers of the 
1708 district gazetteer, Liu Qi, so its source value is less than that 
of the Zhangqiu description. It is however part of a major treatise 
on the 1-i-gia system included in the gazetteer. This treatise was 
also included in at least two general works on administration during 
the Qing dynasty58 so we must assume that their compilers regarded Liu 
Qi as one of the more informed observers of the li-gia system during 
the early Qing period and also that this treatise was based upon 
serious study in local archives. The relevant text seems to be a more 
or less verbatim quotation from a submission of Magistrate Wang Ying- 
qian to higher authorities.
The reception heads in Tangyi are not referred to in connection
57 Ibid. 12/67.
58 Huang-ohao ging-shi wen-bian and Qingchao lun-ce lei-bian.
Zheng-zhi-Zun ch. 4. The latter is quoted in Liang (1957), p.104.
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with a Single Whip reform. Liu Qi arranged the discussion of them 
under the tax captains (Z■'tccng-zhang) and he referred to Wang's 
submission as a proposal to replace the da~hu and end their suffering. 
Tax chests were in existence so the tax was probably managed by 
'combined reception and separate forwarding'. This method had imposed 
considerable hardship as a result of cheating at the various stages of 
the collection and forwarding. The hardship was considered so severe 
by the people that they used every kind of manipulation to conceal 
property in order to avoid the service and the people of modest means 
(xiao -m in) regarded conscription as da-hu as equivalent to being 
thrown into the tiger's den.
The Single Whip was however introduced in 1608 so the reform of 
the da-hu was undertaken at the same time.59 Wang Ying-qian proposed 
and apparently obtained permission to abolish the da~hu and replace 
them with reception heads. Ten of these were conscripted to receive 
silver and seventeen to receive taxes in rice and grain. The hardship 
on the da-hu had mainly been caused by the forwarding; this was now 
completely abolished as the reception heads only received, while all 
forwarding was to be handled by the officials. The reception heads 
were conscripted according to the Z-i-jia, apparently one for each of 
the seventeen I'L-j'ia in the district. This method of conscription 
would only have provided the seventeen reception heads for taxes in 
kind; how the ten conscripted to receive silver were selected is not 
specified. Within each ti,-jia the service was rotated among the jda 
so that each jia served one year in a ten-year rotation. One of the 
advantages of such an arrangement was that the Zi-jia assessment only 
had to be made every ten years instead of the five-year assessments 
which had previously been applied. No further explanation of this 
previous system of assessment was given by Wang Ying-qian but perhaps 
the Zi-jia corvee had at some time been changed from service for one 
year in ten to service for six months in five years. Such an arrange­
ment might have served to alleviate some of the burdens on the Zi-jia 
but as we can see this would also put additional pressure on the 
district administration for the assessment work.
The regulations for the reception heads allowed for some 
5 9 Tangyi x ia n -z h i 1710/4/7.
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flexibility. Some jia could be economically so strong as to justify a 
conscription of two or more reception heads, while other jia could be 
so weak that it would be unfair to ask for even one reception head.
Such adjustments were further justified as the reception heads 
received a certain remuneration to be paid by the whole district. No 
indication is given as to how the funds for this remuneration were 
collected or disbursed. The adjustments were apparently only to be 
made between the jia so we must assume that each ii-jia had to provide 
one reception head.
Wang continued by saying that he had already selected twenty- 
seven reception heads and also two granary men (oang-fu) who 
presumably worked at the district granary to receive the taxes from 
the reception heads. He extended certain privileged exemptions from 
taxes and corvee to these households for ten years and this made these 
positions so attractive that households apparently competed for them.60
Kuribayashi has already described the reception heads to some 
extent. His conclusion is that they were probably successors to the 
/■/-leaders. 5 1 From my description they seem rather to have been 
successors to the da~hu> either directly as in Tangyi District or 
indirectly as in Zhangqiu. This conclusion is further supported as 
shou-tou da-hu are already mentioned for 1571 in the SDJHL. However 
from an organizational point of view the reception heads appear to 
have been more directly connected with the Zi—jia than was probably 
the case at least for the early da-hu. But the flexibility approved 
in both districts shows that the provincial authorities were prepared 
to accept that strict adherence to the Zi-jia system for tax 
collection was no longer possible in some districts if differences in 
the economic strength of the I'i-j'ia were too marked and if the local 
population when consulted by the officials were opposed to it.
6 0 
6 1
62
Ibid. 2/11-12.
Kuribayashi (1971), pp.175-176. 
SDJHL 4/34.
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THE SINGLE WHIP IN OTHER JINAN DISTRICTS
This section will give short descriptions of the Single Whip in 
other districts for which details are available. Occasionally hints 
are given about the fate of the li-jia or about administrative 
processes which either directly or indirectly must have influenced the 
local self-government system. The picture cannot be complete as 
information is not provided for all the districts. However the Single 
Whip appears from the following description to have been so widely 
accepted as to suggest that it was introduced in most if not all 
districts of the prefecture.
In Binzhou Subprefecture a reform of the da-hu was introduced 
which resembles similar reforms under the Single Whip. The sub­
prefecture had c. 90 da-hu who had each collected c. 500 taels of 
silver and had suffered greatly from this service. In 1582 Magistrate 
Ai Mei ordered that the da-hu would only have to weigh and receive the 
taxes and act under supervision of the gong-zheng lao-ren. The 
collection was to be checked each day in the yamen and on the last day 
the chief officer (shou-lzng-guan) was ordered to manage the 
forwarding. The expenses of the forwarding were to be covered from 
the collected surplus in the tax and was explicitly not to be demanded 
from the da~hu. The shz-paz had previously been middlemen between the 
taxpayers and the da~hu and had misappropriated considerable sums. Ai 
Mei now ordered that the da~hu of each tz-gza should collect the tax 
and the taxpayers should hand their tax directly to the da~hu.
The details of the previous forwarding service of the da-hu are 
not available due to textual damage, so we cannot establish whether 
this forwarding could have had an influence on the relationship 
between the da~hu and the lz-jza. The connection between the two is 
clear from 1582 although no order was given to reduce the number of 
da-hu to correspond to the seventy-eight lz-jza in the subprefecture. 
This would hardly have mattered as the Iz-jla from which more than one 
da-hu had been conscripted would have been the economically more 
powerful, and with higher tax payments they could probably have used 
more than one da-hu. I suggest that with the termination of the 
forwarding duties of the da~hu the connection between them and the 
ll-gza became closer when the question of granary rates or matching
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the collections for deliveries to specific granaries no longer existed. 
When the da-iiu were only receiving the taxes the H-gia were probably 
still administratively and geographically the most convenient unit
6 3from which to collect.
Another district where the Single Whip is not specifically 
mentioned but where similar reforms were carried out was Shanghe. 
Beginning in the Long-qing period the H-gia [corvee] was abolished 
and all corvee levied in silver according to land and ding. The 
payments were fixed and graded. But not all services could be 
included in this corvee regulation, as from time to time artisans had 
to be conscripted to repair the yamen offices and also temporary 
levies in support of other districts (xie-ji) could not be 
regularized.6 4
Yangxin District introduced the Single Whip for taxes and corvee 
in 158265 and Taian Subprefecture introduced it in early Wan-li.66 
In Pingyuan District the li-leaders, shi-pai and li-registrars were 
abolished in 1587. The Z-i-elders were retained in order to preserve 
some traditional subdivisions (du-tu). 67 The Single Whip was 
introduced in Zhanhua District in 1588 but the gazetteer gives no
C Qinformation on the organizational changes involved. In Xincheng the 
population figures were revised in 1578 and tax classes were 
abolished.69 This would seem to have been part of a Single Whip 
reform but the gazetteer only used this term for reforms introduced by 
Magistrate Zhao Wen-bing who held office between 1586 and 1589. In 
this reform the equal corvee was no longer to be assessed and the 
da-hu were abolished. Tax payments were divided into ten instalments 
to be paid in the first ten months of each year. The amount in each 
instalment was further decided according to the harvest time. For an 
annual payment of one tael of silver 0.2 tael was paid in the fifth
63 Binzhou zhi 1583/2/50-51.
64 Shanghe xian-zhi 1586/3/6.
65 Yangxin xian-zhi 1682/3/8.
66 Taian zhou-zhi 1670/2/8.
67 Pingyuan xian-zhi 1590/1/20.
68 Zhanhua xian-zhi 1619/3/55.
69 Xineheng xian-zhi 1693/3/2.
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and the tenth months, while the remaining 0.6 tael was divided equally
7 oover the other eight months.
Putai District amalgamated the levy of equal corvee with Z-i-jia 
corvee and other levies in 1587. In Qidong the Single Whip was
introduced between 1589 and 1595 and the services as Zi-leaders and 
other services where the households were conscripted to corvee 
(probably the shi-pai, here called pai-jia) were abolished.72 Laiwu 
District apparently received orders shortly before 1595 to introduce 
the Single Whip whereby the corvee duties of the Zi-leaders, etc., 
were abolished and collection organized by the officials. In 
Qingcheng the final consolidation of taxes and of corvee to be levied 
on land was probably in 1596 and this apparently met with some 
opposition which had died down when the gazetteer was compiled in 
1612.74 The Zi-jia corvee had however disappeared soon after 1575 
when Magistrate Li Ji-gao shortly after his arrival in 1574 economized 
on excessive expenditures, reassessed the corvee, abolished the Zi-j’'La 
[corvee] and discontinued rotational services.75
The Single Whip in Zichuan District was introduced by 160276 and 
in Deping it was introduced in 1604. In this latter district the 
people claimed that they had suffered under the former tax system and 
after deliberations a decision was made to introduce the Single Whip. 
This was then approved by the higher authorities from prefect to 
governor. The main problem in Deping was to equalize the corvee, 
which was done by abolishing the tax classes and having only two rates, 
one for ding with land and one for those without land. Another major 
problem was the forwarding of taxes and corvee which had hitherto been 
performed by forwarding households (jie-hu). They had previously 
served one year in three but this had developed into annual service. 
The proposal was now made to introduce a ten-year rotation where each
70 Ibid. 12/17.
71 Putai xian-zhi 1592/4/2.
72 Qidong xian-zhi 1685/4/16.
7 3 Laiwu xian zhi
74 Qingcheng xian-zhi 1617/1/15.
75 Ibid. 1617/1/15.
76 Zichuan xian-zhi 2/26.
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Zi-gia would rotate the service among its gia but with provisions that
the stronger Jia could serve for two years while the weaker gia could
serve jointly. This was approved by the gentry and the elders and was
then put up as a petition. The way this service was conscripted
resembles the method used for the reception heads. However there is
no indication that they were paid for their service and their function
7 7was apparently also different.
Finally the Single Whip was introduced at some unspecified time 
during the Ming dynasty in Lingxian District but no details are 
available. The sources for this survey have been rather 
disappointing. However sufficient information has been unearthed to 
indicate that the Zi-gia corvee was abolished under the Single Whip 
and also that most of the other functions of the Zi-gia were no longer 
performed. The bureaucracy still had a tendency to prefer to use the 
Zi-gia organization for tax collection — and perhaps in Deping 
forwarding was also imposed upon the Zi-gia. But with the provisions 
for modifications according to the strength of each Zi-gia or each g'iat 
these services must be regarded as fundamentally different from the 
original Zi-gia corvee. My impression is that when a rotational 
service was desirable — and this could be the case for tax collectors 
to prevent them from continuous frauds — then the Z-i-gia might as well 
be used since it was already in existence and had been so since the 
founding of the dynasty. Continued reliance upon the Zi-gia also had 
the advantage that the officials — at least to a certain extent — 
still only had to manage the relatively larger units instead of house­
holds; finally the Zi-gia would have continued to be a convenient 
instrument for the emergency — or irregular —  levies.
FISCAL CHANGES
1. Corvee
The reform of the corvee in the Wan-li period was mainly 
concerned with the collection of levies from the people and perhaps
77 Deping xian-zhi 1796/3/2, 10/40-42.
70 Lingxian zhi 1845/7/1.
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also the further commutation to silver payments. For the collection 
from the households we have details from Putai District after it had 
been consolidated in 1587. We also have figures for the equal corvee 
in 1565. However a direct comparison of the figures is impossible, as 
the 1587 figures contain several items which were not included in the 
equal corvee of 1565. These items included ti-gia contributions 
(li-jia gong-fei) , horse-price silver, levies of straw or fodder (cao- 
liao), salt tax and some forwarding charges. The equal corvee had in 
1565 been assessed every three years but this had changed to every 
five years after orders to that effect had been received during the 
Wan-li period. The triennial assessments in 1565 do not correspond to 
the biennial assessments of which there was so much evidence in the 
SDJHL. The explanation may be that local variations were allowed 
at that time but the discrepancy may also be the result of a misprint. 
The figures for Putai District in 1587 are probably rather unique for 
the prefecture, as they still include a levy of men-silver after
consolidation and this was not normal in the Single Whip. The figures
7 9given are in taels of silver.
1565 1587
men ding men ding
1 4.0 0.7 16.1 4.15
2 3.0 0.6 12.5 3.59
3 2.0 0.5 11.7 3.09
4 1.0 0.4 8.9 2.59
5 0.9 0.3 7.16 1.80
6 0.7 0.2 5.92 1.26
7 0.4 0.2 2.515 1.06
8 0.1 0.15 0.535 0.532
9 - 0.07 - 0.36
Details for the number of households in each tax class in Putai 
are not recorded. A table of the number of households and ding in 
each tax class in Binzhou in 1583 is given on p.177.00
No gazetteers other than that of Putai give figures for the levy 
of corvee on each tax class, not even those compiled during the Wan-li 
period. They usually enumerate in detail all the different corvee 
items to be levied in the district. This may indicate that the
79 Putai xian-zhi 1592/4/2-3.
80 Binzhou zhi 1583/2/38.
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Class Households Ding Ding/Households
1 8 20 2.5
2 26 68 2.6
3 50 161 3.2
4 87 262 3.0
5 168 433 2.5
6 562 1,282 2.3
7 2,021 4,621 2.3
8 6,090 13,833 2.3
9 7,630 16,744 2.2
compilers of the gazetteers and also the district officials were more 
interested in having the correct figures for the district levies — 
which had to be supplied to higher authorities and also for use in the 
district itself — than they were in the problem of allocating the 
levies on the taxpayers. From the point of view of the government the 
quotas to be filled by the districts were probably more important than 
the way they were collected. The government was however not 
disinterested in collection and delivery procedures; after all the 
reforms which had taken place from 1550 and perhaps also before were 
mainly aimed at equalizing the burdens upon the taxpayers. But the 
underlying argument for this, as put directly by Ge Shou-li, appears 
to be the concern for maintaining a constant flow of funds to the 
central and local government as much as a concern for the livelihood 
of the individual taxpayer.
In the gazetteers compiled during the Wan-li period the most
important H-gia corvee, such as qing-fu, bai-fu and Zi-jia horses,
are not mentioned in the sections on corvee in Dezhou, Qidong, Zhanhua, 
8 1and Zichuan. In Binzhou, Shanghe and Wuding these services are 
listed as part of the equal corvee, and in Qingcheng and Zhangqiu 
they are listed as separate items of li-gia corvee.83 Putai District 
did not list the corvee items but the Zi-gia silver was incorporated 
in the general levy. In the Pingyuan gazetteer the section on corvee 
is illegible so the categorization of the Zi-gia corvee cannot be
81 dezhou zhi .1576/4/2-3; Qidong xian-zhi 1617/15/5; Zhanhua xian- 
zhi 1617/3/6; Ziohuccn xian-zhi 1602/16/2-3.
82 Binzhou zhi 1583/2/50; Shanghe xian-zhi 1586/3/28; Wuding zhou- 
zhi 1588/5/5.
83 Qingcheng xian-zhi 1612/1/26-27; Taian zhou-zhi 1670 (1603)/2/12; 
Zhangqiu xian-zhi 1596/12/26.
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determined.0 * Tn Wilding and Q ingcheng special cntegorioh of statutory 
contributions (e-zhi or e-ban-gong-fei) and miscellaneous 
contributions (za—zhi or za—ban-gong-fez) are listed. These 
categories included various small levies for ceremonial and 
administrative expenses in the subprefecture or district. Their 
nature is that of the original levies on the li-jia for local expenses. 
They had not been consolidated in the SDJHL but their listing in these 
gazetteers indicates that they had continued to be levied at least in 
some and perhaps in all subprefectures and districts. The gazetteers 
give no indication whether or not these contributions were still 
levied on the li-jia. These levies also existed in Zhangqiu as 
special categories but were included in the overall Single Whip 
together with the equal corvee and the li~jia corvee.
The levies for each item of corvee did not change significantly 
during this period. A comparison between the 1583 Binzhou gazetteer 
and the SDJHL shows that the total levy of silver corvee was reduced 
from 5,825.1 taels to 5,142.1 taels. The reduction was due to the 
omission of three items and variations in some other items which are 
accounted for in the gazetteer. The figures for the labour corvee 
correspond to the da-tao figures in the SDJHL, which indicates that 
these figures included both the original silver valuations and the 
surcharge. The labour corvee in Binzhou was in 1583 still organized 
so that wealthy and honest households collected the silver and then 
paid for the corvee work, so the corvee heads must still have been in 
existence.8 5
2. Re-measurement of land
In 1580:11:10 the emperor authorized a measurement of all land in
the empire to be based on the experience of a re-measurement in
Fujian Province during the preceding two years. This was —  as far as
8 6is known —  the only order of the kind issued during the dynasty.
84 Pingyuan xian-zhi 1590/1/20.
85 SDJHL 5/6; Binzhou zhi 1583/2/48-49. 
SL 1580:11:bing-zi; Huang, p.300.86
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All the districts in Jinan Prefecture apparently obeyed this order at 
least to the extent that in districts for which information is 
available the figures for acreage from the Wan-li period are used —  
sometimes with modification —  as the basis for future tax assessment.
Many districts had reported at least one measurement of the land 
in the sixteenth century so for them a re-measurement was not a 
completely new thing. During the re-measurement in Shanghe District 
the mou of 240 bu had been used but the unit of measurement had been 
the 'large foot' (da-chi) which was about one and a half times the 
size of the official foot. During the measurement of 1581 the 
official measurement instrument (guan-cha) was to be used and the 
result was an acreage about double the previous figure (16,324.98 qing 
to 7,938.52 qing). In the new measurement the land was classed in 
three grades, the middle grade being one and one-third times the size 
of the upper grade and the lower grade twice the size of the upper 
grade. As a result of the fiscal acreage was 10,216.13 qing.Q1
In Lijin District the land had been measured in 1571. Each 
person measured his own land according to the standard laid down by 
the magistrate and sent the results to the gong-zheng who in turn 
informed the yamen. The results are somewhat puzzling. The original 
acreage had been 3,747.72 qing as given in the introduction to the 
section on land in the 1673 gazetteer. In the same section the 1572 
acreage is given as 3,345.59 qing, while in the essay on the 
equalization of land under Magistrate Jia Guang-da in 1571 the acreage 
is given as 2,073.17 qing, or if calculated strictly according to 240 
bu per mou, 2,354.59 qing. The acreage after the re-measurement in 
1571 was 4,644.52 qing which is very close to double the 1571 figure, 
so it was probably a result of applying the official measure rather 
than the traditional larger foot, as in Shanghe. In the Chong-zheng 
period the acreage in Lijin was reduced by about 600 qing. This 
Chong-zheng figure was split into three grades. This division may 
go back to 1581; the reason for its omission may have been that the 
compilers of the 1673 gazetteer did not feel any need to include such 
information for the earlier period.
87 Shanghe xian-zhi 1586/3/1-2.
88 Lijin xian-zhi 1673/4/2, 10/27.
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The participation of the people in the measurement of their own 
land was apparently a common practice in the prefecture. In Zichuan 
District the gentry and elders welcomed the re-measurement as fields 
had hitherto been measured unequally. Moreover they proposed that one 
or perhaps several persons should be selected to be in charge of the 
measurement. The magistrate Wang Jiu-yi firmly rejected this 
proposal. Instead he distributed measuresticks among the people (bai- 
xing) and they could themselves select persons to undertake the 
measurement. The magistrate would take no part in this selection.
All the land which had not formerly been registered was to be newly 
listed in the registers, presumably together with the land which had 
been listed previously. The registers were to be handed over to the 
li-zheng who in this district had some functions at the relief 
granaries and were probably equivalent to the gong-zheng. The 
magistrate then examined a sample of the fields in a way which even a 
modern statistician would not entirely disapprove. He had an arrow 
shot from a bow and where it landed he would check the measurement.
The people — according to the biography of Wang Jiu-yi — were 
astounded and all went to the place where the arrow had landed and 
said: ’The magistrate has arrived.’ In this way there was no
cheating, with the result that the registered acreage exceeded that of 
the previous registers. The increase was from 5,635.68 to 6,671.95 
qing and after 1581 the land was divided into four grades. This story 
was probably written about twenty years after the event, so the details 
may not be completely reliable, but the general outline is probably 
correct. This suggests that Wang did not want to entrust the 
measurement to the gentry or the local self-government organization, 
either of which would have been the natural choice if he himself had 
to make the selection. Such people were only used for the collection 
of the registers. Some of the landowners may have been forced to rely 
on literate people to fill in their register entry but the magistrate 
at least tried to eliminate any cheating by such people with his 
personal checking of samples.
In Qingcheng District the acreage was increased from 2,364 qing 
to 3,039 qing. The reason was that the old mou had been 304 bu> while 
the new mou was 250 bu. In 1594 the general administration circuit
8 9 Zichuan xian-zhi 1602/10/1, 27/10-11.
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Intendant: of Jinan, Wang Ying-jiao, had apparently heard that all land 
in Qingcheng had not been measured and he ordered that an additional 
measurement be undertaken before a certain date. The magistrate 
protested vigorously as the land of Qingcheng was not extensive and 
there was no possibility of concealment. He succeeded in not having 
to undertake a new measurement.90
Most districts reported that the land had been classed in several 
grades in 1581 or at least in the Wan-li period. The only districts 
for which information is available and which did not report grading of 
land were Changqing, Licheng and Taian. The Taian gazetteer states 
that the tax was collected according to a uniform levy. Licheng 
District reported in the Qing dynasty that the land was classified in 
five 'metallic' grades which may go back to the middle of the 
sixteenth century. So in most districts the conditions were such that 
a graded corvee levy could be imposed on the land. This was clear in 
Putai District where in the Wan-li period li~jia silver was levied on 
land at 0.003 tael per mou on first-grade land, 0.002 tael on second 
grade and 0.001 tael on third grade.92 In Leling District taxes and 
some corvee were levied on land and both were assessed according to 
the land grading.93
90 Qingcheng xian-zhi 1612/1/14-15.
91 Licheng xian-zhi 1640/5/2; Taiccn zhou-zhi 1670 (1603) /2/8; 
Chongqing xian-zhi 1845/5/4.
92 Putai xian-zhi 1591/3/10.
93 Leling xian-zhi 1762/2/50.
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CHAPTER V
OTHER LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS c. 1550-1600
INTRODUCTION
This chapter will describe the other self-government institutions 
known to have existed in Jinan Prefecture around 1550-1600. A short 
description of the fate of the institutions introduced early in the 
dynasty will be followed by a longer description of the institutions 
established during the sixteenth century to serve some of the same 
non-fiscal purposes; finally the welfare organizations, primarily the 
welfare granaries, will be dealt with at some length. The sources are 
the local gazetteers but for the function of some of the institutions 
other sources have been used to provide further insights. Some of 
these other sources can be related to Jinan Prefecture. As was the 
case with sources for the ll-jla system, the gazetteers compiled 
during or immediately after the period give more information than 
those compiled during the Qing dynasty. However the Qing gazetteers 
show slightly more interest in the non-fiscal local self-government 
system of the Ming than in its li-jia system. One reason for this may 
be that the Qing compilers regarded the non-fiscal local self- 
government system of their dynasty as a continuation from the Ming, 
while the Qing fiscal local self-government system was created from 
scratch after the great economic upheavals during the dynastic 
transition. Another reason may be that the non-fiscal self-government 
system was in some cases tied to buildings or at least to the land on 
which permanent or temporary constructions had been erected. As the 
gazetteers often record the history of buildings and other permanent 
structures, including major repairs and final or temporary abolition, 
some information is provided in this way.
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ALTARS AND PAVILIONS
Altars for the 'five soil and five grain' spirits (jii-she) were 
established in Changshan District in 1369, one in each ii. Sacrifices 
to the soil and grain spirits of the ii were performed in spring and 
autumn followed by communal wine-drinking and pledge-reading (xiang- 
yue). The altar for the unconsoled spirits (xiang-ii) was identical 
to the Z-i-she altar and ceremonies were performed three times a year 
at the Qing-ming festival, in the middle of the seventh month and at 
the beginning of the tenth month. These ceremonies were performed by 
the ii-elders {ii-jia-iao) and other local elders. The dating of the 
terms of xiang-yue and H-jia-iao in the district gazetteer may be 
doubtful but there seems to be no reason to doubt that the altars and 
the ceremonies were introduced at the level of the ii in early Ming. 
They had all been abolished by 1716.1 2
Information on the altars at the local self-government level is 
only available for the xiang-ii altars in a few other districts. In 
Haifeng District one altar had been established in each i'i and 
sacrifices were performed at the same time as those at the district 
xiang-ii altar. These altars were under direction of the Z-i-leader 
(ZI-zhang). 2 In Lijin District there had been over forty altars, one 
in each i'i (the district had thirty-four and later forty Zi-jia). 3 
Pingyuan had forty-six altars, one in each i'i (forty-six Zi-jia).4 
Qidong apparently had one in each Z-i-jia and in 1685 the land on which 
they had been erected still existed in fourteen places.5 6 All these 
altars had been abolished at the time the gazetteers were compiled; 
only the Pingyuan gazetteers was compiled before 1600.
In Deping District there had been altars in each subdistrict.
They had been confiscated (qin-mo) in the Jia-jing period to settle
cpeople on the land. Zichuan District also had altars in each
1 Changshan xian-zhi 1716/2/11.
2 Haifeng xian-zhi 1670/5/9.
3 Lijin xian-zhi 1673/3/2.
4 Pingyuan xian-zhi 1590/1/23.
5 Qidong xian-zhi 1617/7/2, 1685/2/12-23.
6 Deping xian-zhi ll^S/2/11.
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nsubdistrict and they had been abolished by 3602. The general 
impression from these examples is that the altars had probably existed 
in all districts at the beginning of the dynasty, and at least in some 
cases either in the Zi-gia or in units which were later directly 
absorbed in the Zi-gia system. We cannot determine how long they 
survived but the fact that they are referred to in relatively few 
gazetteers suggests that the decline of this institution had started 
early in the dynasty.
At the district level the altars survived longer. The district 
altar in Changshan had been repaired in 14838 and the Qidong altar had 
been relocated in 1486. The most conspicuous example of such 
survivals is the relocation of the Binzhou Subprefecture altar in 1583 
recorded in the gazetteer of this year together with information on 
the ceremonies performed at it.10 So ceremonies for the unconsoled 
spirits were performed in this subprefecture in late Ming and 
presumably also in the other subprefectures and districts of Jinan.
Sheng-ming and Jing-shan pavilions are only referred to at the 
district level. Many Qing gazetteers reported that they had been 
abolished, although in Qidong proposals were made to re-introduce them 
in 1685.* 11 These pavilions are reported in Pingyuan around 150012 and 
they had been repaired in Lijin District c. 1552. 1 3 In Dezhou Sub­
prefecture they were rebuilt between 1573 and 1576.14 The latter 
example indicates that they still served some purpose in that sub­
prefecture, either as meeting places or for posting notices of good or 
bad behaviour. In the latter role they may have been connected with 
the local self-government system, as in the xiang-yue system records 
of the behaviour of the people were sent to the district yamen. The 
pavilions may also have been retained and repaired to show reverence
7 Ziohuan xian-zhi 1602/8/2.
8 Chccngshan xian-zhi 1714/2/11.
9 Qidong xian-zhi 1617/2/1-2.
10 Binzhou zhi 1583/2/16.
11 Qidong xian-zhi 1685/2/3.
12 Pingyuan xian-zhi 1590/2/23.
13 Lijin xian-zhi 1673/10/26.
14 Dezhou zhi 1B16/2/1.
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for the decisions of the founding emperor and as a constant reminder 
to the people that their behaviour was the object of public scrutiny.
B A O -J IA  AND X IA N G -Y U E  
1. Origin of the bao-jia
With the erosion of the non-fiscal duties of the Z-i-elders, in 
Shandong as well as in other parts of the empire various policies were 
adopted in the sixteenth century to create new organizations for the 
non-fiscal duties of the local self-government system. The most 
famous of these organizations were the bao-jia and xiang-yue which are 
closely connected with the names of Wang Yang-ming (Wang Shou-ren)15 
and Lü Kun.16
The first operation of the bao-jia system in the Ming dynasty was 
probably during the Zheng-tong period when it was used as a security 
organization in mining areas of Fujian Province. Watch towers were 
constructed by these bao-jia and jfa-leaders were appointed among the 
wealthy households. The large-scale application of the bao-jia began 
however in 1517 when Wang Yang-ming became governor of Nangan (the 
border area of Jiangxi, Fujian and Guangdong Provinces) which suffered 
greatly from banditry. Immediately after arriving he took steps to 
suppress robbers within the city by promulgating the 'ten-family-card1 
system (shi-jia-pai-fa) which was later called the bao-jia system.
Ten households were grouped together and their names written upon a 
card which was circulated every day among the members of the group. 
Each day between five and seven p.m. a member of the household on duty 
was to carry the card round to the other households and — with their 
knowledge — they would note any changes in the composition of the 
household or any other noteworthy matters. If anything suspicious was 
discovered the officials were to be informed. If anything was 
concealed then all the ten households were considered guilty when this 
was discovered.17
1 5 
1 6 
1 7
DMB, pp.1408-1416.
Ibid. , pp.1006-1010.
Wada (1939), pp.121-122; Elmquist, pp.241, 301-303.
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The explicit mutual responsibility of the households in security 
matters under Wang Yang-ming’s system is quite different from the 
local self-government system of the early years of the dynasty. The 
Precepts of Popular Instruction did not spell out any mutual, 
responsibility. They only alluded to this when they said that the 
people should not harbour criminals,as this could be harmful to 
relatives and neighbours. These people would certainly have been 
implicated if the sheltering of criminals was discovered.18 The 
reason for this difference in emphasis may be that the Precepts of 
Popular Instruction were promulgated while the dynasty was still 
relatively new. At that time there may have been a feeling among the 
lawmakers that the people after long years of unrest were more 
inclined to be law-abiding. The situation facing Wang Yang-ming was 
completely different. He was appointed governor to a border area 
between three provinces with the specific purpose of bringing lawless­
ness under control and for this purpose mutual responsibility between 
households was doubtless a useful instrument.
The original bao-jia system of Wang Yang-ming was only concerned 
with mutual surveillance by the households. No police action was 
expected from the 'ten-family-card' units and no leader was selected. 
Wang Yang-ming's reason for this was that he did not want to promote 
any of the households in these small units to a position where they 
enjoyed advantages over the others.19 This attitude probably reflects 
some aspect of the social structure at that time. For the 
surveillance of the households relatively small groups were most 
suitable, but on the other hand such groups were too small for leaders 
to be designated if social harmony was to be maintained.
With no leadership in the 'ten-family-card' units, other leaders 
were needed to mobilize the population in case of bandit alarms. For 
this purpose watch-chiefs were established in the villages. The 
watch-chiefs were not to be concerned with disputes in the villages 
but only with the command of the villagers during bandit alarms. An 
elaborate system was set up to warn the villagers and also to secure
o Qcommunication between villages during alarms.
18 Elmquist, p.287.
19 Ibid, p.250.
20 Ibid. pp.305-306.
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The Tten-family-card' system was not widely adopted in China 
during the Ming dynasty. It was used in some areas during military 
emergencies. As a durable local self-government institution it 
already proved inadequate in the Nangan area during Wang Yang-ming’s 
time. When the only function was to watch the households and report 
on irregularities there was a tendency among the officials and the 
people to stress the formalities of this watching while neglecting its 
real purpose. To overcome this problem the educational element of 
local self-government was emphasized, and Wang Yang-ming did this by 
combining the bao-jia with the xiang-yue.21
2 . Xiang-yue
The bao-jia system of the Ming dynasty is generally supposed to 
be a continuation of similar systems which began during the Song 
period on the model of Wang An-shi, although the Song systems did have 
leaders of the ten-family groups. The Song dynasty roots of the 
Ming xiang-yue are even more evident; at first the Ming xiang-yue 
copied those of the Lii family {Lü-shi-xiang-yue) , which had been 
further refined by Zhu Xi during southern Song.
The xiang-yue, or pledge groups, were first proposed in the Ming 
dynasty in 1388 when a Han-lin bachelor Xie Jin proposed that since 
new educational laws were not ready the Household Rules of the 
Zheng family ought to be adopted as the regulations for families, 
and the ’Xiang-yue of the Lii family’ should be adopted for 
conciliation between neighbours. This proposal came at a time when 
the ’elders’ were not formally established in their community role.
It was not accepted and became irrelevant on the establishement of the 
li-e.lders between 1394 and 1398.
Following the weakening or breakdown of the community functions 
of the Z-i-elders in the fifteenth century local experiments were made 
with the xiang-yue. The first records are from Chaozhou Prefecture, 
Guangdong Province, in c. 1440 when the prefect ordered the villagers
2 1
22
Ibid, p.242; Wada (1939), p.122. 
Elmquist, p.81.
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to erect pavilions in which pledge-group directors {yue—zhang) and 
recorders (yuc-shi) chosen from the people were to carry out the 
xiang-yue system. Other local records mention the system over the 
next eighty years. However the initiative taken by Wang Yang-ming 
appears to have been the decisive step for a more widespread 
application of this method of local self-government. This may have 
been because of his high reputation but also because social conditions 
were ripe for this kind of experiment. One noticeable factor in the 
development of the bao-jia and xiang-yue is that they — like the 
Single Whip — were instituted on the initiative of local officials.
This stands in sharp contrast to the policy of the Hong-wu period when, 
perhaps following local experiments, detailed centralized regulations 
were enforced for local self-government.
The xiang-yue of Wang Yang-ming in Nangan was primarily intended 
to regulate the activities between the people within the xiang-yue.
The size of the xiang-yue was not defined, so the village was probably 
the unit. Each xiang-yue was to have one yue-leader (yue-zheng) and 
two deputies (yue-fu). They were to be elderly persons respected by 
the people of the xiang-yue. In addition four directors {yue-zheng) , 
four advisers {yue-shi), four recorders (zhi-yue) and two ritualists 
(yue-zan) were selected. These were all to possess the personal 
virtues necessary for carrying out their functions. Each xiang-yue 
was to keep three registers. The recorders were to list the names of 
all the members of the xiang-yue in one register together with their 
daily activities. The other two registers were used to record the 
behaviour of the members, one for good and commendable actions and one 
for misdeeds. The yue-leader was to be responsible for these 
registers. All good deeds were to be recorded in clear and definite 
language, while misdeeds were to be described more cautiously, not 
condemning the members too hastily so as to give them a chance to 
reform. The xiang-yue were to meet each month at a suitable place, 
e.g. a temple with sufficient space and within convenient distance for 
all the members. Modest refreshments of food and drink were to be 
served for which the members were to pay 0.03 tael.
2 3 Ibid. pp.240-241; Wada (1939), pp.120-121.
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The xiang-yue was responsible for assistance to members who were 
in any difficulties; if they failed in this duty the whole xiang-yue 
would be guilty of neglect. At the time of tax collection the xiang- 
yue was to make sure that no member absented himself before the taxes 
had been paid, so that the other members would not have to make up the 
deficit. It had a strong responsibility to ensure that no member of 
the community suffered from excessive economic strain, for example to 
ensure that moneylenders did not charge excessive interest or harshly 
insist on loan repayments. This provision was evidently intended to 
prevent members of the xiang-yue from being driven to unlawful actions 
out of economic necessity. Membership of the xiang-yue was to be open 
to reformed bandits but at the same time the xiang-yue were to ensure 
that such persons did not engage in dubious activities or practise 
extortions. Finally the xiang-yue were responsible for seeing that 
marriage and funeral ceremonies were conducted with due regard for the 
financial capabilities of the households.24
The educational functions of the early xiang-yue followed the 
Four Pledges of the Lii- shi- xiang-y ue. These were: Mutual
encouragement in worthy endeavours, Mutual restraint of misconduct, 
Ceremonialization of everyday social intercourse, and Mutual help in 
misfortune. When this form of xiang-yue was amended by Zhu Xi he gave 
elaborate explanations for situations covered by each of these 
pledges.2 5
The break with the xiang-yue tradition of the Lü family began 
probably in 1529 when the Six Maxims of the Hong-wu emperor began to 
replace the Four Pledges. In the same year local self-government of 
the xiang-yue type was adopted as official policy. On 1529:3:9 the 
Left vice-minister of War Wang Ting-xiang complained that there had 
recently been famines in all provinces and as a remedy he proposed 
that welfare granaries (yi-cang) should be established in each li-she 
because the relief granaries in subprefectures and districts were 
insufficient. He suggested that in the villages 200-300 families
Elmquist, pp.308-315.
25 Ibid. pp.89-95.
25 DMB, pp.1431-1434. Wang had been Right administration 
commissioner of Shandong in 1524.
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should form one association (hub) and that each month the members of 
these associations should pay an amount of grain to the granary 
according to their tax class. One virtuous man was to be selected as 
head (she-tou) and another was to keep the books as deputy. In years 
of bad harvests the grain was to be distributed first to the middle 
and lower tax-classes and then to the upper tax-classes. Only the 
latter were to repay the grain. The distribution was to be made 
according to the wishes of the people without interference from the 
officials but records were kept for their inspection. This measure 
would create sufficient social stability so that both the bao-jia and 
the xiccng-yue could function and thus contribute to control over the
“? 7population.
The Ministry of Revenue ordered these proposals to be implemented 
but some changes were made, either immediately in the ministerial 
order or later in the actual introduction. These changes are recorded 
in the DMHD, MHY and Guo-ohao di-an—hwi. The latter states that the 
granary association was to hold monthly meetings under the direction 
of a s/ze-director (she-zheng). During these meetings the Precepts of 
Population Instruction were read and the people were commended or 
admonished for their behaviour.28 In the DMHD the s/ze-head (she-tou) 
presided together with the s/ze-director over these meetings to be held 
at the beginning of each month. If any of the members failed to 
comply, then in serious cases they were reported to the officials and 
in minor cases were to pay a fine to the welfare granary. With 
regard to the size of the granary associations the sources are in 
disagreement. The Guo-ohao dian-hui follows the SL and gives the size 
as 200-300 families, while both the DMHD and the MHY give the size as 
20-30.30 Which of the four sources is the most reliable is impossible 
to say. There may be errors in printing which were then perpetuated 
in the two traditions. Hoshi Ayao puts forward the explanation that 
the SL tradition was mostly concerned with the establishment of self- 
government in principle, while the DMHD tradition recorded actual
27 SL 1529:3:jia-zheng.
28 Guo-ohao dian-hui 101/13.
29 DMHD 20/23.
30 DMHD 22/51; MHY 56/1077.
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3 1implementation. This explanation may be correct, as groups of! 30-50 
households has often been regarded as the most convenient size for 
effective local self-government.
The situation in Zhangqiu District in the Wan-li period may help 
to shed some further light on the origin of this discrepancy.
Zhangqiu had 103 H-gia. For welfare granaries the district was 
divided into 30 she each with one granary under the supervision of a 
gong-zheng. The gong-zheng also supervised 410 xiang-yue which each 
had officers to conduct ceremonies and keep records. So each granary 
association was on average based upon three and a half li-gia or 
perhaps, given the uncertainty of the li-gia households registration, 
between 300 and 600 households. This would leave each xiang-yue with 
perhaps 30-50 households.32 The DMHD gives 30-50 families as the size 
of the granary associations but does not clarify whether each 
association was to have one granary or whether each association was 
simply to be the basis for the monthly or bi-monthly meetings at which 
the members contributed the grain to be stored in the welfare granary. 
In the latter case a granary might have been established for several 
associations. Whatever the explanation is, we have to accept that two 
traditions apparently existed from 1529 with regard to the size of 
granary associations. This may have left some discretion to the local 
officials in the implementation of the policy and may be the 
explanation for the situation in Zhangqiu.
From 1529 the bao-jia and xiang-yue together with the welfare 
granaries were part of central government policy but they were 
apparently not introduced extensively during the Jia-jing period.
Most local sources only report them in the Long-qing and Wan-li 
periods and this is definitely true for Jinan Prefecture. According 
to Sakai Tadao the Lii-shi xiang-yue continued in the Jia-jing period 
but from the later years of the reign the Precepts of Popular
3 3Instruction and the Six Maxims became predominant.
31 Iloshi Ayao, "Mindai no yoso to shaso", Tdyoshi Kenkyu 18 (1959), 
133.
32 Zhangqiu xian-zhi 1596/14/97.
33 Sakai Tadao, Chügoku zensho no kenkyu, (Tokyo, 1951), p.44.
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3. The xiang-gia of LÜ Kun
One of the better known systems of xiang-yue and bao-gia in the 
Wan-li period was that devised and introduced in 1592 by Lii Kun while 
he was governor of Shanxi Province. One of the reasons this system is 
well-known is because Lii Xun's description of it was included in his 
Shi-zheng-iu which was used during the Qing dynasty as a guide to 
local administration. However, regardless of how widely Lii Kun's 
system was applied in the Ming dynasty it must be taken into 
consideration here as Lii Kun had been administration circuit intendant 
in Jinan Prefecture from 1587 to 1589, immediately before his transfer 
to Shanxi first as surveillance commissioner and later as governor.
So local development in Jinan could have been influenced by his ideas 
or these ideas could have been influenced by his experience in Jinan, 
or, most likely, a mixture of the two.
Lii Kun' s system was an amalgamation of the xiccng-yue and bao-gia. 
This system was based upon a ii which had to have 100 families.
Whether in practice the ii corresponded to the ti-gia is doubtful but 
it was important that the member families of the xiang-gia (as it was 
abbreviated) should all be mutual neighbours with no members of other 
xiang-gia interspersed among them.34 Each xiang-gia would have one 
director (yue-zheng), one deputy (yue-fu), one instructor (yue-giang) 
and one adviser (yue-shi). The first two were the leaders of the 
X'iang-yue and rhe two latter were in charge of administrative and 
educational duries. The families were divided into groups of ten 
called gia. Tiese ten families would select one jia-leader (jia- 
zhang).35 The basic mutual surveillance unit to which a family 
belonged was tie ’four neighbours’ {si-tin), a system which has a long 
tradition in Chinese history. If any member of the xzang-gza did any­
thing wrong then the neighbours on the four sides were to admonish him; 
if he did not repent they would report this to the j-fa-leader who 
would report ti the yue-director to have it recorded in the Book of 
Misdeeds. If a member did anything meritorious then the neighbours 
were to report it in the same fashion and it would be entered in the 
Book of Merits. 36
34 SZL 5/4.
35 Ibid. 5/2.
36 Ibid. 5/3.
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Guidelines regulated the relationship between the government 
officials and the officers of the xiang-jia so that officials or other 
government personnel could not harass the members of the xiang-jia.
It was in particular forbidden to ask the officers of the xiang-jia to 
perform any outside services.37 Each xiang-yue was to hold two 
meetings per month, on the second and the sixteenth, in a building 
large enough to accommodate all 100 members. This could be a temple, 
a public building or a private home. During the meeting a tablet with 
the Six Maxims was to be displayed at one end of the room with the 
officers of the xiang-yue seated on each side, while the other members 
sat in rows along each side of the hall. There would be singing 
during the meeting and the j'fa-leaders were to step forward and report 
on good and bad behaviour. The members concerned were to be praised 
or admonished and their deeds were to be entered in the appropriate 
book.3 8
Some flexibility was allowed in the organization of the xiang-jia. 
First of all if men suitable for the four positions could not be found 
within one X'iang-j'ia then four persons would be selected from another 
X'iang-j'ia so that 200 families formed two X'iang-j'ia each with four 
officers with the appropriate qualifications. If the number of 
families was not 100 or 200, then an official was to re-arrange the 
xiang-jia but some flexibility was allowed and it was not permitted to 
include in a xiang-jia families who lived at a distance too great for
3 9a convenient performance of the duties.
The officials in subprefectures and districts were to personally 
examine the books of merits and misdeeds. If the officials discovered 
that the xiang-yue officers or the 'four neighbours' had not reported 
as was their duty then these would be severely censured and punished. 
Self-government institutions were also to participate in this general 
surveillance of the xiang-yue. At the subprefecture or district town 
as well as in each subdistrict, two wealthy and honest persons were to 
be appointed as gong-zheng with the duty of administering the xiang- 
yue within their area. Lti Kun commenced his section on the gong-zheng
37 
3 8 
3 9
Ibid. 5/4.
Ibid. 5/4-5, 14. 
Ibid. 5/5.
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with a description of the decline of the lao-ren. The latter had 
previously assisted the administration in the subprefectures and 
districts but by this time they had been degraded to mere tax 
collectors in the li-gia, yamen runners, etc. So in his view the 
gong-zheng were successors to the ’elders’ {lao-ren). However he does 
not say \^hether the lao-ren were Zi-elders or some other elders at the 
subdistrict level. He says that at the beginning of the dynasty two 
lao-ren were appointed to the Shen-ming and Jing-shan pavilions which 
could have been established at li-jia (or li), subdistrict and/or 
district levels. From the context it is however clear that he was 
thinking of levels below the districts, i.e. subdistricts or Z-i-jia.40
The members of the xiang-yue were first of all landowners and 
houseowners in the area. Gentry families (jin-shen), which must refer 
to those with a ranking official in the family, and families with 
licentiates or bachelors did not have to enrol in the xiang-yue. 
Households in show business (yue-hu), domestic servants (jia~nu), 
hired labourers (yong-gong) and tenants were not allowed to join the 
xiang-yue. Together with visitors on temporary stay they were under 
the control of landowners or houseowners. All other labourers who 
performed duties which had formerly been provided as corvee, such as 
artisans, cooks, runners, etc., were allowed to join the xiang-yue if 
they had originally been registered in the district or subprefecture 
or had been residents for a long time and if they took the pledge of 
the members of the xiang-yue.41
The xiang-yue had certain judicial powers in petty cases which 
were not subject to heavy punishment, such as the cangue or banishment, 
and for which no formal accusation had been made to the district 
officials. Any misconduct was of course entered in the Book of 
Misdeeds which each month was examined by the officials so they could 
monitor improper activities and the way in which the xiang-yue dealt 
with them. The punishments allowed for the xiang-yue were reprimand 
and exclusion from the community. A sign written in large characters 
was to be nailed to the left side of the offender’s gate giving his 
name and the activities of which he was guilty, such as unfilial
4 0
4 1
Ibid. 5/6-7.
Ibid. 5/2, 8, 10.
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behaviour, deceit, theft, gambling, etc. The offender was to attend
the meetings of the xiang-yue to hear the Precepts but otherwise the
people in his neighbourhood were to have no dealings with him. Only
when the other members of the xiang-yue were convinced that the
offender had sincerely repented were they to give a bond of joint
responsibility and guarantee that he had reformed. The sign would
4 2then be removed from his gate.
The surety function of these self-government units was to be 
under the direction of a bao-director (bao-zheng) if the xiang-yue had 
100 households. If there were 150 households a deputy (bao~fu) was 
also appointed.43 These officers were systematically to investigate 
the coming and going of the people of the xiccng-yue as well as other 
people from the district and those who were under the control of land- 
owners or houseowners. They were to report to the officials on 
robbery and with the assistance of the other members of the xiang-yue 
provide protection for those who had been robbed. Each xiang-jia was 
to employ an instructor to drill the men between eighteen and sixty 
years (sui) of age in the use of weapons, and the members were to keep 
the weapons at home ready for use. In order to perform their duties 
the £>ao-director and his deputy were to be physically strong men from 
wealthy families.44
4. Xiang-yue and bao-jia in Jinan Prefecture
Both xiang-yue and bao-jia are reported in many districts of the 
prefecture, so they were apparently widespread in the period. The 
xiang-yue is treated most frequently in the gazetteers at least in 
terms of separate headings. In some of these cases they are combined 
with the bao-jia. Indirect evidence for the widespread use of bao-jia 
is provided by Song Ying-chang who had extensive administrative 
experience in Shandong, including surveillance commissioner c. 1565,
42 Ibid. 5/10.
43 Ibid. 5/12. In Elmquist's translation, if there were 150 house­
holds an additional bao-zheng and one bao-fu were to be appointed.
This is however a misinterpretation. Elmquist, p.326.
SZL 5/12-13.44
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prefect of Jinan c. 1580 and governor c. 1590-1592.45 As Vice- 
minister of War he wrote in a despatch to the governor of 1593:1:10 
that he was afraid the conscription of able bodied men (zhuang-ding) 
from the bao-yia of each circuit could not continue.46 This was a 
function which could previously have been demanded from the li-yia,so 
it is possible that Song for defence purposes renamed the Zi-yia as 
bao-yia. This would correspond to a development in Boping District, 
Dongchang Prefecture, where in 1586 the li-yia had been changed to 
bao-yia and the xiang-she to xiang-yue .47
The first reference to the bao-yia in Jinan Prefecture is in 
Putai District. Under the heading of defence in the 1592 gazetteer it 
is reported that the bao-yia were introduced in 1566. They did 
however not last long and were re-introduced in 1588 with 102 bao-yia. 
These were identical to the xiang-yue. 4 8 The bao-yia was also 
reported without reference to the xiang-yue in Binzhou Subprefecture 
in early Wan-li. The 1583 gazetteer mentions in a general description 
of the li-yia system and the elders that the bao-yia had spread to 
this subprefecture. The result had been a constant improvement in 
bandit prevention and in settling vagrants.49 The bao-yia system must 
have been in operation a few years before 1583 but perhaps in view of 
the experience of Putai not for long. Under the heading ’subdistricts 
and small towns’ (xiang-zhen) in the same gazetteer it is stated that 
the small towns were places where people lived together for more 
convenient defence and trade and that the bao-yia system had recently 
brought about more law-abiding conduct in the subdistricts and small 
towns. The subprefecture had in 1583 16 of these small towns50 and 
there were probably 173 bao-yia.51
The xiang-yue have been found in almost half of the districts and 
subprefectures of Jinan. Their introduction in Zichuan is directly
45 Jinan fu-zhi 1839/25/3, 26/4, 27/5.
46 Jing-lüe fu-guo yao-bian 5/21.
47 Kuribayashi (1971), p.286.
48 Putai xian-zhi 1592/2151, 4/6,
49 Binzhou zhi 1583/2/42.
50 Ibid. 1/34-36.
51 Ibid. 1701/1/7.
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• • 5  2connected with the name of Lii Run and he must have exercised direct 
or indirect influence on their introduction in many of the other 
districts, as this usually took place in the period 1587-1596. The 
course of this introduction was as follows:53
District or Year of Number of Number of
Subprefecture Introduction xiang-yue li-Qia
Xingcheng 1586 - 1589
Pingyuan 1587 155 46
Putai 1588 102 59
Wuding (xiang-yue pavilions mentioned in 1588 gazetteer)
Zichuan (introduced by Lii Run) 93 63
Linyi 1590 83 32
Laiwu 1592 - 1595
Qingcheng 1592 - 1596
Zhangqiu before 1596 410 103
Xintai mentioned 1615
Lingxian before 1618
Qidong (apparently in existence but source unreliable)
Taian (possibly in existence)
The xiang-yue were introduced into Pingyuan in 1587 after the
circuit intendants in the [Jinan] administrative circuit and the Wu-De 
surveillance circuit had investigated the conditions in the district 
and had obtained the permission of the governor and the regional 
inspector. The district was divided into 155 xiang-yue, each with one 
2/ue-director, one deputy, one instructor and one adviser. The xiang- 
yue were to hold two monthly meetings where the Six Maxims were read 
out and explained together with a summary of the Ming code and a chart 
giving examples of filial behaviour. After this, good and bad 
behaviour was to be recorded in the respective registers. The seal­
holding official in the district would choose the most spectacular 
incidents from these registers and record them in district registers
52 Ziehuan xian-zhi 1602/19/2.
53 Xincheng xian-zhi 1693/12/17; Pingyuan xian-zhi 1590/1/27;
Putai xian-zhi 1592/4/5; Ending zhou-zhi 1588/4/7; Ziehuan xian-zhi 
1602/19/2; Linyi xian-zhi 1837/4/13; Laiwu xian-zhi 1673/5/25; 
Qingoheng xian-zhi 1612/1/40; Zhangqiu xian-zhi 1596/14/97; Xintai 
xian-zhi 1659/6/25; Lingxian zhi 1845/16/29; Qidong xian-zhi 
1685/2/36; Taian zhou-zhi 1671/2/8.
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which each season were sent to the circuits for inspection.
The officers in the xiang-yue in Pingyuan correspond to the 
system of Lii Kun. Variations are however recorded in contemporary 
sources. The xiang-yue of Putai had one ritualist (yue-zan) in 
addition to the director, the deputy, the instructor and the adviser.55 
In Zhangqiu each xiang-yue had one adviser, one master (shuai) and one 
instructor. The 398 bao-jia of Zhangqiu had jta-leaders and xiao-jia 
as officers. The families were divided into groups of ten called pai 
for the purpose of defence. The xiang-yue were for education and the 
gong-zheng were in addition deputed by the officials to settle minor 
matters such as arrears in payment of debts or disputes over fields 
and houses.5 6
In Xincheng the xiang-yue and bao-jia were introduced by 
Magistrate Zhao Wen-bing between 1586 and 1589. The functions of the 
two organizations were as usual. However the xiang-yue together with 
the di-fang had to report on thieves in the village.57 This appears 
to be a new function for the xiang-yue and at the same time the 
di-fang or 'local constable' is introduced. The di-fang was in the 
Qing dynasty a part of the local self-government system and had 
largely the same functions as provided in the bao-jia system.58 The 
xiang-yue in Xincheng also became part of the taxation system. In 
cases of arrears in tax payments the runners (mu-zao-li) would order 
[officers of] the xiang-yue to go to the gate of each offender and to 
draw up registers stipulating time limits for payments to facilitate 
investigations. If anybody had not paid by these time limits then the 
yamen police (kuai-shou) was sent out to compel them to pay. The 
xiang-yue were not directly involved in the money transactions as had
been the case with the li-jia, and in the commemoration eulogy for the
5 9magistrate this was praised as benevolent to the people.
54 Pingyuan xian-zhi 1590/1/27, 1749/4/10.
55 Putai xian-zhi 1592/4/5.
56 Zhangqiu xian-zhi 1596/14/97.
57 Xincheng xian-zhi 1673/12/17.
58 T ’ung-tsu Ch’ii, Local Government in China under the Ch3 ing 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1962), p.3.
59 Xincheng xian-zhi 1673/12/18.
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Participation in tax collection procedures was not among the normal 
duties of the xiang-yue so we are left to wonder whether in spite of 
this eulogy such involvement would not in the long run lead to misuse 
of the xiang-yue.
The information given in the gazetteers on the bao-jia and xiang- 
yue in Jinan Prefecture is generally short but appears to be reliable, 
as much of it is in contemporary sources. Lii Kun was no doubt 
instrumental in developing this aspect of local self-government in the 
prefecture but he was probably not the only influence. It is further­
more worth noting that although the provincial authorities were 
apparently consulted on the introduction of the xiang-yue and bao-jia 
they did not enforce a uniform system.
SHE-SCHOOLS
Together with the introduction of the xiang-yue and bao-jia
attempts were also made during this period to revive the local she-
schools (she-xue). The she-schools were a heritage from the Yuan
dynasty and in the Ming they were ordered to be introduced in 1375 all 
over the empire with one school for each fifty families.60 If any 
schools were established following this order they did not fare too 
well, probably because the officials interfered with their operation 
in improper ways, so when a new order to establish she-schools went out 
in 1383 the officials were forbidden to meddle with the affairs of the 
schools. These were then under total self-government control. This 
was reversed in 1436 when the schools again came under full official 
control and this seems to have been common policy for the rest of the 
dynasty.6 2
Several orders from the government to establish she-schools
60 SL 1375:l:ding-hai; Wang Lan-yin, "Ming-dai zhi she-xue, I", 
Shi-da Yue-kan 21 (1935), 44; Tilemann Grimm, Erziehung und Politik 
im konfuzianischen China der Ming Zeit (1368-1644), (Hamburg, 1960), 
pp.139-144.
61 SL 1383:10:geng-si.
62 Wang Lan-yin, "Ming-dai zhi she-xue, II", Shi-da Yue-kan 25 
(1936), 84 ff.
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during the fifteenth century are recorded in Jinan gazetteers so the 
lifespan of these schools was apparently not long.63 This is perhaps 
easy to understand, as the schools demanded money expenditure or at 
least some effort both by the students and by the communities 
responsible for the operation of the schools. There is evidence that 
many families did not want or could not afford to have their sons to 
go to classes, so most schools probably never operated effectively 
for any length of time.64 The purpose of the schools was primarily 
the moral education of the population and instruction was mainly in 
the Great Proclamation of the Hong-wu emperor {Da-Gao), the Ming 
Code, and in some places also in some of the classics.65 The general 
tendency became to have only one or a limited number of schools in 
each district66 so that only a limited number of boys had the 
opportunity to get this instruction. According to some local 
gazetteers the brightest students from the s/ze-schools could 
advance to the Confucian schools (ru-xue)
She-schools were probably established during the Hong-wu period 
in each ii (or ti-gia) in the districts of Jinan Prefecture. The 1533 
edition of the Shandong provincial gazetteer still reported she- 
schools in each Zi in nineteen subprefectures and districts. Three of 
these also had a she—school in the district town. The remaining 
districts only reported one s/ze-school and these were all with the 
exception of Zhangqiu in the district town.68 We cannot be sure that 
the schools actually operated in 1533 but the gazetteer shows that 
they had been established at some time and that in 1533 remains of 
the schools such as land, buildings or a tablet still existed.
The schools had probably been initiated in the Hong-wu period althoug 
the evidence is not conclusive. Three Jinan gazetteers recorded that 
the schools had been ordered to be established during this period but 
all three are Qing editions so they may have relied on central 
government sources for this information.68 In Changqing District the
63 Linyi xian-zhi 1837M/12; Changqing xiqn-zhi 1835/8/8.
64 Grimm, pp. lhO-lkl.
65 Ibid., p. ll+2; Wang (1936 ), p. 110.
66 Wang (1935 ) , pp. 5^-80.
67 Wang (1936 ) , p. 110.
68 Shandong tong-zhi 1533/16/2-7. Note 69 over.
s/2ß-schools were established in each ii at the beginning of the Hong­
zhi period but this does not preclude the establishment of similar 
schools earlier.70
The tendency in the sixteenth century to have only one s/ze-school 
in a district is clear in Zhanhua where the she-school was rebuilt 
c. 1556 for forty to fifty students aged thirteen to fourteen years. 
They studied ceremonies and certain unspecified books, were examined 
twice a month in the Ming-lun Hall and could advance to the Confucian 
school.71
In the Wan-li period increasing attention was paid to the she-
schools when Lii Kun was circuit intendant, so it is reasonable to
assume that this was connected with his initiatives for local self-
government. In the SZL he has a section on the revival of the she-
schools. He prescribed that the teachers in the s/ze-schools were to
be chosen from men above the age of forty who were honest and
interested in learning although previous education was not required.
These men were instructed in the Xiao-xue and Xiao-jing and in writing
and pronunciation. If after one year they were proficient in these
subjects they were to be appointed teachers in the she-schools. Four
schools were established in the district town and one for each 200
families in the countryside. The J^a-leader was to select a number of
students between the age of eight and sixteen to attend school from
the tenth month to the third month of the following year. Lii Kun
continued his instructions with detailed regulations for the conduct
7 2of the students in the schools.
In Jinan the establishment of she-schools along the lines 
described by Lii Kun was concentrated in the period 1587-1591. Linyi 
established 83 schools connected with the xiang-yue and the she- 
granaries. Pingyuan had 40 schools and Zhangqiu more than 10, while
69 Binzh&u zhi 1701/2/60; Le'iing xian-zhi 1762/3/32; Linyi xian- 
zhi 1837/4/13.
70 Chongqing xian-zhi 1835/8/8. The dating to the Hong-zhi period 
may be an unlikely but not impossible error for the Hong-wu period.
For one example of such an error see Ch. I note 72.
71 Zhanhua xian-zhi 1619/2/35.
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in Putai there were 75 schools with a total of 800 students. Leling 
considered the re-establishment of the old s/ze-schools in 1591 but the 
result is unclear.73 It is possible that similar s/ze-schools were 
established in other districts during this period. Such an assumption 
may be supported by the fact that in three of the above cases the 
gazetteers were compiled in the years immediately following the 
establishment of the schools. However some of the other gazetteers 
record establishment of schools in the period after 1600, so if any 
noticeable activity had taken place during the 1588-1591 period in 
districts where such records exist it would most likely have been 
noted in these gazetteers. A tentative conclusion must therefore be 
that the sTze-schools of the kind prescribed by Lii Run were not 
established in a majority of the subprefectures and districts of Jinan.
The she-schools established after 1600 were on a less ambitious 
scale than those of the previous period. Only Lingxian is recorded to 
have set up a considerable number, i.e. twenty. Deping established 
one she-school in c. 1605, Xintai two schools in 1613, Yangxin rebuilt 
eight schools in the same year and in Licheng there may have been ten 
schools during this period but no details of their establishment are 
available.7 4
The expenses of the s/ze-schools were to some degree the 
responsibility of the local self-government system but also involved 
official funds and control. In Putai the schools were supported with 
grain from the welfare granaries and in Linyi they were closely 
connected with such granaries and the xiang-yue. In Pingyuan a fee 
was probably paid by students from well-to-do families, while the fees 
for poor students were paid by giving the teachers land which had 
belonged to absconders. The school in Deping was supported by a plot 
of school-land. School-land is also reported in other districts but 
in most cases the income from such land went towards supporting 
academies (shu-yuan), so we -cannot assume 'that the she-schools 
were usually endowed with such funds. Finally the she-school in
73 Pingyuan xian-zhi 1590/7/26; Putai xian-zhi 1592/4/5; Zhangqiu 
xian-zhi 1596/21/74; Leling xian-zhi T762/3/32; Linyi xian-zhi 
1837/4/13.
74 Lingxian zhi 1845/16/28; Deping xian-zhi 1796/2/7, 5/10; Xintai 
xian-zhi 1659/2/3; Yangxin xian-zhi 1682/2/11, 10/19.
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Lingxian was supported from official funds.75
The revival of the s/2e-schools as part of the local self- 
government system was clearly a policy in the prefecture during the 
Wan-li period but serious efforts were concentrated in the short 
period c. 1587-1591. As they only appear to have been introduced in 
relatively few districts where they were probably short-lived, this 
policy cannot be described as successful.
WELFARE GRANARIES
1. Background
Together with the general interest in the 1580s in local self- 
government institutions such as the xiang-yue came a new wave of 
initiatives for the re-introduction of welfare granaries in Jinan 
Prefecture. These granaries were established at the subprefecture and 
district levels as well as at the subdistrict and lower divisional 
levels. The main purpose of these granaries was to store grain or 
other foodstuffs in abundant years to prepare for lean years so that 
famines could be eliminated or at least alleviated. To prepare for 
effective famine relief the element of distance was very important in 
the organization of the granaries. They had to be located so that the 
people to whom grain was distributed did not have to travel long
7 6distances which could exhaust them in their undernourished state.
As the people first affected by famines were those who did not have 
the capability to store grain in good years, the granary organization 
also had an element of social welfare policy.
Welfare granaries have a long tradition in Chinese history and in 
the Ming they were instituted shortly after the founding of the 
dynasty. The first empire-wide order seems to have been the 
instruction of 1377 to establish ever-normal granaries (ohang-plng- 
cang) in all districts. These granaries were not primarily welfare 
granaries. Their main function was to keep the price of staple foods
7 5 
76
See notes 73 and 74 above. 
Hoshi (1959), p.129.
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relatively even. In good years the officials were to buy grain and 
then re-sell it in bad years. Indirectly this served the interests 
of the poor but an element of economic policy was also involved and 
these granaries could be viewed as part of the general policy for 
agricultural recovery.
The early ever-normal granaries were not effective for famine 
relief,either because they were not established at all or because they 
were inadequate as a relief measure. After a famine in Shandong in 
1388 an order was issued to the Ministry of Revenue that it should 
make funds available for the purchase of grain. In the districts this 
grain was to be stored in four granaries built in places with high 
population concentration so that people with surplus grain could 
conveniently sell to these granaries. The official was to lock up the 
granaries when the grain had been received and put them under the 
guard of rich people. Grain was only distributed in bad years as a 
relief measure, so these granaries appear to have been the first real 
welfare granaries for emergency situations.78
The granaries ordered in 1388 were probably identical to the so- 
called emergency granaries (yu-bei-cang). In the 1583 edition of the 
Binzhou gazetteer it is stated that in the past each subdistrict had
7 9an emergency granary which had been instituted in the Hong-wu period. 
In Wuding Subprefecture there had also been emergency granaries in 
each subdistrict and these had been abolished in 1440. That sub­
prefecture also has records of ever-normal granaries which had been 
abolished by 1588, probably some time previously as the ground was now 
used for a horse market. References to emergency granaries are 
given in the gazetteers of other districts but no details are 
available except that they had been abolished by the time when the 
gazetteers were compiled during the Qing dynasty. With a view to the 
method of compilation of the gazetteers we can however assume that 
these granaries had existed in many if not all districts during the 
Hong-wu period. As pointed out by Shimizu Taiji there is no reason to
77 Hoshi Ayayo, Mindai sown, no kenkyü (Tokyo, 1963), p.453.
78 Ibid, p.454.
79 Binzhou zhi 1583/1/27.
80 Wuding zhou-zhi 1588/4/5.
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believe Lhat these granaries were' only established on the order of the 
central government, as the people were probably anxious to establish 
some kind of relief granaries which could then later be formalized and 
regularized by the government. Such a time could have been that of 
the government order of 1388.01
During the Hong-wu period the emergency granaries were to some 
extent under the administration of local self-government, as the 
distribution of the grain was determined by the magistrate in 
consultation with the elders. This element of self-government may 
have been a weakness in the system, as several instances of mismanage­
ment of the granaries were reported to the central government. The 
problem was that wealthy households, some of whom had to guard the
o ogranaries, could illegally borrow grain without returning it. The 
supervision of the officials was apparently not sufficiently strict 
at this time to ensure that such malpractices in the self-government 
system could not occur. No order to abolish these granaries was 
issued as a result of these complaints. After all the general policy 
of the government at that time was to make use of self-government of 
institutions outside the immediate vicinity of the yamen as was seen 
with the li-jia and the Z-^-elders.
Even with such records of mismanagement the emergency granaries 
may have served their purpose for some years but they would probably 
have broken down sooner or later as did the other non-fiscal local 
self-government institutions. Such a process may for the emergency 
granaries in Shandong and surrounding provinces have been accelerated 
by the civil wars of the Jing-nan Incident. Orders were issued in 
1403 and 1404 to distribute grain from official granaries, so the 
emergency granaries were clearly not able to cope with the misery in 
these provinces caused by the war. But that was probably beyond 
their expected capability. However the emergency granaries were 
apparently not effectively restored until the Zheng-tong period at 
which time they came under stronger official management and were 
mostly relocated in the cities. High officials were sent out to the
81 Hoshi (1963), p.454.
82 Ibid. p.464.
83 Ibid. p.456-457.
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different parts of the empire in 1440 to implement a relief policy 
along these lines. This coincides with the abolition of the sub­
district emergency granaries in Wuding. The subprefectural town still 
had an emergency granary in 1588.85
The strengthening of official control over the granaries did not 
mean that the self-government element was completely removed. But the 
administrative procedures for supervision were elaborated and the mere 
relocation of the granaries to the vicinity of the yamen would have 
shifted the balance greatly towards official control. The government 
paid regular attention to the administration of the granaries in the 
years following 1440°6 but no details have been found for Jinan 
Prefecture. An emergency granary was established in Qidong District 
shortly after 1512 probably in response to needs which had arisen 
after the large bandit incursions of the preceding years. This 
granary may also have been built as a replacement for one which had 
been destroyed by the bandits, so no supposition can be made that the 
granary did not exist before that time.
The emergency granary under official control was not without its 
problems. Dishonest officials could oppress the people by demanding 
grain in excess of the normal tax paid to these granaries. Even if 
this did not happen the people could easily have regarded the 
granaries as potential means of oppression. This would weaken their 
basis of support and according to the Guo-chao dian-hui most of the 
emergency granaries had been abolished in Shandong by 1540.88 This is 
consistent with the lack of information on the granaries during this 
period in the gazetteers and is to some extent confirmed by the SDJHL. 
Between the years 1559 and 1565 several instances were recorded where 
the weigher corvee (dou-ji) at the emergency granaries was reduced; 
in 1559 among other places in Qidong, in 1563 in Binzhou and in 1565 
in Yanzhou Prefecture. These reductions may indicate that the
84 Ibid, p.462.
85 Wuding zhou-zhi 1588/4/5.
86 Hoshi (1963), p.467.
87 Qidong xian-zhi 1617/3/5.
88 Hoshi (1963), p.469.
89 SDJHL 8/14, 41, 57.
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granaries had not been entirely abolished but they are no proof of 
this, since the corvee services could have continued as a source of 
revenue after the actual work at the granaries had been discontinued. 
But they are a good indication that the granary organization was now 
in decline. The emergency granary in Changqing District was extended 
both in the Jia-jing and Long-qing periods so this cannot have been 
universal.
The response in the sixteenth century to this decline of the
emergency granaries was a revival of other forms of granaries, notably
those under local self-government control. The decisive change in
government policy was probably the approval of Wang Ting-xiang’s
memorial in 1529 concerning granaries and their accompanying
association (hui or she). She-granaries had existed in some parts of
the empire from the beginning of the dynasty. They are reported to
have existed during the Hong-wu period in Dengzhou Prefecture,
Shandong, and in other parts during the fifteenth century. A major
consideration in the establishment of she-granaries —  often referred
to as she-granaries of Zhu-Xi —  was that they were spread more widely
over the subprefecture, or district than were the emergency granaries
9 1and thus more accessible for people in need.
The Zhu-Xi method for the she-granaries had been codified in 1181 
when he was circuit intendant for grain, tea and salt administration 
in the eastern circuit of Liangzhe. In his method the people were 
each year registered in the bao-jia and grain could only be 
distributed to members of these bao-jia. The officers of the bao-jia 
were responsible for assessing the amount of grain to be distributed 
to each member and for identifying them during the distribution. The 
granaries were at the level of the subdistricts (xiang) and the actual 
distribution was under supervision of a reliable official sent out by 
the district administration. Grain was normally distributed as loans 
in the spring before the new harvest and these loans had to be repaid 
during the autumn with an interest of 3% to cover wastage and
9 2administration expenses.
90 Changqing xian-zhi 1835/3/12.
91 Hoshi (1963), pp.471-472.
92 Elmquist, pp.95 ff.
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The granaries proposed in 1529 by Wang Ting-xiang were called 
yi-cang but Lhey must have been what was normally termed she-cang in 
the Ming dynasty. This confusion stems from changes in the use of the 
term yi-cang. In the Sui and early Tang dynasties this term was used 
for welfare granaries at levels below the district, while in later 
Tang and Song it was used for welfare granaries established in 
district towns. These were more similar to the emergency granaries of 
the Ming after 1440. The confusion in Ming is evident, as one source 
mentions yu-bei-yi-cang, while another source states that the yi-cang 
were also called she-cang. Hoshi Ayao concludes that the yi-cang of 
the Ming were really either emergency granaries or she-granaries and 
dismisses them as a separate category.93 I generally agree with this 
conclusion but as will be seen later the term yi-cang was used in 
Jinan Prefecture during the Wan-li period for some special granaries.
2. Granaries in the Wan-li period
The year 1529 is taken by Hoshi Ayao to be the turning point in 
government policy towards granaries but from his own work — mostly 
with government sources but also some gazetteers — he also concludes 
that this policy did not have any widespread effect before the end of 
the Jia-jing period. This is certainly supported by the evidence in 
Jinan Prefecture where the only development between 1529 and the 
Wan-li period was the previously mentioned extension of the emergency 
granary in Changqing District.
Considerable granary activity in the districts of the prefecture 
is reported from 1576 and for the rest of the Wan-li period with 
regard to yu-bei-cang, chang-ping-cang > she-cang, yi-cang and bao-chi- 
cang. In Hoshi's opinion the emergency granaries were not part of the 
policy to establish granaries in the Long-^qing and Wan-li periods.
They are however reported in Jinan and their nature is worth exploring. 
Binzhou, which in the Hong-wu period had one emergency granary in each 
subdistrict , had later changed this to one granary to the north of the 
subprefectural town with four storehouses which could hold 8,000 dan
9 3 Hoshi (1963), pp.478 ff.
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of grain. In 1582 a further ten granaries were built for the storage 
of over 3,000 dan of grain. The grain for these granaries was 
provided partly from purchase in years of good harvests and partly 
from fines paid instead of punishments. In this way more grain was 
accumulated than ever before. The year 1583 was one of bad harvest 
and grain was needed for relief. Apparently this was provided in the 
form of loans to the inhabitants of the subprefecture which had to be 
repaid with a small interest.95 This function of the emergency 
granaries with several smaller granaries perhaps spread over the sub­
prefectures seems to be following the practice of the s/ze-granaries 
and they should perhaps be regarded as the same. But no information 
is given about participation of local self-government and as this 
appears to have been an essential part of the s/ze-granaries it is 
perhaps appropriate to describe them as emergency granaries.
An emergency granary is reported in Dezhou Subprefecture in 1576. 
In Putai District the emergency granary was rebuilt in 1574 and
enlarged in 1589. The granary in Qingcheng was renovated and enlarged
9 6in 1576; the same happened to the Pingyuan granary in 1582 and 1588. 
According to the 1586 edition of the Shanghe gazetteer, the emergency 
granary was expanded in that year with two new granaries close to the 
district administrative buildings but in the 1836 edition the events 
of 1586 are described as the establishment of an ever-normal granary, 
so there is some confusion as to the nature of these granaries. In 
Jiyang District emergency and bao-chi-granarles were probably built in 
1602 and the emergency granary in Xintai was restored in 1613 as part 
of a general policy in the district for building granaries.98 The 
evidence presented here cannot be regarded as conclusive. The term 
yu-bei-cang clearly survived in the prefecture during the Wan-li 
period but the nature of the granaries may have changed. In the two 
most informative cases —  Binzhou and Shanghe —  the gazetteers were 
compiled the same year or the year after the activities concerning the
94 Huang, p.249.
95 Binzhou zhi 1583/1/27.
96 Dezhou zhi 1576/2/2; Putai xian-zhi 1592/4/8; Pingyuan xian-zhi 
1590/1/6; Qingcheng xian-zhi 1612/1/7.
97 Shanghe xian-zhi 1586/2/12, 1836/3/25.
98 Jiyang xian-zhi 1765/2/8; Xintai xiccn-zhi 1659/2/3.
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granaries took place. This could indicate that the officials and 
compilers of the gazetteer had not yet made up their minds as to what 
name the granary should rightly be called in view of the general 
granary policy. So the contention of Hoshi Ayao may be correct in 
spite of the survival of the term yu-bez-cang.
Ever-normal granaries are besides Shanghe also reported in 
Changqing District in 1592 but no details are given. They are also 
mentioned in 1587 in Xincheng but the termonology used in this 
district is confusing, since the function of the ganary is closely 
connected with the xzang-yue and lending of grain. This ever-normal 
granary is described in a commemoration tablet for Magistrate Zhao 
Wen-bing who established the granary, but in the same edition of the 
gazetteer the name bao-chz is. used for the granary established in 
1587. So a description of this particular institution properly 
belongs to the section below.
3. Xzang- yue and granaries
The s/ze-granaries in Jinan were in all recorded instances 
established at least after 1583 and probably after 1587. This of 
course indicates that Lü Kun was influential in introducing the 
granary organization in connection with the xzang-yue,so it is reason­
able to describe what he had to say about granary administration.
The SZL does not contain any section entirely devoted to the she- 
granaries. Regulations for such local granaries and the involvement 
of the xzang-yue in relief works are included in a lengthy instruction 
on management of grain storage — including directions for construction 
of ventilation of the storehouses, for the measurement utensils to be 
used and prohibitions against the use of open fire for lights. No 
less than 10,000 dan of grain was to be stored in the district town 
and no less than 500 dan in each market town in the four subdistricts. 
The grain was procured from four sources: payments in lieu of
punishments, fines, purchases, and inducements to donate grain. It was 
apparently loaned to the people in spring and returned in autumn. The 
interest rate is not stated. The rate in private loans of a similar 
kind could be as high as 50% or 100%, so the official interest rates
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were probably considerably less. The high interest on private loans 
did not prevent these loans from being repaid, while this was not done 
with the official loans. This was a problem of enforcing the repay­
ment, so Lii Kun ordered that the officials who were in charge of the 
granaries could not be relieved of their duties until all grain had 
been returned.
For storage of grain among the people, in addition to that held 
in the granaries described above, Lii Kun encouraged the formation of 
association granaries (hui-cang). The association was to meet twice a 
month and the members were to deposit an amount of grain according to 
their wealth. During the twenty-four annual meetings the rich were to 
deposit twenty-four dan of grain and the poor no less than 2.4 dan. 
This grain was stored at a place large enough to hold all the grain. 
The aim of the association granary was also not primarily relief for 
the poor. The intention was that households which had surplus grain 
to store should do so under mutual supervision which would help to 
promote such storage better than if they had been left to store grain 
privately. The contents of the association granaries were to be 
reported to the officials and if they were not properly stocked the 
officials were to reprimand the administrators of the granaries who
q qwere to be wealthy and honest local men.
The xiang-yue was the administrative unit for the distribution of 
grain. Each xiang-yue was to draw up a register in which the people 
entitled to receive grain were divided into four groups according to 
their wealth. The conditions or the amount to be loaned to the 
members of each group were different (from poor to rich: fie, fang,
di, she). The officials were to calculate the amount of grain needed 
for each group and regulate the amount to be loaned to each group 
according to the stocks; the households were then issued certificates 
stipulating the amount they could borrow. The people were to mutually 
guarantee the transactions; the basic group was to be ten people with 
different surnames. If such groups did not function properly then the 
jia-leader and i/we-director would guarantee and make up any arrears in 
repayments. The grain was issued, apparently from the district or 
subdistrict granaries, according to the nature of the loans in the
9 9 SZL 2/12-15.
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following order: she, fang, fie, and di. The maximum number of
persons to receive grain each day was 500.100
The clear intention of this organization was to secure an 
adequate supply of grain for all the inhabitants no matter what the 
size of the harvest and without depending too much on the storage 
capabilities of Individual households. In really bad years this 
organization was however not adequate to cater for the poorest members 
of the community. To relieve their plight Lii Kun ordered the 
distribution of rice gruel in the same way as when he served in 
Shandong. The gruel was to be provided either from private charity — 
for which some official pressure was applied — or from the public 
granaries. In the villages the grain for the gruel was to be provided 
from the she-granary. The gruel was to be distributed both to 
inhabitants of the district and to vagrants. It was to be cooked at as 
many places as possible in the districts, preferably in every village, 
but at least so that no one would have to go more than ten Z-i to be 
served. He gave directions for the establishment of facilities to 
prepare the gruel which were to be managed by the stronger of those 
asking to be fed, a form of local self-government. Management 
included registrars to keep records of all the people to whom food was 
distributed.101
4. J/ze-granaries in Jinan
The s/ze-granaries in Jinan were in some cases called z/'i-granaries, 
a fact which supports the view of Hoshi Ayao. According to the 
founder of the yi-granaries in Xintai District, Magistrate Wang Ying- 
xiu, these granaries followed the tradition of the Sui and Tang 
dynasties, so he failed to notice the change in terminology of later 
Tang and Song. The z/t-granaries were introduced in 1618 and the 
people of Xintai District willingly provided the grain for them since 
public funds were made available to pay for it. From the people's 
point of view they could then use the grain which they would in any 
case prefer to store as collateral for loans from the district
10 0Ibid. 2/25-26.
Ibid. 2/41-46.1 o 1
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treasury. There was however resistance among the elders and the yue- 
leaders to building storage granaries. They suggested that the grain 
should be distributed for storage among the people but this was 
rejected by Wang Ying-xiu. The twenty-five bao which in Xintai were 
equal to the ti-gia were divided into five areas (qu) each with five 
bao. The district town had one granary for the ten bao closest to the 
town and three granaries were established outside for the bao along 
the southeastern road, the southwestern road and the northwestern road 
respectively.102
Storage in private houses was however practised in some districts. 
Y^-granaries were established in Zhanhua District in 1588 but with no 
fixed buildings. In the district town the grain was stored in public 
buildings, while in the villages it was stored in the private homes 
where this was most convenient. The total amount of stored grain was 
at the outset of 1588 or shortly after over 1,000 dan. 103 Zichuan 
District established bao-chz-granaries in 1591 by borrowing 2,070 dan 
of grain from the emergency granary to be the basic stock of the new 
granary system. Each of the xiang-xue directors was ordered to store 
twenty-two dan or a total of 2,046 dan. It is not clear whether this 
was in addition to the grain borrowed from the emergency granary. The 
figures are so suspiciously close to each other as to suggest that it 
was the same grain. However the district town had a bao-chi-granary 
administered by four elders as part of this system. The total storage 
was in 1603 — at least on the books — 11,358.5 dan. The real figure 
may have been lower, as there had been considerable cheating.104
It is possible that s/ze-granaries were constructed in each xiang- 
yue in some districts, but the evidence is inconclusive. She- 
granaries were according to the 1837 edition of the Linyi gazetteer 
established in 1590 at eighty-three places in conjunction with the 
xiang-yue.105 The 1673 Lijin gazetteer reported that there had been 
six bao-chi-granaries in the district town and fifty-three in the 
xiang. This may refer to the Wan-li period.106 The information from
102 Xintai xian-zhi 1659/6/24-25.
103 Zhanhua xian-zhi 1619/2/27.
104 Zichuan xian-zhi 1602/19/1.
105 Linyi xian-zhi 1839/3/16.
106 Ligin xian-zhi 1673/2/4.
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Lhosc two districts docs not allow us to make any estimate as to the 
construction of granaries in the xiang-yue. The impression I get from 
reading Lii Kun is that the local self-government participation in his 
general welfare system was as much a question of the organization as 
of the actual provision of storage room, although he does mention that 
the she-granaries needed supervision by officials to check the 
presence of the stock.107
The operation of the granaries in Xincheng District may have been 
organized along the lines suggested by Lii Kun. In 1587 Magistrate 
Zhao Wen-bing established an ever-normal granary to store over 10,400 
dan of grain. The grain was sold in bad years to reduce the price and 
then bought in good years to increase the price. This information is 
included in the commemoration tablet for Zhao Wen-bing as the 
introduction to one of its ten sections. The section then continues 
in small type: 'Stored grain and established yue' and goes on to
describe the distribution of grain in spring, its return in autumn 
with an interest of 20% and how the amount loaned to a person should 
be according to his wealth so there would be no problems with repay­
ment.108 The granary established at Xincheng in 1587 is referred to 
in the section on granaries of the same edition as a bao-chi- 
granary.109 This term was apparently then used for an ever-normal 
granary which at the same time functioned as a central storage for the 
grain distributed and collected annually through the x'iang-yue. This 
system appears to have been identical with the one used in Zichuan, 
with one bao~chi-granary and additional storage in each xiang-yue.
The most common system seems to have been that described in 
Xintai and the fact that it was adopted in that district in 1618 
suggests that it was regarded as the most effective. A few granaries 
spread over the district would to some extent have solved the problem 
of distance without sacrificing the benefits of effective control 
which would have been difficult to exercise over granaries in each 
xiccng-yue. In Pingyin District one yi-granary was established in 1585
107 SZL 2/30.
108 Xincheng xian-zhi 1693/12/17. The tablet was composed at the 
initiative of elders, i/wö-leaders and deputies, 200 in all.
Ibid. 2/6.1 0 9
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in the district town and she-granaries were established in 1589 in 
three market towns ((Han).110 Ten she-granaries were established in 
Putai District in 1590 and they were followed in 1591 by a yi-granary. 
An example of the location of a s/ze-granary in that district is Yizi 
[xiang-\yue in Liting village on the eastern road. So they were out 
in the villages but with several xiang-yue per granary. The 
functional difference between the z/^-granary and s/ze-granaries in 
Putai was that the yi-granary was established with over 1,000 dan of 
grain to assist poor scholars who could not pass the provincial 
examination, to support respectable young people of good family (fu~ 
shi-min) while they grew up, and to pay for marriage and funeral 
expenses. This function of the yi-granary arouses the suspicion that 
it may have been privately established for the benefit of the off­
spring of well-established households , but it was in fact established 
by the magistrate, so it was part of the official system. The she- 
ganaries each with over 1,000 dan were to assist when there was a 
grain shortage and also in the education of youngsters in the she.* 111
Zhangqiu District was divided into thirty she each with a bao~ 
chi-granary which in 1596 was to hold no less than 400-500 dan of 
grain. The grain was distributed in spring and returned in autumn and 
the granaries were under the control of the gong-zheng.112 The 
section on granaries in the 1596 gazetteer also lists over thirty yi- 
granaries which had been established in 1589 for relief purposes.
The coincidence of these numbers suggests that the two kinds of 
granaries were based upon the same organization and may even to some 
extent have used common facilities, but a distinction was made between 
them from an institutional and functional point of view. Bao-ohi- 
granaries were finally established in Jiyang District in 1602 but no 
details are provided.114
110 Ping yuan xian-zhi 1590/1/7.
111 Putai xian-zhi 4/8, 11/16.
112 Zhangqiu xian-zhi 1596/14/47.
113 Ibid. 21-74.
114 Jiyang xian-zhi 1679/2/8.
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CONCLUSION *
The welfare organizations described above show many variations in 
terminology. The bao~chi-granaries were very similar to the she- 
granaries but may have had an element of ever-normal granary to 
justify them as a special category. The z/i-granaries are in most 
cases identical to the s/ze-granaries, which proves Hoshi's point, but 
in one case the z/Z-granary was a special category when it was used to 
support proper education and ceremonies in families which could not 
afford to conduct these according to their social standing.
The fate of the relief granary systems during the Ming dynasty 
seems to have been that they functioned relatively well in a locality 
only for relatively short periods, as shown by the constant 
reorganizations ordered by the government and recorded in local 
gazetteers. This may however be deceptive as we are dealing with 
time-spans which might have appeared to be long in the lives of 
contemporaries. Even modern societies cannot really complain if some 
measures to prevent excessive misery among the people can work 
effectively only for a decade or two before they have to be adjusted 
or re-invigorated. In the Chinese society of the sixteenth century it 
was not a bad achievement that these relief organizations could have 
been instituted with some degree of uniformity and within a relatively 
short period of time. It would have been a surprise if they had 
lasted for very long. The problem was that the bureaucracy apparently 
did not have the capacity to make the necessary adjustments whenever 
the need arose.
The tendency of the relief organizations in the sixteenth century 
was a reversal of the policy from 1440 onwards: that is towards
increased reliance upon local self-government for management. They 
were like other self-government systems initiated by the officials 
and was under their constant supervision. This supervision may have 
been closer than had been the case for local self-government in the 
earlier days of the dynasty. The granaries were introduced together 
with the xiang-yue and bao-jia of which they were often an integral 
part. The traditional self-government systems of li-gia and Zi-elders 
could no longer be relied upon to support such relief organizations. 
This is fully evident in Jinan and is a strong indication that the
* General conclusion see p p . 19 ff.
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li-jia oven before its more or less complete demise with the 
introduction of the Single Whip had ceased to be an effective 
community organization.
The welfare granaries suffered both from local self-government 
and official involvement. There are several instances where the 
stock of the granaries was not maintained because people did not 
repay the loans or the grain was improperly loaned to wealthy house­
holds who also defaulted. The clerks and other personnel in the yamen 
also used the stock of the granaries for their personal benefit.115 
Such dishonesty contributed to the decline of the welfare granaries. 
This decline was probably accompanied by a decline in the role of the 
xzang-yue, so the conclusion to be drawn from these experiments must 
be that the local self-government principle was still useful in the 
sixteenth century but the conditions at that time were no better than 
earlier in the dynasty for prolonged success.
1 1 5 Zichuccn xian-zh'i 1602/19/2 Xincheng xian-zhi 1693/12/17.
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APPENDIX I
Li-jia in Jinan Prefecture
Early Ming Jia-Jing1 Late Ming Notes
Binzhou 78 78 78 1583/1/7, 1/35
Changqing 41 44 1835/1/2
Changshan 63
Deping 40? 41 1796/2/14
Dezhou 20? 34 1576/1/?
Feicheng 32
Haifeng 25 43 43 1670/2/10
Jiyang 40
Laiwu 30 40 42 1673/2/16
Leling 56 56 56 1762/1/65
Lieheng 98 98 1640/3/16
Lij in 34 40 40 1673/4/1
Linyi 32
Lingxian 32 32 32 1673/3/1
Pingyuan 46 46 46 1590/1/20
Putai 63 59 59 1592/5/4
Qidong 46 55 55 1685/1/6, 1617/6/1-2
Qihe 27
Qingcheng 33 33 33 1612/1/33
Shanghe 58 68 68 1586/1/2
Taian 97 97 1671/1/1
Wuding 114 98 98 1588/2/1
Xincheng 42 45 45 1693/1/3
Xintai2 21 21 25 1784/2/1, 1659/1/7
Yangxin 70 70 Wuding zhou-zhi 1588/15
Yucheng 56
Zhanhua 48 24 24 1619/1/4
Zhangqiu 103 103 103 1596/1/4-5, 14/96
Zichuan 60 63 60 1602/1/2
Zouping 57
1 Hou-hu-zhi 2/52.
2 The 1■i.-j'ia in Xintai was called bao. In 1556 the 21 bao were
combined to 5 bao on the initiative of a local man. They were divided 
again in early Wan-li into 21 bao and four more bao were added in 
1582. Xintai xian-shi 1784/2/1, 16/6.
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APPENDIX II
Commutation of Transferred Revenue Summer Taxes in Taels1
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Licheng 1.2 1.6 0.75 1.0
Zhangqiu 1.2 1.6 0.75 0.8
Qihe 1.2 1.6 0.75 0.8
Changqing 1.2 1.6 0.75 0.8
Linyi 1.6 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.0 0.8
Zichuan 1.2 1.6 0.7(5) 0.8
Yucheng 1.2 1.6 0.8 0.8
Changshan 1.2 0.8
Zouping 0.75 0.8 1.0 0.8
Feicheng 1.2 0.75 0.8
Xincheng
Qidong 1.2
1.6 1.0 0.8
0.8
Jiyang
Lingxian
1.2 0.8
0.8
Wuding 1.2 1.6 0.75 0.8 1.0
Yangxin 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.8
Shanghe 
Haifeng
1.2
0. 75 1.0
0.8 0.8
Leling 1.2 0.8 0.8
Dezhou 1.2 0.8
Deping 1.2 0.8
Pingyuan 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.1 0.8
Taian 1.2 0.75 0.8
Xintai 0. 75 0.8
Laiwu 0.75
Binzhou
Putai 0.7(5)
1.0
0.8
1.1 0.8
Zhanhua 0.7(5) 0.8
Lij in 
Qingcheng 1.2 0.75
1.0
0.8
0.8
I: Three granaries in Baoan Subprefecture in northwestern Beizhili. 
II: Pasturage Granary probably in northern Beizhili.
Ill: Guangying Granary in Baoding Prefecture in southern Beizhili.
IV: Gusheng Horse Administration Granaries in northeastern Beizhili.
V: Dezhou Granary in northern Jinan Prefecture.
VI: Office of Provisions (Jiu-cu-mian-ju), Peking.
VII: Court of Imperial Entertainment, Peking.
VIII: Tianjin Granary in eastern Beizhili.
IX: Xunxiang Battalion in Beizhili.
l SDJHL 1/1-46.
A P P E N D I X  III
Population figures
H o u s e h o l d s Ding P e r s o n s S o u r c e
J i n a n  (1533) 239 ,l*+3 2 , 1 02 ,9 3 5 1
B i n z h o u  ( 1 5 8 3 ) 1 6 ,61+1 " 3 7 , 9 1 2 1 5 8 3 / 2 / 3 8
C h a n g q i n g  (Ming) 1+8,335 181+5/5/2
C h a n g s h a n
D e p i n g  (155 6) 6 , 9 7 7 1 7 9 6 / 3 / 2
(1 58 7) l*+,2 6 8 " 1 7 9 6 / 3 / 2
D e z h o u  (1 57 3) 8 , 8 8 7 ” 5 0 , 1 3 0 1 5 7 6 / 3 / 1
F e i c h e n g
H a i f eng (15 8 l ) 2 2 , 6 9 0 1 6 7 0 / 8 / 1
J i y a n g  ( W a n - l i ) 3 9 , 8 0 2 1 7 6 5 / 3 / 1
L a i v u  (1596) 5 , 8 2 9 5 1 , 8 6 1 1673 A/i
L e l i n g  ( L o n g - q i n g ) li+, U 92 2 3 , 6 9 9 1 7 6 2 /2 /1+2
(W a n - 1 i ) 2 *+ ,5 1 *+” 3 1 , 7 7 9 1 7 6 2 /2 / 1+2
L i c h e n g  (l6*+0 ) 7 0 , 7 2 2 l 6 *+0 / 5 / 2
Li j in (157 2 ) 6 , 5 0 0 2 5 , 3 3 3 1 6 7  3 /*+ /I
(1596) 2 1 , 2 3 3 ” 23,27*+ 1 6 7  3 /*+ /I
L i n y  i
L i n g x i a n
P i n g y u a n  (15*+1) 5 , 5 3 5 ” • 5 1 , 6 3 8 1 5 9 0 /1 / 1 8
P u t a i  ( 1 5 6 7  ) 8 , 3 3 5 1 0 , 8 5 0 1592/1+/1
(c. 1 5 8 6 ) lU ,6 5 *+" 1*+ ,675 1 5 9 2 /U/l
Qi d on g  (1 55 1) 1 1 ,3 *+0 " 1 0 1 , 2 9 0 1617/15/*+
Qihe .
Q i n g c h e n g  (l 6l2 ) 2 2 , 6 8 1 I 6 1 2 /I/II
S h a n g h e  ( 1 5 8 7  ) 11,31*+" 1 2 3 , 9 8 6 1 5 8 6 / 3 / 3
T a i a n  (l603) 7 1 , 3 2 5 1 6 7 1 /2 / 8
W u d i n g  ( 1 5 8 8  ) 6 2 , 7 7 0 1 3 2 , 6 5 0 1 5 8 8 / 5 / 1
X i n c h e n g  (1 5*+ 3 ) 6 , 3 7 2 " 5 3 , 2 3 0 1 6 9 3 / 3 / 2
(157 8) 1 3 , 7 5 1 1 6 9 3 / 3 / 2
X i n t a i  ( W a n - l i ) 1 0 , 1 8 2 1 6 5 9 / 3 / 1
Y a n g x i n  (1 5 97  ) 1 1 , 5 *+6 " 38-,871 1682/3/*+
Y u c h e n g  (l at e  M i n g ) 5 5 , 3 6 8 1 8 0 8 / 5 / 1
Z h a n h u a
Z h a n g q i u  (c. 15 3 0) 1 3 ,1 7 0 " 1 5 9 6 / 3 / 9
Z i c h u a n  (1553) 1 1 , 0 5 1 1 0 7 , 7 7 0 1 6 0 2 /1 2 / 1
(1 6 0 2 ) 9 ,8 0 U" 1 6 0 2 /1 2 / 1
Z o u p i n g  ( J i a - j i n g ) 8 , 2 3 5 ” m e n *+5,783 1 6 6 0 / 3 / 1
w o m e n  2 2 ,6 U 7
l609- 1 9 , 0 7 7 1 6 6 0 / 3 / 1
1 Shandong tong-zhz 1533/8/20
A P P E N D I X  III (CONT.)
A definitive estimate of the population figure for Jinan 
Prefecture in the period 1550-1600 cannot he made on the basis of 
these figures. However in the fifteen subprefectures and districts 
for which households figures (") are available the average number 
of households is over 12,000. This suggests that the average number 
of households per district in the whole prefecture may have been 
well over ten thousands. With an average size of the households at 
eight to ten persons the total population of the prefecture may 
have been three millions or more. This figure is not incompatible 
with the 1533 figure for which there may have been some 
underregistration.
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dou-eheng-hu o j  y- gui ^ j f
d o u - ji  Sj- he-zong yJj
du dftjl heng-tu  j g
du-tu  J$j hu jz
d u i- fe n - s i  j j  j ] h u - tie  jz
e-ban-gong-fei fjj* ^ hu-zhang jz
e -zh i  j j hua-hu j
fang hua-rong-di ^  i*L
fang-zheng - fj f  j £ hui C9
fe i - y in  j j j hui-eang y^r- Jfn 
* &
fen -shou-fen -g  ie  j j  ffjjj. huo-fu
f u r f f gi-guan  J |
fu~hu 'J? j z g i - l in g  ^
fu - lu  f f j g ia  ip
fu-ma j y  ^ gia-nu
fu -sh i-m in  -f;
V J
gia-shou ^  §
fu -y i-huang-ce  ^  f t f j g ia -sh o u -za o -li  ^  ^  ^
fu -y i-q u a n - shu gia-zhang  ip ^
g ong-fe i jjj giang  g
gong-shou ^  ^ Jiangxi c h a i-y i s h i- y i
gong-tong \u[ yz&jUZ.% %
gong-ying-yin  '£ jiao-fu$£}
gong-yong-yin '£  /£ ^ Jiao-min pang-wen
gong-zheng '£  j f g ie -d i- z a o - l i  ffjfa. ^
gong-zheng Zao-ren )JX y ( j /^ g ie 3 fangs d i3 she p jj £
guan-eha j?  ^ gie-hu  j z
guan-di gie-ren-g i-song-gong-w en-fu
g u a n -li-zh e -fen g i 3ZLit
guan-tian >~j£ jjrj gin
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jin-.-.hon
j in - s h i  (jjj d r
jing-shan
j iu -c e
ju -ren
jun  Jgj?
C un-gong-fu P?] £. J~^
jun-men ip
gun-ping  ^
jun-yao JpJ ^
kan-cha i-fu  -jr^ ^
ka n -jia n -jia -sh o u  ^  e p  ^
kan-ku J%
k u -z i ftp d~
kuaz-shou J-
lao-ven
u %
U  t
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l i -g u i  
li~Cza
l i - g ia  gong-fe i ^  fjj
I z - jza - la o  ip y f e
Lz-gza-lun Q  tg  
l i -g ia -y in  
l i- la o -re n  ij?  
ii-m u  rj^ __ 
l i - p a i  i £  ^  
l i - s h e  v g
l i-s h u  dL 
l i - z a i  ^ g
li-zhang  ^Lpc. 
li-zh en g  J C
liang-zhang  j- i
liao -yzn  
lii-sh i gpd
Lil-shi-xiang-yue  ^  ^  ^
lii-xu
ma-oao Jß  ^  
ma-fu
m a-jia ^  l ip
ma~zheng Jp ß A j 
men
men-yin ^  pi
men-zi j r
m in  ^
min-bing fe-
m in-di
m in-tian  it]
ming-biccn pjj ^
Ming-lun Ofl 
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m u-chai-yin s f ^ ^ J i f c  
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pai ^  
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L i Kai-xian  ^ (Wan Gong) ^  <^r
L i-s h i Peng-cheng ^
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Li Xing i ! t {/an<7 Guo-sheng 31
Liang Meng-long J jl (Wang Ye-shan) JE. ;i-»
Liangzou Msn^ J iu -y i  ^
Liaodong {/ang- Qi J  j>/r
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Wang Ye j£> Yu S h e n -x in g  Y j , j j ß  ^
(Wang Qiao) ^ Zhang Huang ^
Wang Y in g - j ia o  j £ .  i v ^ j  ß ^ _ Zhang J ia n
Wang Y in g -q ia n  J E , Zhang Q i-cheng j j f c  ^ > ^ 2
Wang Zong-mu j £  ' j f t Z /z a c  Da-gang  ^
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Xie J in  ^ Z /zao  Y Y n^
Xu J ie  j l tg (Zhao Zuo-shan)  / i - *
Xunxiang  ^ Zheng R u -b i y f c  J'jq
Yanzhou  ^  vty~j Zheng de  J P
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Y izhou  i;(j Zhu X i $ L  Jfrrf v ^ - \
Y izhou  ^  ,^/j Zhucheng ^  ^
BIBLIOGRAPHY
JINAN GAZETTEERS
Binzhou zh i fS . +/J ^  1583
Binzhou z h i  y'-Q I / j  ^  1701
Chongqing x ia n -z h i  y ^  ^  1833-35
Chang sheen x ia n -z h i  ^  1716
Deping x ia n -z h i  1796
Dezhou z h i Jhj ^  1576
Dezhou z h i  t*| ^  1673
Feicheng x ia n -z h i  1672
Haifeng x ia n -z h i  y^ t 1670
Jinan  fu - z h i  1^ )  \  1692
Jinan  fu - z h i  ^  j f f  ^  1839
Jiyang  x ia n -z h i  £  1765
Laiwu x ia n -z h i  ^  ^  1673
L e lin g  x ia n -z h i  1762
Licheng x ia n -z h i  ^  1640
L i j i n  x ia n -z h i  ^ ^  1673
L in y i x ia n -z h i  Sft? 1837
Lingxian z h i  1673
L ingxian  z h i 7^  1845
Pingyuan x ia n -z h i  Ip 1590
Ping yuan x ia n -z h i  ^  A£, 1749
P uta i x ia n -z h i  ^  1592
229
'cr>
ir
Putai xian-zhi y}fi' ^
Qidong xian-zhi ^
Qidong xian-zhi ft ^
Qihe xian-zhi fjj* y£j ifjt^ 
Qingoheng xian-zhi . ^ p
Shanghe xian-zhi p*J 
Shanghe xian-zhi 
Taian zhou-zhi
Taian fu-zhi jjfc. Zfc Jff ^
Wuding zhou-zhi t£ ^  V ?  j 
Wuding fu-zhi 7 ^ *
Xincheng xian-zhi ^  ^
Xintai xian-zhi -^/r
Xintai xian-zhi ^=-
Yangxin xian-zhi ^
Yuoheng xian-zhi 
Zhanhua xian-zhi yfc^
Zhangqiu xian-zhi ^
Z hangqiu xian-zhi ~ r p  j b
Ziohuan xian-zhi j/J ^
Zichuan xian-zhi yjjj J'j ij^ ^
Zouping xian-zhi $  f
1763
1617
1685
1673
1612
1586
1836
1670 (1603) 
1760 
1588 
1759 
1693 
1659 
1785 
1682 
1808 
1619 
1596 
1691 
1602 
1687 
1660
OTHER SOURCES
Ba-bian jing-shi lei-zuan , / V .  ^ , ^ 7  jjh ^  (1626.
1966 reprint).
Baoding fu-zhi 'lL_ 1607.
Taipei
230
Da-Ming h u i-d ia n  (1587 . T a i p e i  1963 r e p r i n t ) .
Da-xue y a n -y i-b u  ^  . . .  (1487. T a i p e i  1 9 7 6
r e p r i n t )  ^  ^  ^
Ge-duan-su-gong w en-gi | |  JC (1 5 8 2 ) .  By Ge
S h o u - l i .
Gu-cheng-shan-guan w en-gi ^  (1 6 0 7 ) .  By Yu
S h e n - x in g .
Guo-chao d ia n -h u i  j=5j  ^ (1601 . T a i p e i  1965 r e p r i n t ) .
H ou-hu-zhi 5 ^  (1 6 1 1 ) .
Huang-chao g in g -s h i  wen-bian jtf- j J -  (1 8 8 7 ) .
Huang-Ming z h i-s h u  f?y^  /£,! (1579 . T a i p e i  r e p r i n t  n . d . ) .
J in g - lü e  fu -g u o  yao-b ian  ( T a ip e i  r e p r i n t
o f  W a n - l i  e d i t i o n . )  By Song Y in g -c h a n g .
L i  K a i-x ia n  g i  j3j^ ( P r e f a c e  1556. S hangha i  1959
e d i t i o n ) .
M ing-hui-yao ^  (1887. T a i p e i  1963 e d i t i o n ) .
M ing-lü  g i - g ie  f u - l i  ^  ^  (16*L0. T a i p e i
r e p r i n t  o f  1908 r e p r i n t ) .
M ing-shi (1736. P e k in g  1974 e d i t i o n ) .
M ing-shi-Zu  ^  ( T a i p e i  1963-1968  r e p r i n t ) .
Qing-chao lu n -ce  le i-b ia r i. Z h en g -zh ir lim  ~W^}~ ^
(Quoted i n  L ia n g ,  1 9 5 7 ) .
Shandong g in g -h u i- lu  /l* (1 5 7 1 ) .
Shandong to n g -zh i iL  ^
Shandong to n g -zh i
Shandong to n g -zh i
Tangyi x ia n -z h i %
rb (1 5 3 3 ) .
b (1 6 7 8 ) .
£ (1 9 1 1 ) .
(1593. 1871 e d i t i o n ) .
z b (1 7 1 0 ) .
231
Tu-shu-bian
lei-zuan).
(1613. Quoted from Ba-bian jing-shi
MODERN SECONDARY LITERATURE
Broman, Sven, Studies on the Chou Li, (Stockholm, 1961).
Brunnert, H.S., and V.V. Hagelstrom, Present Day Political 
Organization of China, (Shanghai, 1912).
Cartier, Michel et Pierre-ßtienne Will, "Demographie et institutions 
en Chine: Contribution a l ’analyse des recensements de l’epoque
imperiale (2 ap. J.-C. - 1750)", Annates de Demographie Historique 
(1971), 165-235.
Cartier, Michel, Une Reforme Locale en Chine au XVIe Siede. Hai Rui 
ä Chun3 an 1558-1562, (Paris - La Haye, 1973).
Ch’ü T ’ung-tsu, Local Government in China under the Ch3 ing, (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1962).
Elmquist, Paul Oscar, Rural Control in Early Modem China {Ph.D thesis, 
Harvard University, 1963).
Franke, Herbert, and Rolf Trauzettel, Das Chinesische Kaiserreich. 
Fischer Weltgeschichte vol. 19 (Frankfurt, 1968).
Franke, Wolfgang, An Introduction to the Sources of Ming History,
(Kuala Lumpur-Singapore, 1968).
Franke, Wolfgang, "Material aus Gesammelten Schriften (pieh-chi) als 
Quelle für Lokalgeschichte. Bemerkungen zu einer Untersuchung von 
Michel Cartier", OE 21 (1974), 191-198.
Franke, Wolfgang, "Zur Grundsteuer in China während der Ming
Dynastie", Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 56 
(1953), 93-103.
Friese, Heinz, Das Dienstleistungs-Sy stem der Ming Zeit (1368-1644), 
(Hamburg, 1959).
Goodrich, L. Carrington, and Chaoying Fang, eds., Dictionary of Ming 
Biography, 2 vols., (New York and London, 1976).
Grimm, Tilemann, Erziehung und Politik im konfuzianischen China der 
Ming 7,eit (1368-1644), (Hamburg, 1960).
Guo-li Zhong-yang Tu-shu-guan /^ j vj? J^j gfc
Ming-ren chuan-ji zi-liao suo-yin, 2 vols.,
•/jjf Ü  ' f  fi\ , (Taipei, 1965-1966).
M /vif #£,
232
Ho, Ping-ti, Studies on the Population of China. 1368-1953, (Cambridge, 
Mass., J959).
lloshi Ayao ^  ~}r- > "Mindai no yobisö to shasO", <f)
i f i  ijfp d  > Töyoshi kenkyu 18 (1959), 117-137.
Hoshi Ayao TvL > Mindai soun no kenkyu &JJ ^
^9 ’ T^oky°J 1963)*
Huang, Ray, Taxation and Governmental Finance in Sixteenth-Century 
Ming China, (Cambridge, 1974).
Hsiao Kung-chuan, Rural China. Imperial Control in the Nineteenth 
Century, (Seattle, 1960).
Hucker, Charles 0., "Governmental Organization of the Ming Dynasty", 
HJAS 21 (1958), 1-66.
Iwami Hiroshi ^  ^  , "Kasei nenkan no rikisa ni tsuite"
■jfe i f  fa] *f) / j  (nz j  < )  C  , in Tamura hakase shoju  
toyoshi ronso, (Kyoto, 1958), pp.39-56.
Iwami Hiroshi yfc Qj > "'Santo keikairoku’ ni tsuite" /-I*
^  t ^ £  , in Shimizu hakase tsuito kinen
Mindaishi ronso, (Tokyo, 1962), pp.197-220.
Kataoka Shibako /fp ^  , "Kahoku no tochi shoyü to ichijö
benpö" d b P&j $  d  —  in Shimizu
hakase tsuito kinen Mindaishi ronso, (Tokyo, 1962), pp.139-163.
Kawakatsu Mamoru / ij , "Mindai no kishöku ni tsuite"
l1/j ^  d? nt Ls? n U  L » Föyöshi Kenkyu 33.3 (1974),
48-71 J 7
Kuribayashi Nobuo ci| 7^.
rikösei" ü/-) ^  *7 /**_ ff (L ^
shigaku ronshu 4 (1955), 365-400.
'Mindai koki no noson to 
, Töyo
Kuribayashi Nobuo fj? Tv » Rikosei no kenkyu
f-'J 9  7/jf ‘jL  ’ (T°ky°> T971)-
Legge, James, T/ze Chinese Classics, 3 vols., (Hongkong-London, 1865).
Li Guang-bi ^  ^  ^  , Ming-chao shi-lüe Lift ifijf at ,
(Hubei, 1957). ^
Li Jian-nong j ^  , Song-Yuan-Ming ging-ji-shi-gao ^
öjÜ &  ^  <£_ ^  * (Peking’ 1957)'
Liang Fang-zhong > Ming-dai liang-zhang zhi-du
f f  k  H  $ _  . (Shanghai, 1957).
233
Liang Fang-zhong -j j  -j»L’
wi -ix, — i ‘%
"Ming-dai
(1952), 15-49. >ik £p ^
yi-tiao-binn-fa nian-biao",
, Ling-nan xue-bao 12.1
Littrup, Leif, "The Early Single Whip in Shandong, 1550-1570", Papers 
on Far Eastern History 15 (1977), 63-95.
Littrup, Leif, "The Yellow Registers of the Ming Dynasty — Translation 
from the Wan-li Da-Ming Hui-dian", Papers on Far Eastern History 
16 (1977), 67-106.
Myers, Ramon H., The Chinese Peasant Economy. Agricultural
Development in Hopei and Shantung_, 1890-1949, (Cambridge, Mass., 
1970).
Nishijima Sadao H2? ^  , "Mindai ni okeru momen no fukyü
ni tsuite" &)\ ^  fa  O? Cf {> J& £  ,
Shigaku Zasshi 57 (1948), 193-214, 275-304.
Obata Tatsuo /Jx Jh% "Könan ni okeru riko no hensei
ni tsuite" <f) f Z f t  i f  Z, £  f  O  M /  A t  7  ( S C
Shirin 39.2 (1956), 89-123. 1 ”  ^  ^ ^  1 7 0
Parsons, James B., "The Ming Dynasty Bureaucracy", in Charles 0.
Hucker, ed., Chinese Government in Ming Times, (New York and 
London, 1969), pp.175-227.
Sakai Tadao , Chügoku zensho no kenkyü ^  ^
o) A* (Tokyo> 1961>-
Schurmann, Herbert Franz, Economic Structure of the Yuan Dynasty, 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1956).
Shimizu Morimitsu , "Chügoku no göson töchi to
sonraku" f  J p  f f ij j  ^  ^  y% <L ’ in Shakoi
koseishi taikei ^  ’ v* 2’ pt* 2j (Toky°>
Tani Mitsutaka > Mindai basei no kenkyü QJj
^  » (Kyoto, 1972).
Taniguchi Kikuo % fl , "Mindai Kahoku ni okeru
ginsa seiritsu no ichi kenkyü — Santo no mongin seiritsu o chüshin
ni shite" o jj f t  z i t  if*  i f  3 M lk  jfk  A l  O — Z y  aL
— - iU <r? /*} iL £. csz. U Z » Töyoshi
Kenkyü 20.3 (1961), 1-33.
Taniguchi Kikuo CZ Afeb , "Mindai Kahoku no daiko ni
tsuite" 'ft ^  J (l 7^ ^  (/Z. C )  £  , Töyoshi
Kenkyü 21 (1969) , ^ 74-505.
234
Taniguchi Kiktio L2 P ß j  /fcjfc. , "Kuribayashi Nobuo, Rikosei
no kenkyü" ^  & 3L J &  W %'\ n jjf 'i7 > T oyosh i Kenkyü
31.2 (1972), 116-121. 1 J 1 JLj
The Times Atlas of China, (London, 1974).
Tsurumi Naohiro 01 Hj % %A "Mindai no kireiko ni tsuite"
Q/j 'He *0 j z  ( ) £. , Tdyo gakuho 47.3
(1964), 35-64.  ^ ^ y
Wada Sei U] yj  ^ , Minshi Shokkashi yakuchü &)^
i r ^  S t  > 2 vols*> (Tokyo, 1957).
Wada Sei l£jf , Shina chihö gichi hattatsushi £<kj Z)
iH y& f x f  ^  , (Tokyo, 1949, reprinted Tokyo 1975 as
Chügoku chihö . . . ) .
Wang Lan-yin pjfy , "Ming-dai zhi she-xue" Pj^ / j f '  p f.
& P , Shi-da yue-kan 21 (1935), 42-102, 25 (1936), 63-129.
Weber, Max, The Religion of China. Confucianism and Taoism.
Translated and edited by Hans H. Gerth, (Glencoe, 111., 1951).
Wei Qing-yuan Jpj f p  , Ming-dai huang-ce zhi-du &U
m i  / t (Peking, 1961).
Wiens, Mi Chu, "Changes in the Fiscal and Rural Control Systems in the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries", Ming Studies 3 (1976), 53-69.
Wu Cheng-luo Jpe- y ^  , Zhong-guo du-liang-heng shi f f
’ <1937> Shanghai 1957).
Yamane Yukio lU ^  , "Jügo jüroku seiki Chügoku ni okeru
fueki rödösei no kaikaku" _/?> > «y- j i f  d f  ^
S> I S p  , Shigaku zasshi 60.11
(1951), 43-68. '
Yamane Yukio J-i ^  p f  , "Mindai richü no shokuseki ni kansuru
ichi kösatsu" P/j -/Y S. tf 0; ■% t,z PS —  & ib ’
Töhögaku 3 (1952), 79-87. v  ^  ^  "
Yamane Yukio ii-\ , Mindaishi kenkyü bunken mokuroku
Ni b  aL*? > (Tokyo> 1960)-
Yamane Yukio j f i  p fc  & , Nihon genson Mindai chihöshi denki
( T o k y o , PJ1 b  if  tG t •?/ ffj *
Yamane Yukio tU - f l k  % T L  , Mindai yöeki seido no tenkai U/j -if
M  T L  f ' J  )t_ v  %_f$A > ( T o k y o > 1 9 6 6 ) -
235
Ynn}r,> Martin C. , A Shiner,c Village. Taitouy Shan tung Province, (New 
York and London, 1945).
